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This thesis provides insight into how terrorist organizations exploit the 
information environment to achieve their objectives.  The study establishes an 
analytical IO framework, by integrating US military doctrine with a fundamental 
approach to IO theory.  The framework proves useful in examining the IO tools 
terrorists have assembled and how they implement them to influence their target 
audiences.  The thesis shows that terrorists are, indeed, naturally linked to the 
information environment by their nature and strategy.  Generally speaking, all 
terrorists employ IO tactically to enhance their operations.  However, many 
organizations have a profound understanding of the information environment and 
also have the ability to manipulate information to achieve their objectives. Since 
terrorist organizations are militarily weaker than the states they face and cannot 
rely on physical attacks to accomplish their goals, they must adopt an information 
strategy to achieve their objectives.   This thesis emphasizes three primary 
conclusions: first terrorist conduct violent attacks in the physical environment to 
enable operations in the information environment.  Second, terrorist integrate 
offensive and defensive IO to survive and appear legitimate to potential 
supporters and to the state.  Finally, terrorists intentionally target four different 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. TERRORISM – AN INFORMATION WAR. 
When US President George W. Bush declared war against terrorism, or 
more pointedly, against Al Qa’ida, the United States entered an obscure 
paradigm of conflict.  The terror organizations lurking in this paradigm are 
different from the conventional foes of our past and pose many asymmetric 
challenges for a nation accustomed to thinking about war as primarily inter-state 
conflict.  Most notably, America has found itself at war with a covert, illegal, non-
state actor with global reach.  Terrorist organizations are not constrained by 
moral or ethical rules and regularly ignore state and international laws governing 
warfare. Terrorists rely on secrecy to survive and often live underground, which 
make them very hard to find and destroy.  The fact that terrorists are non-state 
actors further adds to the difficulty the US faces in dealing with them. There are 
no state governments or authorities with which to negotiate or to hold 
accountable.  Additionally, terrorists employ a strategy of warfare very different 
from our own.  They cannot afford to fight a conventional attrition-based war, as 
we are accustomed, where the winning side in the conflict is the one who 
physically forces the other to capitulate.  Terrorist organizations would quickly 
become extinct employing such a strategy against a powerful nation.  Rather, 
terrorists fight an attrition-based war of the ‘will’.  They attempt to wear down the 
will of government leaders by terrorizing their populace. Albert Bandera suggests 
“terrorists try to exercise influence over targeted officials or nations through the 
intimidation of the public and the arousal of sympathy for the social or political 
causes they espouse” (Nacos, 1994, p.1).  Terrorism is a political and 
psychological weapon directed at targets that neither caused nor are able to 
solve the problem that motivates the terrorists.     
Usama bin Laden has waged such a psychological war of wills with the 
United States for nearly a decade.  Al Qa’ida is suspected of conducting several 
attacks against the US to include: Somalia in 1993, the 1993 World Trade Center 
bombing, the 1998 Embassy bombings in Africa, and the suicide boat attack 
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against the USS Cole in 2000. The attack on September 11th, however, perhaps 
illustrates this psychological strategy most clearly.  The nineteen radical Islamic 
men responsible for the devastation on September 11th were part of a covert 
organization with global reach and had been ‘riding the rails’ of American society 
for many months preparing for the attack on America.  Their very lives had 
become a deception: posing as students and businessmen.  This deceptive 
cover allowed them to live and work among us for months, gathering intelligence 
until the time came to act.  Early Tuesday morning, September 11th, 2001, they 
boarded four United and American Airlines passenger planes.  Armed with 
common grocery store box cutters, these men executed the bloodiest attack on 
American soil since the Civil War.  Yet, Usama Bin Laden’s main goal in 
undertaking the attack on September 11th was not merely to kill thousands of 
people.  Rather it was likely meant to send a message worldwide to millions of 
people and to influence their governments. Bruce Hoffman suggests that 
“terrorism may be seen as a violent act that is conceived specifically to attract 
attention and then, through the publicity it generates, to communicate a 
message” (Hoffman, 1998, p.131).  Bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa, the Declaration of 
the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders, describes 
the U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia as a catastrophe that has humiliating and 
debilitating effects on the Muslim people. Bin Laden writes, "Since God laid down 
the Arabian Peninsula, created its desert, and surrounded it with its seas, no 
calamity has ever befallen it like these Crusader hosts that have spread in it like 
locusts, crowing its soil, eating its fruits, and destroying its verdure” (Lewis,  
1998, p.14).   
On September 11th, 2001, Al Qa’ida attacked the World Trade Center and 
the Pentagon, and had planned to hit either the Capitol or the White House.  
These targets were likely selected to send a message to four primary audiences: 
the active, opposing, sympathetic and uncommitted. 
• The active audience: to Al Qa’ida supporters and active 
sympathizers, Usama bin Laden proclaimed that the US was 
vulnerable to attack.  His organization had succeeded in destroying 
the WTC and striking the Pentagon, the US military headquarters.  
3 
The attack was likely intended to rally Islamic support for Al Qa’ida, 
encouraging enlistment into their ranks and, in general, to bring all 
Islamic peoples to join in his Jihad against the US and other 
Western countries.   
• The opposing audience: Usama bin Laden’s message was likely 
intended to strike fear in the US populace, generating doubt in the 
ability of the government to safeguard them.  The attacks portrayed 
to the American public that despite all the government defenses—
the army, police force, and FBI—Americans will never be safe from 
attack. Once civilians feel unsafe in their own homes and 
workplaces, daily life is disrupted, causing considerable harm to 
personal and national morale.  
• The sympathetic audience:  Bin Laden’s message to the 
sympathetic audience was likely intended to rally other 
conservative Islamic state and non-state actors behind his Jihad 
against the US and Israel.  He likely intended to unify the extreme 
fundamentalist, while also pressuring the more liberal Islamist 
members into becoming more conservative. 
• The uncommitted audience: Additionally, the terror attacks sent a 
third message to international populace. To the rest of the world, 
bin Laden presented the attack as an example of his determination 
to achieve his political aims by any means and at any cost. The 
terror attack was intended to draw the attention of international 
public opinion to the conflict and bin Laden’s demands.   
 
Al Qa’ida’s psychological strategy likely intended to use all three of these 
audiences to pressure President Bush to withdraw US troops from Saudi soil and 
other Muslim-held lands. (Ganor, 2002).   This thesis further explores the 
relevance of the different audiences in chapter III. 
Al Qa’ida and other terrorist organizations bring an interesting toolkit to the 
fight that enables them to compete in what is essentially a battle of information: a 
battle that involves sending terrifying information to one audience, while at the 
same time seeking the sympathy and support from another. Although it is the 
violent physical act of the terrorist that captures our attention, it is the 
psychological influence in the information realm that gives the terrorist leverage.  
We believe terrorist organizations rely on the power of information to sway public 
attention and pressure decision makers to make changes favorable to the 
terrorists.  Dorothy Denning, author of Information Warfare and Security and 
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professor at the Naval Post Graduate School, suggests that terrorists are very 
adept at information warfare and often exploit emerging technology to leverage 
information (Denning, 1999, p.68).   
Making the claim that terrorists enhance their coercive power by 
manipulating the information environment, this thesis will provide insight into this 
phenomenon.  If the US is to combat terrorist organizations in the information 
environment, we must gain a better understanding of this toolkit that allows them 
to leverage information.  The US Department of Defense (DoD) has developed 
theory and doctrine relating to Information Operations (IO) and provides great 
insight into activities in the information domain.  US military units routinely 
employ IO against their adversaries.  The possibility that terrorist organizations 
also employ IO tools against our national interests is real and deserves additional 
analytical attention and increased public awareness. 
 
B. THESIS OVERVIEW—SCOPE OF THIS STUDY. 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore different terrorist organizations to 
determine how they employ Information Operations to achieve their objectives.  
In order to explore this phenomenon, the thesis takes the following path.  First, 
we examine key concepts to establish a general foundation for thinking about 
terrorism and Information Operations.  Next, we survey the Department of 
Defense’s approach to IO.  The Department of Defense provides valuable insight 
into the concept of IO through theoretical and doctrinal publications. Additionally 
we explore Edward Waltz’s theoretical perspective of the concept of Information 
Operations.  Although other theories exist in the literature, Waltz’s fundamental 
approach to the information environment provides a suitable framework for the 
purpose of this thesis.  Adapting Waltz’s framework to a series of terrorist case 
studies, we will provide a new framework illustrating how terrorists use 
Information Operations to achieve their objectives.  Finally, the thesis concludes 
with a synopsis of the evidence and a net assessment of the terrorists’ ability to 
leverage Information Operations to support campaigns of terror.  By exposing 
how terrorist employ Information Operations, we hope to help the United States 
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combat these asymmetric enemies in the information domain and reduce their 
influence and attacks. 
 
C. KEY CONCEPTS. 
Before beginning a study of how terrorist organizations employ Information 
Operations, we must first establish a basic foundation.  In particular four 
questions must be addressed. What are Information Operations?  What are 
some common misperceptions of Information Operations?  What is terrorism?  
Finally, why do terrorists use Information Operations?  The answers to these 
questions provide the reader a foundation to further explore IO theory and 
doctrine, and the approach terrorists take to exploit the information environment. 
 
1. What are Information Operations? 
There’s a war out there old friend- a world war.  And it’s not about who’s 
got the most bullets; it’s about who controls the information.  What we see 
and hear, how we work, what we think.  It’s all about information. 
        Cosmo 
 
The US Department of Defense offers two different approaches to 
operating in the information environment, which has resulted in a smorgasbord of 
different terminology.  Information Warfare (IW) is a concept consisting of six 
existing functional elements that are only employed during actual times of conflict 
or combat.  Information Operations (IO) is a concept consisting of two additional 
functional elements; however, IO is more comprehensive and is intended to be 
part of a strategic campaign conducted “throughout the full spectrum of conflict 
from peace to war and back to peace again” (Armistead, p.13).1  Since active 
terrorist organizations are continuously alternating between violent attacks and 
peaceful activities, their actions are better explained with a full-spectrum 
                                            
1 Joint and Army doctrine differ slightly on what elements belong in IO. The IO field has 
developed rapidly and it may take time for a common position to emerge. IW: Operations Security 
(OPSEC), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Military Deception, Electronic Warfare (EW) and 
Computer Network Operations (CNO), physical destruction; IO adds public affairs (PA) and civil-
military operations (CMO). 
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approach to IO.  Therefore, this thesis will use the term IO to explore terrorists’ 
actions in the information environment.  
The information revolution has ushered in advanced technology and new 
networking concepts that have changed the way we live and work in the world 
today.  In Edwin Armistead’s, Hard Reality of Soft Power, Dan Kuehl suggests 
that we live in what is called the Global Information Environment (GIE): an 
information fishbowl.  He writes, “the Global Information Environment has 
become a battle space in which technology is used to deliver influential content in 
order to shape perception, influence decisions, and control behavior” (Armistead, 
2002, p.4).  More and more of the world’s population are joining the GIE, creating 
a global hyper-sensitivity to information.  In a world where information is 
becoming increasingly important, Information Operations are become 
increasingly potent.  IO provides the means to leverage information, focusing on 
the ‘wetware’, the gray matter of the human brain where perceptions are formed 
and decisions are made.  From a military perspective IO enables a commander 
to gain an information advantage at decisive moments over his enemy.  With this 
information superiority, the commander can potentially exploit the enemy’s 
vulnerabilities, saving friendly lives and greatly influencing the outcome of the 
battle.  
In the preface to Winn Schwartau’s book Information Warfare, John Alger 
highlights the goals of Information Operations: “those actions intended to protect, 
exploit, corrupt, deny, or destroy information or information resources in order to 
gain a significant advantage, objective, or victory over an adversary” (Schwartau, 
1999).  Information Operations is a relatively new concept, although most of its 
elements are not new.  In fact, history is filled with examples of individual 
elements of IO being employed by skillful commanders.  During biblical times the 
Israeli leader, Joshua, defeated the well-fortified city of Ai, by employing 
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deception, psychological operations, and sound operations security.2  The US 
Army has in the last century routinely employed elements of IO.  From the 
Normandy Invasion in World War II to General Schwartzkopf’s famous left hook 
during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, psychological operations, deception, public 
and civil affairs, electronic warfare, and operations security have provided 
commanders valuable tools during many historical battles. Chapter II presents an 
example of US IO during the 1991 Persian Gulf War with Iraq.  In the past ten 
years information technology has made profound advances, creating powerful 
information systems and communication networks.  The US military has adapted 
this technology to create a new element of IO involving the use of computers and 
networks.   Computer Network Operations is the only new element of IO.  The 
thesis explores all of the elements of IO in detail in chapter II. 
The concept of IO integrates all of the above individual elements into one 
strategy to provide the commander an unprecedented synergistic tool, which 
allows him to gain information superiority over his adversary at decisive points 
during the battle.  Many of the IO tools do not rely upon advanced technology 
and are available to friend and foe alike.  Therefore, the better we understand the 
power of information to influence decisions and develop the tools to leverage 
information, the greater advantage we will have in future battles.   Concepts such 
as the Information Environment, Influence Operations, and the role of information 




                                            
2  In roughly 1200 BC, Joshua captured the city of Ai by means of deception, shortly after the 
fall of Jericho. After suffering a minor defeat in his first attempt at taking the city, Joshua devised 
a ruse that has been repeated countless times since: the feigned retreat.  Arraying the bulk of his 
host before the gates of Ai, Joshua offered battle, all the while hiding a goodly portion of his force 
to the rear of the city, out of sight. When the soldiers of Ai took the field and began battling his 
men, Joshua ordered a retreat designed to look as if it were a rout. When the exultant men of Ai 
came after them, Joshua’s hidden force emerged and stormed Ai, overwhelming the skeletal 
force left behind and seizing the city. As the news hit the men of Ai their charge faltered, and 
Joshua wheeled his force and pinned them between his men and the now-captured city. Their 
force in disarray, the men of Ai were slaughtered. (Handel, 1985, and Dunnigan and Nofi, 1995.) 
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2. What are Some Common Misperceptions of Information 
Operations? 
There are three common misperceptions many people have concerning 
Information Operations.  First, since the advent of the information revolution and 
advanced technology, IO is often equated to the use of advance technology.  
However, the use of advanced technology does not constitute IO, but rather 
reflects our military’s advanced state of modernization and sophistication.  
Chapter II gives an example in Somalia, when a technologically inferior foe, 
General Aideed, exploited the information environment to great effect.  Equipped 
with an understanding of the power of information, Aideed turned a military 
defeat into an information war win. Second, IO is often thought of as merely the 
employment of one of its functional elements. For example, psychological 
operations (PSYOP) or computer network operations (CNO) are often singled out 
as being IO.  While both are principle elements of the IO concept, when taken 
individually they do not adequately reflect the integration or strategy of IO.  
PSYOP leaflets and broadcasts, computer hacking, and network defense are all 
important elements of IO, but fail to individually create the full-spectrum synergy 
necessary to achieve information superiority.  Finally, a common statement made 
about IO is: “IO is nothing new.”   As stated earlier, the principle elements of IO 
have existed since Biblical times; however, “What is new is bringing these 
elements together as components of the information element of combat power. 
The IO concept focuses efforts that before were diffuse” (FM 3-13 1-57).   
 
3. What is Terrorism? 
Terrorism by nature is difficult to define.   The lengthy, evolving history of 
terrorism and today’s faddish use of the word in the media has hindered us from 
adopting a widely accepted definition. Terrorist acts conjure up negative 
emotional responses in the victims (those hurt by the violence and those affected 
by the fear) as well as in the terrorists themselves.  Therefore, when we label 
someone as a terrorist, we are subjecting him or her to our own moral judgment 
(Jenkins, 1978, p.3).  People see the same act and interpret it according to their 
own beliefs and experiences.  Many of the leading terrorist authorities would 
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agree that terrorism is difficult to define. Laqueur explains this difficulty in his 
book The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and The Arms of Mass Destruction.  He 
quotes Nietzsche suggesting, “Only things without a history can be easily 
defined; terrorism, needless to say has a very long history” (Laqueur,  1999, p.6).  
Often many people refer to this difficulty in reaching a definition of terrorism as 
the old cliché, ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’.  However, 
Brian Jenkins dismisses this adage as simply not true.  He suggests, “Most 
civilized nations have identified by law modes of conduct that are criminal, 
among them homicide, kidnapping, threats to life, and willful destruction of 
property” (Jenkins, 1978, p.4).  He further asserts that even in war there are rules 
that regulate appropriate conduct.  Terrorists do not abide by any of these rules.  
Although there are slight differences in the definitions of terrorism found in the 
United States government, these differences actually only reflect the emphasis of 
the function of each agency.  The FBI provides a suitable definition for the 
purposes of this thesis. 
“Terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or 
property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any 
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.” 
 
4. Why do Terrorists use Information Operations? 
Unlike the US military, which has only recently developed an IO strategy, 
terrorist organizations have existed for centuries employing a psychological 
strategy.  The US military has generally relied on attrition-based warfare to 
achieve its objectives.  Since terrorist organizations are usually not at military 
parity with a state, they cannot go toe-to-toe in combat and hope to win.  
Terrorists resort to IO, because that is the only option they have.  To provide 
additional evidence of why terrorists resort to IO, we will briefly explore two 
perspectives of terrorism that grant insight into their strategy.  First, the chapter 
examines Maurice Tugwell’s psychological strategy of terrorism.  Tugwell 
suggests that terrorists employ a strategy of psychological influence, relying on 
the use of terror to coerce a government to make changes favorable to their 
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cause.  This strategy leverages the power of information to cause change and 
Tugwell claims “terrorists are in the business of changing minds” (1990, p.2).  
Subsequently, the chapter addresses Gordon McComick’s terrorist influence 
process model.  McComick’s model provides insight into how most terrorist 
organizations exploit the information environment to influence their targets.  His 
model walks through a four step process terrorists take to achieve their influence 
objective. 
 
a. Maurice Tugwell’s Psychological Strategy of Terrorism. 
       Many theorists have written about the strategy of terrorist 
organizations, offering different viewpoints about why terrorists do what they do; 
however, one expert, Maurice Tugwell, has made detailed studies of the strategic 
goals of terrorist, guerrilla, and insurgent organizations for over twenty years. 
Tugwell’s perspective of this phenomenon suggests that terrorist organizations 
employ a long-term psychological strategy to achieve their objectives.  His 
approach supports this thesis by providing insight into why terrorists conduct 
violent attacks and offers evidence that terrorist rely on the psychological 
influence of their violence to achieve their objectives.  Furthermore, Tugwell’s 
explanation illustrates the terrorists’ natural bridge to the information 
environment.  
Tugwell contends that the terrorist threat to societies and states is 
more about the adverse psychological influence they cause than the actual 
physical damage they inflict.  He says “that terrorism essentially conforms to the 
Carl von Clausewitz’ claim that war is the continuation of politics by violent 
means” (Radvanyi, 1990, p. 1).   Tugwell points out that violent physical force 
often replaces the failure of peaceful persuasion; however, persuasion still 
remains the objective and the ultimate purpose of each action.  He states that in 
the end “terrorists are trying to change the minds of their enemies” (Radvanyi, 
p.11).  Terrorism, more than any other form of conflict, moves back and forth 
across the line between peace and war. “One day its leaders address the public 
through the news media, in the manner of politicians; the next day, they blow an 
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airliner out of the sky to underline their point” (Radvanyi, p.2).  An ancient 
millenarian Jewish terrorist group known as the Zealots serves as an example to 
support Tugwell’s claim.  From AD 66 – 73 the Zealots ruthlessly assassinated 
anyone having to do with the Roman Empire: army soldiers, administrators, 
Jewish collaborators, etc.  Using short daggers, known as sica, the terrorists 
would stage the attack in a busy square of the city or in an ally jammed with 
people.  “The intimidatory power of the Assassins rested on their reputation of 
always killing their chosen victims, however long it took” (Radvanyi, p.2). The 
killing was usually very dramatic; the terrorists would emerge and slit the throat of 
the victim and then quickly retreat, blending back into the crowd.  The violent 
attacks were designed to have long lasting psychological repercussions far 
beyond the immediate audience: the 10 to 20 people who witnessed the event.  
 Over time the vicious reputation of the Zealots spread by word of mouth 
throughout all of present day Israel.  Their reputation preceded them in the 
information environment to shape the perception of thousands of people, 
especially those opposed to the group and sympathetic to the Romans (Hoffman, 
1998, p.88).    Thus as Tugwell points out, the Zealots relied more on the 
psychological influence of their reputation to influence the populace than the 
slaying of their victims. 
  
b. Gordon McCormick’s Influence Process of Terrorism. 
Gordon McCormick, former Rand analyst and current professor at 
the Naval Post Graduate School, suggests that nearly all terrorists follow a 
common influence process to achieve their objectives.  McCormick’s influence 
model also supports Maurice Tugwell’s psychological strategy mentioned above.  
McCormick suggests that terrorists are naturally linked to the information 
environment, since they must follow logical steps in order to influence a decision 
maker.  Figure 1 depicts McCormick’s influence process model with four steps 
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McCormick Influence Process Model
 
Figure 1.   Influence Process Model by Dr. Gordon McCormick 
 
In the first step the terrorists attack the immediate target, often involving dramatic 
acts of violence intended to capture the eye of the media.  The immediate targets 
are often victims with no authority or individual ability to influence the 
government.  Many terrorist attacks first appear like indiscriminate attacks; 
however, this is not true.  Terrorist chose targets for their maximum publicity and 
to influence specific target audiences.  The second target is the media, which 
generates the first order effect.  The terrorists normally cannot control how the 
acts will be reported (negatively or positively). Knowing this, many terrorist 
organizations operate their own underground television, radio, and print media 
outlets.  The also maintain their own informational websites on the Internet.   
Often times they deliver a direct message to the media through a proxy courier or 
phone call.  During the recent US war in Afghanistan, Usama bin Laden provided 
video taped interviews to Al-Jazeera in order to deliver his message.  The third 
step is when the media serves as the distribution point, propagating scenes of 
the attack to a wider audience, which is the target of influence. The second order 
effect occurs here.  Today’s technology often allows near-real time video 
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coverage of events.  Al Qa’ida’s attack against the US World Trade Center and 
Pentagon and the Chechen hostage taking in Moscow serve as two recent 
examples of the media providing live coverage of an attack.  CNN alerted the 
entire world to the first attack against the Pentagon and World Trade Center and 
then provided live footage as the second American Airliner exploded into the side 
of the World Trade Center and the subsequent collapse of the building. Another 
example came in 2003 with the live coverage of 50 Chechen terrorists holding 
nearly 900 Russian theatergoers hostage. Video coverage highlighted the 
commandos attempted rescue.  The police employed gas during the attack to 
incapacitate the terrorists.  Unfortunately, due to the concentration of the gas and 
poor health conditions of many of the hostages, over 100 hostages died during 
the attack.  The media provides the terrorists a conduit to four different 
audiences: opposing, uncommitted, sympathetic, and active.  These audiences 
will be further addressed in chapter III. The third order effect occurs when the 
target of influence reacts. The measure of success is determined by who gains 
and benefits, impacting the terrorist group and completing the cycle.   
 The 1972 terrorist attack at the Munich Olympic Games provides 
an example of McCormick’s terrorist influence model.  Eight members from the 
PLO’s Black September Organization had planned to take several Israeli athletes 
hostage and then make demands of the Israeli government to release Palestinian 
terrorists being held in prison.  With the advent of television and worldwide 
broadcasting, the world watched as the German police foiled the Palestinians’ 
original plan to move the hostages from helicopters to an awaiting Lufthansa 747 
airliner.  During the ensuing gun battle with the Germans, a terrorist leaped from 
one of the helicopters and tossed a hand grenade back into the cabin behind 
him, murdering all nine Israeli athletes with a hand grenade (Hoffman, p.72).  
Although the Black September operation failed to secure the freedom of their 
comrades in prison, the shock and violence of the attack at the Munich Stadium 
had a profound influence on television viewers around the world.  The Israeli 
Olympic athletes served as a superb immediate target for the terrorists.  The 
media coverage of the Games ensured that millions of people would be 
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watching.  Although Black September’s operation received negative publicity 
from the horrific fate of the athletes, the greater world audience became aware of 
the plight faced by the Palestinian refugees.  Hoffman quotes Abu Iyad, the 
PLO’s intelligence chief, admitting, “they didn’t bring about the liberation of their 
comrades imprisoned in Israel as they had hoped, but they did attain the 
operation’s other two objectives: World opinion was forced to take note of the 
Palestinian plight, and the Palestinian people imposed their presence on an 
international gathering that had sought to exclude them” (Hoffman, p.73).  
Eventually, international sympathy toward the Palestinian cause enabled Yassar 
Arafat and the Palestinians to gain a seat in the United Nations (Gallagher, 
1992).   
 
D. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS: A CHAPTER OUTLINE. 
This chapter provides an introduction to our thesis by presenting the need 
to understand how terrorist exploit the information environment and use IO to 
achieve their objectives.  The chapter also established a basic understanding of 
Information Operations and terrorism, providing perspectives by two authors, 
Tugwell and McCormick, on the terrorists’ use of information to achieve their 
objectives.    
Chapter II explores the principle elements of IO prescribed in US military 
doctrine and explains the information environment.  The chapter examines a 
perspective of IO developed by Edward Waltz.  First, Waltz provides an 
explanation of the role of information in conflict.  Next, he presents his 
operational model of IO activities in three conceptual domains.  The chapter then 
adapts US military principle elements of IO to Waltz’s conceptual domains in 
order to create a useful framework to apply to terrorists.  
Chapter III develops the IO framework into an analytical tool that the 
thesis uses to evaluate the terrorist case studies.  To accomplish this goal the 
chapter first explores works by several well-known terrorist authors to highlight 
the characteristics of terrorist organizations that can have an impact on how 
terrorists employ IO.   With the theoretical understanding of IO established in 
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Chapter II, the chapter develops the framework by examining three aspects of 
the terrorists’ approach to IO.  First, the terrorists conduct the attack in the 
physical environment to directly influence an audience or to enable operations in 
the information environment.  Second, the terrorists employ elements of IO as a 
force multiplier to gain legitimacy e.g. leverage with the state actor.  Third, the 
terrorists are able to take the action in the physical environment and target their 
message to address multiple audiences. 
Chapters IV and V provide evidence of our claims using two terrorist 
organizations, namely, Al Qa’ida and the Provisional Irish Republican Army.  The 
chapters provide a brief historical background, presenting the respective non-
state terrorist organizations and their operating environments to determine how 
they employ IO tools to leverage information against states.  The chapters 
investigate examples from two distinctly different types of terrorist organizations: 
radical Islamic Fundamentalist religious groups and ethno-nationalist separatist 
groups. The terrorist group typologies categorized in the 1999 Government 
Report on Profiling Terrorist provided a basis for case selection.  We selected the 
organizations based on their histories of active terrorism, the availability of data, 
and their representation of different types of terrorist groups.  Usama bin Laden’s 
Al Qa’ida terrorist organization is a unique network of Islamic Fundamentalist 
groups with global reach seeking radical political reformation among liberal 
Islamic states and the eviction of Western influence from the Islamic world.  The 
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) is broadly representative of ethno-
nationalist separatist organizations.  The PIRA sees itself as a nationalistic group 
working to free Ireland from English control and can be compared to other such 
groups as the Liberation Tigers of Eelam (LTTE), fighting in Sri Lanka, and the 
Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), Basque separatists fighting in Northern Spain and 
Southern France.  The PIRA is representative of a small number of highly 
professional underground armies, which draw on a long tradition of paramilitary 
resistance to the state’s power.  These two sample non-state organizations 
therefore have quite different requirements.  The role of Information Operations 
serves different functions for each one. 
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Chapter VI provides a synopsis of how non-state terrorist organizations 
may incorporate Information Operations to achieve their objectives. The chapter 
provides general concluding remarks, reflecting commonalties and differences 
between the two types of terrorist organizations, each competing in very different 
operating environments.  The chapter also offers a framework of terrorist 
information operations, highlighting tendencies and trends.  It closes with a 
number of questions for further research. 
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II. THEORY OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
To achieve victory we must as far as possible make the enemy 
blind and deaf by sealing his eyes and ears, and drive his 
commanders to distraction by creating confusion in their minds.   
- Mao Tse-tung, On Protracted War 
The goal of this chapter is to explore the concept of Information 
Operations (IO) and establish a theoretical understanding of operations in the 
information environment.  We accomplish this goal by first analyzing Department 
of Defense (Joint and Army) doctrine. Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for 
Information Operations; Army Field Manual 3-13, Information Operations: 
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures; and Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations, 
provide a doctrinal approach to IO.  We selected DoD as our starting point, 
because the principles established in US military doctrine have proven to be 
sound during times of peace and conflict and provide a valuable basis for 
understanding IO.  Next we examine a theoretical perspective to information 
domains and the influence of Information Operations by Edward Waltz, author of 
Information Warfare: Principles and Operations.  Waltz constructs an information 
model of warfare, providing a better understanding of the role of information in 
conflict. Waltz’s model of information domains provides the basis for establishing 
a theoretical understanding of IO.   
Although we also reviewed other academic perspectives to the concept of 
Information Operations and the terrorists’ use of IO (often referred to as 
information warfare), these works proved to be inappropriate for the focus of this 





                                            
3 Other approaches to Information Operations include works from Dorothy Denning, Martin 
Libicki, Andrew Rathmell, and Mike Tanji. 
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A. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT. 
The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, 
organizations, or systems that collect, process, or disseminate 
information; also included is the information itself.   
US Army Field Manual 3-13 
This section will first explore aspects about the information environment.  
US military doctrine often makes reference to two different yet coexisting arenas: 
the physical and the information arena.  Humans live, breath, and walk in the 
physical arena.  We see, hear, and touch objects that are real and exist in a 
physical state.  US commanders make decisions that impact the physical arena 
such as to attack the enemy or defend.  All of us are keenly aware of the physical 
arena, because we exist in it daily; however, many people do not realize that 
another arena coexists and oftentimes dramatically influences what happens in 
the physical.  The information arena exists in the minds of humans, in decision- 
making processes, and information processing machines. Psychological and 
physical activities can affect this arena, shaping human perceptions and 
influencing peoples’ beliefs.  Corporate marketers commonly exploit the link 
between the two arenas, influencing consumers to buy products or services.  
Humans are attracted to visual aides: we tend to trust what we can see in the 
physical arena.   
Often CNN and other popular news media rely on B-Roll (still pictures, 
audio, and real-time video) to capture the attention of their audiences.  Advanced 
technology enables media outlets to incorporate B-Roll with the news broadcast, 
transforming an abstract, lifeless news article into dramatic and suspenseful 
stories.  The visual aid of B-Roll enhances the ‘believability’ of information in the 
story.  Because the media (television in particular) has access to such a large 
audience, it has wielded great power in American and world affairs.  Media 
coverage of the US involvement in Somalia had great impact on President 
Clinton’s decision to pull troops out of the country.  “General Aideed manipulated 
the media to keep the militarily superior United States off balance…and forever 
changed US foreign policy in the region” (Armistead, 2002, p.11).  This powerful 
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influence that B-Roll unleashes serves to segue into the unseen yet coexisting 
information arena, where information of all forms wields the power to influence. 
The US Army refers to this unseen arena as the Information Environment (IE) 
and treats it as another component of the battlespace (FM 3-13, p.1-2).   
So what exactly is the IE component of the combat battlespace?  
Coexisting with the physical environment, the IE is a perceptual battlespace.  
Information or the denial of information shapes the IE, influencing decision 
makers, groups, and even whole populations.  The IE typically is not limited to 
the linear battlespace that military commanders conceptualize, but activities in 
the IE oftentimes shape a commander’s understanding of the battle and can 
profoundly impact his decisions in the physical environment. A commander can 
target systems and actors in the IE with the ultimate goal of impacting key 
adversary decision makers in the physical environment.  
The IE includes “worldwide communication networks, friendly and 
adversary forces and organizations’ command and control (C2) systems, and 
friendly, adversary, and other personnel who make decisions and handle 
information, including populations” (FM 3-13, p.1-2).  Handling this information in 
the IE is a networked infrastructure of individual people, groups and 
organizations, and information systems (JP 3-13).  Twenty-first century 
technologies, such as home computers, the Internet, and digital satellite 
communications, have networked the IE in such a manner that people world-wide 
can now be influenced.  CNN broadcasted live to the world the tragic Al Qa’ida 
attack on September 11th 2001.  Hundreds of millions of people watched the 
terrorists’ spectacle unfold as the 2nd American Airlines passenger jet slammed 
into the World Trade Center, which subsequently collapsed upon itself, killing 
thousands of people inside.  In the recent 2003 war with Iraq, embedded media 
reporters from the BBC, CNN, al-Jazeera, and other international media traveled 
with American military units throughout the war.  Their broadcasts enabled 
anyone with access to a television or computer the ability to see the war live.  
Americans witnessed the US 3rd Infantry Division as it crossed the Tigris River 
and moved into Baghdad.   
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The US military employs Information Operations to gain an advantage 
over the adversary in the IE.  This information advantage enables the conduct of 
successful combat maneuver operations in the physical environment.  US 
doctrine calls this phenomenon information superiority4.   Achieving superiority in 
the IE provides battlefield clarity to the friendly commander, while at the same 
time obscures the battlefield for the adversary, denying him options and possibly 
causing him to be more reactionary.  The friendly commander can then trump the 
adversary movements at decisive moments, allowing him to “seize and retain the 
initiative” (FM3-13, p.1-17).  Unlike air superiority, which can be maintained and 
easily determined, information superiority can be fleeting and gained or lost 
through the passage of time. It is critical when unable to maintain continuous 
information superiority to achieve it at decisive moments that provide the 
maximum benefits to friendly forces and disadvantage to the adversary.  
The US withdrawal from Somalia in 1993 provides an example of a 
smaller, less-technical force achieving information superiority at a decisive 
moment against a larger force.  Mohammed Farah Aidid, the dominant Somali 
warlord, led a ragtag guerrilla force against elite forces of the US Army in the 
streets of Mogadishu.  According to the traditional rules of warfare, US General 
Garrison and his elite soldiers of Task Force Ranger won a tremendous victory 
against the Somali warlord.  Aidid lost several of his top lieutenants in the raid 
and a large percentage of his supporters.  Additionally, most of his ammunition 
stores were expended and his active fighting force was reduced by over 50% 
(Adams, 1998, p.71). 5    
Although General Garrison’s superior forces tactically defeated the Somali 
gunmen in the streets of Mogadishu, Aideed trumped Garrison’s success by 
exploiting the information environment.  CNN’s global transmission of jeering 
Somali citizens dragging corpses of US soldiers through the streets of 
                                            
4 FM3-0 defines information superiority as “the operational advantage derived from the ability 
to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or 
denying an adversary’s ability to do the same”. 
5 The toll of casualties read: 18 Americans and 1 Malaysian dead, 84 Americans and 7 
Malaysians wounded; 312 Somalis dead and 814 wounded. 
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Mogadishu shocked the American populace and greatly influenced the decision 
of President Clinton to withdraw troops from Somalia.  Adams quotes a senior 
military officer saying,  
By Saturday and Sunday we had won the war, but on Monday Aidid 
mounted a strategic attack in the information domain.  The 
American people simply had not been briefed about this area of the 
battle space, and so when bodies started appearing on TV screens, 
Americans said, ‘Wait a minute, nobody told us this was going to 
happen’- and Aidid won (p.72).  
The psychological weight of the photos and video of dead US soldiers and the 
apparent inhumane treatment by the Somalis occurred at a time when most 
American people and the President were expecting to see US success in 
Mogadishu.  Aideed succeeded in gaining information superiority by controlling 
the television images coming out of Mogadishu.  CNN’s images of the mutilated 
Army Rangers and the dead Somali civilians soured American TV viewers and 
became a major influence to pull US troops out of Somalia; “in essence, Aideed 
(sic) won the information war” (Libicki, 1995).  
The growth of information technology (IT) and the global reach of real-time 
communications systems have made IO a potent instrument in swaying public 
opinion and influencing decisions.  IT often amplifies the effectiveness of 
operations in the information environment, influencing audiences well beyond the 
field of battle.  Yet, gaining information superiority (IS) is not necessarily 
determined by advanced technology or the lack thereof.  IS is gained through 
skillful control of information at decisive points during or after the battle.  The 
news broadcasts after the battle enabled Aidid to manipulate the American 
perception of what was really going on in Somalia.  He was able to leverage this 
powerful influence in the information environment to finally gain victory in the 





B. INFORMATION OPERATIONS. 
Information operations (IO) are actions taken to affect adversary 
and influence others’ decision-making processes, information, and 
information systems, while protecting one’s own information and 
information systems (FM 3-0).   
The United States first formally divulged the concept of Information 
Operations in 1996 as a component of Joint Vision 2010.  Since then IO has 
evolved into a part of a strategy to achieve national objectives through non-
kinetic means. “IO is an attempt by the US to develop a set of doctrinal 
approaches for its military and diplomatic forces to use and operationalize the 
power of information” (Armistead, 2002, p.11) IO is not a weapon; rather it is a 
process, a way of thinking about relationships.  IO shapes the information 
environment by influencing peoples’ perceptions and enables military or 
diplomatic operations in the physical environment.  The US accomplishes this by 
synchronizing and de-conflicting the principle elements of IO (Armistead, 2002, 
p.6).  This section first explores the elements of IO, providing the reader a 
fundamental understanding of the terms and military reference.  Secondly, the 
section explores the offensive and defensive categories of IO.  Offensive and 
defensive IO must be integrated to ensure the mission is successful: the 
adversary is defeated and friendly assets are protected (FM 3-13, p.1-13).   
 
1. Elements of Information Operations. 
As noted earlier in chapter 1, IO integrates several previously separate 
functions, forming a powerful synergy that enables the commander to shape the 
information environment.  The US military publications provide a list of IO 
elements, supporting, and related activities (FM 3-13, p.1-14).  For the purpose 
of this thesis we provide a description of the IO elements that are useful to the 





a. Psychological Operations (PSYOP). 
The US Military defines PSYOP as “operations that are planned to 
convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their 
emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately to influence the behavior 
of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals” (JP 3-53, p.v).  
PSYOP are conducted primarily to influence the adversary’s perception of the 
battle: to weaken his morale and break his will to fight.  However, PSYOP are 
also used to disseminate information to the target audience to affect their 
behavior.  Classical PSYOP techniques include the air dropping of propaganda 
leaflets and the use of loudspeakers to broadcast information in the target 
language.  
 
b. Military Deception (MILDEC).  
The US military defines Military deception as “those actions 
executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly 
military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to 
take specific actions that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly 
mission” (JP3-58, p.v).  Deception involves showing the adversary that which is 
false and hiding from him that which is real.  The US employs physical and 
electronic means to provide this camouflage.  Deploying inflatable tanks and 
artillery pieces as well as simulating radio traffic to fake the electronic signatures 
of old unit locations serve as realistic examples of deception techniques.   
 
c. Operational Security (OPSEC). 
The US military defines OPSEC as “the process of identifying 
critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly and enemy actions to 
detect security leaks, determining the acceptable level of vulnerability of critical 
systems, and directing actions to safeguard these systems” (JP3-54, p.v).  
OPSEC is often an integral part of deception (camouflage, concealment, and 
decoys) and can also contribute to PSYOP.   Good OPSEC is essential to deny 
the adversary information concerning friendly operations.  This is a critical aspect 
of gaining information superiority. 
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d. Public Affairs (PA).  
The US military describes PA as operations designed to provide 
public information, command information, and community relations activities 
directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the DoD 
(JP3-61).    PA provides truthful information to Americans and other friendly 
audiences, educating them with an accurate depiction of the situation.  This is so 
that the public, Congress, and the news media may assess and understand the 
facts about the military and its operations (JP3-61).  
 
e. Electronic Warfare (EW). 
The US military defines EW as any military action involving the use 
of electro-magnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum 
or to attack the enemy (JP 3-51).  The three major components of EW are 
electronic protect (EP), electronic support (ES), and electronic attack (EA).  EP 
involves passive and active means to protect personnel and equipment from 
enemy EW.  US forces use terrain masking, directional antennas, and other 
techniques to limit radio emissions. ES involves intercepting adversary electronic 
transmissions for further exploitation.  US Forces use the intercepts to gather 
intelligence and also to locate or target the adversary’s emitter.  EA involves the 
use of directed energy to deny, disrupt, or degrade an adversary’s use of the 
electromagnetic spectrum.  US forces direct energy at an adversary emitter to 
jam voice and data communications and radar.  
 
f. Physical Destruction. 
The US military defines physical destruction as “the application of 
combat power to destroy or degrade adversary forces, sources of information, C2 
systems, and installations” (FM 3-13, p.2-11).  Not all physical destruction is part 
of IO.  However, when direct and indirect fires from the ground, sea, and air 
forces are incorporated into the IO strategy to influence a specific objective, 
physical destruction becomes one of the strongest elements of IO.  US Special 
Operations Forces are often used to carry out these operations. 
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g. Computer Network Operations (CNO). 
The US military describes CNO as operations to exploit, disrupt, 
deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer 
networks, or the computers and networks themselves and to safeguard against 
the same (JP 3-13 and FM 3-13). CNO is comprised of the Attack (CNA), 
Defense (CND), and Exploitation (CNE) of computers and networks.  CNA and 
CNE operations are designed to penetrate adversary systems.  Although the 
tools and techniques used to accomplish these operations are classified, the 
intent of the operations is to exploit and attack the adversary’s information, 
computers, and networks.  CNE is a form of cyber-reconnaissance, whereby 
computers are used to access an adversary’s information remotely and gather 
intelligence.  CNA is an offensive operation designed to attack an adversary’s 
information, information systems, or networks with the intent to disrupt, deny, 
degrade, or destroy.  CND operations are designed to protect and defend friendly 
information, computers and networks from attacks by the adversary.  US network 
administrators incorporate strict access controls, authentication passwords, 
intrusion detection devises, and virus scanners to defend against adversary 
attacks.   
 
h. Civil Military Operations (CMO). 
The US military describes CMO as “activities that a commander 
takes to establish and maintain positive relations between their forces, the civil 
authorities, and the general population… where their forces are deployed in order 
to facilitate military operations and to consolidate and achieve objectives” (JP 3-
57, p.vii).   The relationship between the US forces and the host nation 
population always has an impact on how the local population receives the US 
presence in their country and often has influence on the population’s acceptance 





i. Intelligence Support.  
Although Intelligence is not officially an element of IO, intelligence 
support is vital to the success of the IO campaign.  Intelligence provides critical 
information (who, what, where, and when) during the IO targeting process.  
Detailed intelligence is needed to provide IO planners information about the 
target audience’s culture and society.  Intelligence is also critical for the timing 
and as a means to measure the effectiveness of IO operations.  Elements such 
as OPSEC, deception, and PSYOP require early implementation and 
maintenance in order to achieve the desired influence.  Each operation requires 
specific target information to be effective.  They also require intelligence 
feedback to ensure they are achieving the desired influence on the target. 
 
2. Offensive and Defensive Information Operations. 
US military doctrine dictates that IO should be pursued offensively as well 
as defensively.  Oftentimes successful offensive IO is dependent upon the 
integration and synchronization of defensive IO elements (FM 3-13, p.57).  
“Offensive IO supports the decisive operation while defensive IO protects friendly 
force critical assets and center of gravity” (FM 3-13, p.2-3).  Many of the principle 
elements and supporting activities are mutually supportive of each other.  The 
success of military deception for example often depends upon OPSEC to ensure 
the plan remains secret not only from the adversary but also from friendly forces 
without a need to know.  With references to US Army FM3-13, figure 2 illustrates 






































Figure 2.   IO Offense-Defense Model 
 
The Offensive-Defensive model reflects IO elements competing to gain 
dominance in the information environment.  Offensively, IO seeks to acquire, 
influence, deceive, alter, disrupt, deny, and destroy the adversary’s information 
and information processes.  Defensively, IO attempts to detect, deter, prevent, 
protect, recover, restore, and respond to attacks by the adversary.  Military 
commanders determine which elements of IO are needed to successfully 
accomplish the mission and ensure they are integrated and synchronized.  Well 
planned and executed IO creates a synergistic influence that can effectively blind 
the adversary to the true intentions of the friendly forces and enable friendly 
forces to move and fight more decisively.  Although integrating as many of the 
elements as possible provides maximum effect, all elements may not be required 
for each operation.  The commander integrates select IO elements while taking 
into consideration the nature of the operation, the target, availability of resources 




a. Offensive Information Operations. 
The US military describes offensive IO as “operations intended to 
destroy, degrade, disrupt, deny, deceive, exploit, and influence adversary 
decision makers and others who can affect the success of friendly operations. 
Offensive IO also targets the information and information systems used in the 
adversary decision making processes” (FM 3-13, p.1-16). Offensive IO can target 
multiple different audiences including: adversary decision makers, civilian 
populations, critical communications facilities, and other information systems.  
Broadly speaking, the goals of offensive information operations are to adversely 
influence the enemy’s sources of information on the battlefield.  Through careful 
planning and implementation, offensive IO can provide the means to achieve 
information superiority in the information environment.  Achieving information 
superiority has become increasingly important in conventional warfare and often 
is the determining factor in achieving final victory (Khalilzad & White, 1999, ch.7). 
 
b. Defensive Information Operations. 
The US military describes defensive IO as “the integration and 
coordination of policies and procedures, operations, personnel, and technology 
to protect and defend friendly information and information systems. Defensive 
information operations ensure timely, accurate, and relevant information access 
while denying adversaries the opportunity to exploit friendly information and 
information systems for their own purposes” (FM 3-0).  Defensive IO is critical to 
the success of offensive IO and normal combat maneuver operations.  
Commanders must integrate defensive elements to protect and defend friendly 
assets and safeguard relevant information.  The defensive goals are to deter, 
prevent, protect, detect, recover, restore, and respond against adversary attacks 
in the information environment. Activities such as counter deception, counter 
propaganda, and counterintelligence (CI) defend against adversary offensive IO.  
Protecting the information infrastructure and information in the physical 
environment is crucial to ensure that information is timely and accurate and 
information systems remain reliable. 
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During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the US military successfully 
employed several elements of offensive and defensive IO to achieve victory 
against the Iraqi forces under Sadaam Hussein.  
Major emphasis was placed on Command and Control Warfare 
(C2W), CA, and PA activities during Operations Desert Shield and 
Desert Storm. Commanders integrated OPSEC, military deception, 
PSYOP, and EW efforts during Desert Shield to pave the way for 
successful combat operations. During planning for Desert Storm, 
the senior leadership recognized that Iraq's C2 was a critical 
vulnerability whose destruction could enable victory with minimal 
friendly loss (FM 100-6, p.3-1). DESERT STORM demonstrated the 
effectiveness of the integrated use of operational security (OPSEC) 
and deception to shape the beliefs of the adversary commander 
and achieve surprise. Deception and OPSEC efforts were 
combined to convince Saddam Hussein of a Coalition intent to 
conduct the main offensive using ground and amphibious attacks 
into central Kuwait, and to dismiss real indicators of the true 
Coalition intent to swing west of the Iraqi defenses in Kuwait and 
make the main attack into Iraq itself” (Joint Staff Special Technical 
Operations Division, quoted in JP 3-13.)    During Desert Storm’s 
air operations, the enemy was selectively blinded by EW and 
physical destruction to mask friendly force movements and 
operations. Deception operations continued to enforce erroneous 
enemy perceptions of the CINC's intentions. EW and precision air 
strikes against C2 targets were used to disorganize and isolate 
Iraqi forces… Fully aware that the enemy, as well as the public at 
home, was focused on PA coverage of the confrontation, the 
coalition used that coverage to confuse the enemy by encouraging 
speculation on the place, time, and size of  the impending attack... 
After the cessation of hostilities, CA elements enhanced the 
restoration of Kuwaiti governmental and social order and 
responded promptly and effectively to one of the central 
unanticipated consequences of the war as Iraqi forces created an 
enormous refugee crisis in the northern Kurdish provinces of Iraq 
and in southern Turkey (FM 100-6, p.3-1). 
 
C. THEORETICAL PERPECTIVE.  
This section explores a theoretical perspective of IO by Edward Waltz, 
author of Information Warfare: Principles and Operations.  Waltz provides a 
simple operational model of IO that this thesis has adapted to observe how 
terrorist employ IO.  The model consists of three conceptual domains 
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(psychological or perceptual, information infrastructure, and physical), where IO 
activities can influence decision makers. 
 
1. Role of Information. 
Before introducing Waltz’s operational model, however, it is important to 
explain the role of information in conflict at a fundamental level.  Understanding 
the role information plays in conflict is important to further explore how IO 
activities exploit information to achieve an influence.  Waltz proposes a simple 
two-character model to illustrate the role of information in conflict.  The model 
can be applied to two opposing countries at war just as easy as it can be applied 
to two individuals. Waltz’s model starts with an attack character, Adam, engaging 
a defending character, Dave.  Dave must determine the best way to react to 
Adam’s attack.  Adam’s objective is to influence or coerce Dave to respond in a 
way favorable to Adam.  “This is the ultimate objective of any warring party- to 
cause the opponent to act in a desired manner: to surrender, to err or to fail” 
(Waltz, 1998, p.4).  Adam may use physical force or any non-kinetic means 
available to achieve his objective.  As a result Dave may exhaust his resources, 
deciding he can no longer go on, and surrender to Adam.  Dave may also fall 
victim to Adam’s deception and unwittingly make decisions in favor of Adam. 
Waltz’s Role of Information Model (Figure 3) provides a fundamental 
illustration of the power of information in conflict.  Waltz suggests there are three 
factors that influence Dave’s decisions to react to Adam’s attack: 
 1. Dave’s physical capacity to act.  Based upon battle casualties 
and equipment readiness, Dave may not have the capacity to continue the fight. 
 2.  Dave’s will to act.  Dave’s will is a measure of his resolve, 
determination, and commitment to continue the fight.  The will is the hardest 
element for the attacker to measure, because there is no template or tool 
available to estimate the will of an opponent.  Confronted with certain defeat and 
death, some leaders will press on, without regard to consequence, while others 
will quickly give up in order to save their own skin. 
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 3.  Dave’s perception of the situation.  This is an abstract factor and 
is based upon Dave’s understanding of information.  “It is measured in terms 
such as accuracy, completeness, confidence or uncertainty, and timeliness” 
(Waltz, 1998, p.5).  During conflict, Dave’s decisions are determined by his 
perception of the situation, which can differ from the truth. 
How then can Adam influence Dave to act in a manner favorable to his 
objectives?  With the factors listed above, Waltz contends that Adam has several 
options available.  He can directly attack Dave’s capacity to act by attacking his 
combat assets in the physical domain.  This will decrease Dave’s physical ability 
to continue fighting, pressuring him to surrender.  Secondly, Adam can attack the 
information domain, where Dave’s intelligence sensors, command and control, 
and communications asset are located.  This attack might blind Dave, obscuring 
the battlefield and increasing the ‘Fog of War’.  Thirdly, Adam can attack Dave’s 
perceptual domain, where he analyzes and processes information to develop an 
understanding of the battlefield.  The main target here is Dave’s mind.  Although 
Adam is likely to employ several non-kinetic means to shape Dave’s perception, 
carefully timed and selected physical targets also shape Dave’s understanding of 
the battlefield.  Finally, Adam can attack Dave’s will to fight: his morale and 
commitment.  Figure 3 illustrates Waltz’s model and the four options available for 





















Fog of War Morale
Perception of the situation relative
to Adam, and the capacity of Dave 
to act.
 
Figure 3.   Role of Information Model by Edward Waltz, p.6   
 
Notice in the figure above that Dave attacks Adam in the physical domain, 
destroying or denying Dave’s physical capacity to fight (targets such as military 
weapon systems and personnel, equipment, roads, bridges, and other line of 
communication).  Adam also physically attacks Dave in the information domain, 
destroying his ability to see and hear the battlefield.  The attack inhibits Dave 
from observing Adam’s movements and from commanding his own forces on the 
battlefield.  “Physical attacks on observation (intelligence sensors, 
communications) or orientation processes (command nodes) deny valuable 
information” (p.6).  Dave’s understanding of the situation becomes increasingly 
obscured.  Deception, OPSEC, and PSYOPS form Adam’s information attack 
and strike Dave in the information and perception domains.  The attacks corrupt 
Dave’s perception of the situation, shaping his understanding of the conflict and 
making him vulnerable to poor decision making.  EW and CNA target the 
electronic processes and content of the information infrastructure (sensors, 
communication links, and processing networks) that provide Dave the ability to 
see and hear the battlefield (observation and orientation).  These attacks have 
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the ability to directly affect Dave’s ability to receive information and can greatly 
impact Dave’s ability to perceive the situation.   
If Adam can successfully exploit the information available to Dave and 
influence Dave’s ability to process the information, Adam can profoundly affect 
Dave’s perception of the battlefield and possibly decrease his will to continue 
fighting.  Additionally, Adam can conduct physical attacks against Dave with the 
intent of denying, destroying, or corrupting information available to Dave.  It is 
important to note that physical destruction is an element of IO, when it is planned 
and synchronized to achieve an effect or intended influence on the adversary. 
 
2. Operational Model of Information Operations. 
Waltz suggests that the basic principle underlying the shaping of the 
Information Environment is influence. Operations in the Information Environment 
that influence the perceptions, beliefs, and opinions of a target audience can 
enable operations in the physical environment. Waltz contends that IO creates 
influence in three conceptual domains: perceptual or psychological, information 
infrastructure and the physical domain (Waltz, 1998, p.148).  Influence 
operations shape the information environment by affecting the perception and 
battlefield clarity of adversary decision makers, policy makers, or even entire 
populations. Waltz suggests that the highest-level target in the IE is in the 
perceptual domain: the human mind.   The second domain, the information 
infrastructure, processes, manages, and stores the information (Waltz, 1998, 
p.148).  Humans are often dependent upon information infrastructure to transmit 
and receive information.  Oftentimes infrastructure failure can attribute to poorly 
made decisions.  The physical environment forms the third domain, where 
physical attacks or threats set up actions to influence the target in the information 
environment.  Figure 4 illustrates Waltz’s three conceptual domains.  Waltz 
places the perceptual domain first to illustrate its priority in shaping the 
information environment.  The decision maker’s perception of the situation serves 







Figure 4.   IO Conceptual Domain Waltz 
A typical US Army Tactical Operations Center (TOC) serves as an 
example to illustrate the relationship of the three domains.  The commanding 
officer serves as the chief decision maker for the unit.  He is advised by a staff, 
which is responsible to continuously monitor the friendly and enemy situation.  
They analyze enemy intelligence and friendly capabilities and make 
recommendations to the commander, who makes the final decision to act.  The 
staff maintains a current picture of the battle through a vast network of 
intelligence sensors, friendly units, and reconnaissance assets.   
• The minds of the commander and his staff comprise the perceptual 
domain.   
• The vast network of sensors and the staff’s analysis processes 
form the information infrastructure domain.  








D. IO FRAMEWORK. 
This chapter examined US Military Doctrine, highlighting the basic 
principles that serve as the cornerstones to information operations.  The primary 
goal of information operations is to gain superiority in the Information 
Environment at a decisive point in time to enable successful operations in the 
physical environment.  Edward Waltz suggests that Information Operations 
shape the Information Environment by influencing people.  He first provides a 
fundamental explanation of the role of information in conflict to establish a basic 
understanding of the power of information.  Subsequently, Waltz presents an 
operational model of Information Operations, explaining how IO activities can 
generate influence in three different domains: the perceptual, information 
infrastructure, and the physical.  Figure 5 illustrates the IO framework established 
by incorporating the principle elements of IO, prescribed by US military doctrine, 
with Waltz’s operational model of IO.  





























US military doctrine prescribes six elements of IO that have the power of 
direct or secondary influence in the perceptual domain: Physical Destruction, 
Operations Security, Psychological Operations, Military Deception, Public Affairs 
/ Propaganda, and Civil Military Operations (CMO).  These operations target the 
gray matter of the human mind, influencing what the commander perceives and 
often forming biases or preconceptions that can profoundly effect his decisions. 
The elements that directly influence or occur in the information infrastructure are 
Physical Destruction, Electronic Warfare and Computer Network Operations.  
These operations are designed to affect or defend the electromagnetic spectrum, 
information systems, and the information that supports decision makers (FM 3-
13, p.2-2).  Physical destruction directly affects the physical domain and has the 
ability to influence the perceptual domain with its destruction.  US IO focuses 
these influence operations in all three domains to shape the information 
environment and enable operations in the physical environment.  
The thesis offers this fundamental perspective of Information Operations 
as a simple framework to apply to terrorist organizations.  Terrorist organizations 
are different from US military units and approach the information environment 
under different conditions.  Chapter III will apply the framework developed here to 
the asymmetries of terrorist organizations.  This process will hopefully provide an 
approach to IO that is consistent with the terrorists’ goals, motives, and operating 
environment.   
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III. TERRORISTS’ APPROACH TO INFORMATION 
OPERATIONS  
Terrorists’ strategic use of physical violence as a tactic to influence 
multiple targets predates modern technology and mass media.  The Assassins, a 
Middle Eastern group active in the tenth century A.D., “sought not only the death 
of their enemies but also the “surrounding publicity which could bring attention to 
their cause (Reich, 1998, p.264). The Zealots, as previously discussed, waged a 
campaign in 66-73 A.D against Roman occupation of what is now Israel with 
dramatic and very public murders. Their strategy was to use violence as a 
psychological weapon beyond the immediate victim and send a “message to a 
wider, watching target audience (Hoffman, 1998, p.88). Before 24 hour news 
channels, these groups relied on conducting violence in the presence of mass 
witnesses and the ensuing word of mouth to further their cause.  This strategy 
shows perhaps that aspects of the modern concept of Information Operations are 
inherent to the tactics of terrorists’ operations.  
The goal of this chapter is to produce a general IO framework for terrorists 
that will be applied to specific terrorist organizations in subsequent chapters in 
order to determine how they employ elements of Information Operations.  To 
accomplish this goal, the chapter builds upon the theoretical understanding of IO 
established in chapter II by exploring three factors that can have an impact on 
how terrorists employ IO.    The first is that often terrorists employ elements of IO 
to overcome a legitimacy dilemma. The terrorist must remain covert to stay alive, 
yet must overtly gain legitimacy, e.g. leverage with the state actor and the 
populace.  Secondly, the terrorists conduct acts of violence in the physical 
environment to directly influence an audience or to enable operations in the 
Information Environment.  Thirdly, the terrorists take the physical acts and ‘spin’ 
an influential message, addressing multiple audiences.  The chapter then revisits 
the elements of IO, exploring a terrorist’s perspective of their meaning and using 
that perspective to evaluate if groups deliberately apply IO to their operations.  
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Finally, the chapter concludes by summarizing the terrorists’ approach to IO and 
providing a graphic representation of the analytical framework.   
By contrasting DoD methods against terrorist methods, this chapter 
develops a new perspective of IO that terrorists rely on to achieve their 
objectives.  The chapter illustrates that terrorists must take a different approach 
to IO and that elements of IO are an integral part of a majority of terrorist 
operations. To ensure that the action in the physical environment achieves their 
desired influence in the Information Environment, the terrorists select their 
targets by applying an IO lens.  This concept is further explained in this chapter.   
 
A. ORGANIZATION OF TERRORIST GROUPS.  
What does a Catholic, working class, PIRA volunteer from Falls Road in 
Belfast have in common with an Islamic Fundamentalist in the towering 
Hindukush of Afghanistan or a Marxist Revolutionary in the jungles of Colombia?  
Terrorist organizations differ greatly in their goals, means, and operating 
environment as will be described later in subsequent chapters. However, nearly 
all terrorist organizations share one common trait.  They are illegal organs hunted 
by a higher authority and dependent upon secrecy for survival.  This covert, 
illegal nature provides insight into why terrorist organizations may apply 
Information Operations in order to survive and further their objectives.   
Understanding the conditions that cause the deliberate or unplanned use of IO 
may enhance predictive analysis and further develop effective counter terrorism 
strategies. 
 
1. Legitimacy Dilemma.   
The covert and illegal nature of terrorist organizations creates an 
interesting dilemma for groups wishing to appear legitimate in the eyes of the 
state and to their ‘would-be’ supporters. Terrorists must sacrifice secrecy for 
efficiency in order to gain legitimacy as a viable threat, and the sacrifice 
increases the risk of failed missions and getting caught.  While numerous terrorist 
experts have written about the nature of terrorist organizations, one historian, J. 
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Bowyer Bell, has made detailed studies of the nature of terrorist, guerrilla, and 
insurgent organizations for a quarter of a century.  Bell’s analysis highlights an 
important dilemma most terrorist organizations face: they must appear to be 
legitimate organizations in order to gain leverage with the state and to appear 
attractive to sympathizers and supporters, yet they must remain a low enough 
threat as well as secret and hidden from the state in order to stay alive.  J.B. Bell 
has coined this ‘covert-illegal’ commonalty shared by all terrorist organizations as 
the Dragonworld.  Bell describes the Dragonworld as a ‘dream for dramatic 
change’.  He claims “terrorists live in a world that is not structured by traditional 
values or by personal consideration, but rather by an ideal that cannot be 
achieved except by recourse to violence” (1999, p.81). Terrorists freely employ 
abhorrent tactics, ignoring rules established in the Geneva Convention, 
conventional laws of warfare, and even fundamental human rights.  This lawless 
nature of terrorism is supported by their own code of ethics, which is not 
consistent with accepted codes of ethics.  As a consequence of violating 
domestic or international laws, they are hunted, and so must pay considerable 
attention to maintaining their security, not only so their operations will be 
successful, but also so they will not get caught.  
As a group moves forward in its lifecycle it is faced with sacrificing secrecy 
for efficiency of operations in order to stay viable (McCormick lecture, 2002). “As 
a general rule, the greater the secrecy, the greater the inefficiency of the 
organization or operation; absolute secrecy assures absolute chaos” (Bell, 1990, 
p.203). The Shining Path spent ten years building an underground secure and 
clandestine organization, but sacrificed some of its operation secrecy when it 
launched its campaign of violence in 1980  (Crenshaw, 1998, p.17). Groups at 
this point need a synergy of action to minimize their risk or make it worthwhile. 
Terrorist organizations seek change: political, religious, or ideological; however, 
they often lack public support and are too weak to legitimately fight for their 
cause.  They must emerge from this underground, described by Bell, to appeal to 
the populace and gain support; yet must avoid being caught by the state counter-
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terrorist forces.  Bell states, “It is impossible to overstress the penalties paid by 
those on the run: to survive, appear normal, and still operate" (1998, p.81). 
  This section explores the terrorists’ use of IO by examining both 
components of the dilemma.  First, how they employ elements of IO to remain 
secret and covert and then how they are able to emerge from Bell’s Dragonworld 
to gain respect and legitimacy from the state and supporters.  
 
a. Employ IO to Stay Alive. 
The first and most vital aspect of the dilemma terrorists must 
overcome is their vulnerability to the states’ counter-terrorist forces.  The PIRA 
employs several key elements of IO in order to remain covert and unseen by the 
British intelligence forces.  Active PIRA members skillfully integrate deception 
and a strict ‘street sense’ of operational security into their operations.  Members 
blend into the populace, making it extremely difficult for British forces to 
distinguish active members from normal Irish citizens. Eamon Collins, a former 
PIRA intelligence operative, notes “IRA volunteers operating in rural areas, 
wanting to blend in with the hedges, fields, and trees, could wear camouflage 
jackets, but that’s not the gear for towns and villages. You have to blend in with 
the local population: you look like a mechanic, or a postman, or a bank clerk, not 
Fidel Castro” (Gerwehr & Glenn, 2000, p.41). PIRA members never keep written 
orders, addresses, or target information on their body.  Written and telephone 
communications are strictly controlled and normally encoded. Logistics and direct 
action operations are separate.  Often the operative moves to the target area 
without a weapon or bomb, only to recover it from a hide site or another member 
posing as a street vendor near the target.   The PIRA organizational structure 
also provides protection against detection.  The PIRA operated under the 
historical Irish Army structure complete with traditional army hierarchy and 
military titles for its members until the late 1970s. However, this organization 
efficiency undermined their OPSEC, enabling British intelligence to easily 
template and infiltrates their organization.  Members of the Provisional IRA cited 
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this weakness as the one of the main reasons behind the 1977 reorganization.   
Wright quotes members stating:  
The old system came close to identifying those responsible for 
different operations, for if a car was hijacked in Turf Lodge, and 
used in a bombing expedition or such the like, the British knew that 
the unit which carried out the operation was based at Turf Lodge.  
Then all they would have to do is arrest all the known suspects in 
that area, torture them, and eventually they would get one 
confession, implicating the others involved (Wright, 1990, p.154).   
The PIRA evolved into a cellular organization to better protect 
information and improve operation security. By the end of 1978 British 
intelligence was admitting:  “we know little of the detailed workings of the 
hierarchy in Dublin.  In particular, we have scant knowledge of how the logistical 
system works, nor do we know the extent to which the older, apparently retired, 
republican leaders influence the movement” (Wright, 1990, p.154).  The cellular 
structure compartments the active units from the command structure and support 
personnel.  This makes British infiltration into the cells nearly impossible and also 
limits the extent of damage when a cell becomes compromised. 
Al-Qa’ida, serving as an umbrella organization for many Islamic 
Fundamental terrorist groups6, is a very unique organization (Alexander & 
Swetnam, 2001, p.5).  Yet, arguably, Usama Bin Laden relies on the same 
elements of IO as the PIRA to remain covert and survive.  The cornerstone of bin 
Laden’s strategy to ‘stay alive’ had been the impenetrable sanctuary from which 
he operated.  His headquarters and training camps were located high in the 
Hindukush Mountains in Khuasan, Afghanistan, extremely forbidding terrain that 
isolates him from counter-terrorist units. This created a permissive environment 
that allowed al Qa’ida to sacrifice some operation secrecy for improved operating 
frequency, with minimum risk. Bin Laden incorporated the vast cave and tunnel 
networks, built during the 1970s to defeat the Soviets, into his strategy to provide 
secrecy and security for his operations.  His 1996 declaration of war states “By 
the grace of Allah, a safe base is now available in the Hindukush Mountains; 
                                            
6 Groups include al-Jihad, Abu Sayyff, Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Hizzbollah, and Mujahadeen.  
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where the largest infidel military force in the world was destroyed” (Robbins, 
2003, p.358).  Additionally, bin Laden benefited greatly from the Afghanistan 
Taliban government providing him safe haven.  Prior to September 11th, 2001, 
there were no direct threats to his headquarters and training base.  This 
permissiveness allowed terrorists to easily blend into the Afghan civilian 
population.  
 
b.   IO as a Force Multiplier. 
To overcome the legitimacy dilemma, White contends that terrorists 
must somehow appear to be more capable than they actually are in order to gain 
respect and legitimacy from the government and the populace. Brian Jenkins 
states “all political terrorists want to give the illusion that they can fight on another 
level” and they use force multipliers to support that illusion (White, p.16). Force 
multipliers allow a terrorist organization to increase its’ striking power without 
increasing its size (White, 2002, p.16). Jenkins suggests they employ four force 
multipliers routinely to accomplish this illusion and add to their aura: technology, 
transnational support, media, and religion (p.17).  The force multipliers are not 
weapons per se, rather they constitute a process of information exploitation 
intended to influence decision makers and shape public opinion (Armistead, 
2002, p.6).  Jenkins’ force multiplier concept is too incomplete to fulfill the needs 
of our thesis as a terrorist IO typology.  However, the inclusion of technology and 
media makes the concept adaptable and his theory describing the terrorists’ 
need to appear legitimate very useful.  Jenkins’ theory is primarily based upon 
the target audience’s perception of the terrorist organization.  Since most 
terrorists are too weak to directly confront the state in the physical environment, 
they seek to achieve their objective of ‘legitimacy’ in the information environment.  
They often employ elements of IO as a ‘force multiplier’ to accomplish this.   Two 
of the force multipliers categorized by Jenkins, technology and the media, 
facilitate the terrorists’ use of Information Operations.  Hoffman contends that the 
merging of these two force multipliers, coined as the ‘information revolution’, has 
created opportunities for terrorists to manipulate the media and influence multiple 
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audiences.  Advanced technology has made the world more transparent, creating 
a global ‘fishbowl’, where even local events can have international influences.   
Clearly the real-time footage of 9/11 transmitted instantly around the world had 
profound impacts not only on all Americans, but on the international community 
as well (Hoffman, 1998, p.153).  
 Militarily speaking, IO serves as a force multiplier in support of 
physical operations much like artillery serves as a force multiplier supporting 
infantry or armor units.  The supporting role of Information Operations is a key 
element in US doctrine.  This concept is also relevant to the terrorists’ use of IO. 
Since most terrorist organizations cannot or choose not to combat states 
militarily, they must rely on force multipliers that "allow a small group of 
individuals to operate as if they were a larger group" (White, 2002, p.16).  White 
suggests that force multipliers are exceptions to the following rule of thumb: "The 
larger the group, the larger the level of activity" (p. 17).  Terrorists use force 
multipliers, including Information Operations, to increase their striking power and 
influence, without increasing their size.   This is integral to a group’s survival and 
ability to achieve its goals. 
 
2. Physical Environment Enables Terrorist IO.   
As previously indicated, terrorists have demonstrated as early as 67 A.D a 
strategy of using violence to spread their message in the information 
environment to help achieve objectives. Technology such as computers and 
mass media helps promote success beyond a smaller audience, which is why 
they are force multipliers. As noted in Chapter II, conventional US military 
doctrine and theory proposes that Information Operations are intended to 
supplement and enable successful combat operations in the physical 
environment.  The US targets information assets in all three of Waltz’s domains: 
adversary decision makers and the populace in the perceptual domain, networks 
and processes in the information infrastructure domain, and physical information 
activities in the physical domain.  During the recent war in Afghanistan, the US 
successfully targeted the world’s Muslim population with an IO campaign to 
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isolate the al Qa’ida terrorists and Taliban supporters.  US diplomats influenced 
leaders of other nations to cut off support to al Qa’ida and promoted Muslim 
solidarity alongside the United States against an enemy of Islam.  The US also 
made it perfectly clear that the US would not tolerate states harboring terrorists.  
This IO campaign effectively cut off bin Laden and the Taliban leadership from 
any significant outside support and enabled the US to physically invade 
Afghanistan with little opposition and resistance. Thus, the IO campaign served 
as a supporting activity, shaping the Information Environment and enabling 
successful operations in the physical environment.     
The US military achieves victories in the physical environment by waging 
battles in the physical environment, using the Information Environment to help 
support our objectives and reduce costs of war.  Terrorists act in the physical 
environment not to make tactical gains in the physical environment, but to wage 
strategic battle in the information environment; therefore the PE enables many of 
the activities in the IE to occur. Terrorists exploit the IE to reduce the necessary 
actions in the PE, because a group cannot face a state in the PE. A battle in the 
PE is a war of attrition a terrorist group will surely lose. If Hamas or Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) detonates a bomb at a crowded café in 
Haifa or at an Israeli checkpoint in the West Bank, their intent is not to kill Israelis 
for tactical gains, but rather to support strategic objectives. Terrorists are not 
attempting to make tactical gains or influences by killing civilians or shutting 
down checkpoints, but often to speak to a wider audience. The act can 
demonstrate ongoing group activity to its members (the Hamas website 
chronologically lists all hostile actions by group members or supporters) or 
perpetuate a psychology of terror to citizens, its government, and a state’s allies 
or supporters.  A terrorist organization cannot capitalize or reinforce on tactical 
gains in the PE, since resources are limited and attacks are generally too 
isolated to have an effect on a state.  The attacks on the US on September 11th 
were extremely devastating, the most catastrophic terrorist attack in our nation’s 
history.  However, al Qa’ida did not or could not quickly follow through with 
similar or even smaller attacks on US interests in the PE. While sometimes a 
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group’s physical attack may serve merely as only a tactical purpose, such as a 
retribution killing or destruction of a key C2 node, it often has the dual or primary 
purpose of having a strategic impact, and targets are chosen because they have 
strategic impact-terrorists view targets through an inherent IO lens. 
Michael Radu suggests that although US Information Operations may 
often impact the adversary’s perception or will to fight, normally, we rely on 
victory in the physical environment to win the battle (ed. Radvanyi, p.121). This is 
primarily true because we seldom lack the combat power necessary to 
overwhelm the adversary’s forces.  By contrast terrorist organizations can never 
hope to achieve a sustained victory against a state by attacks in the physical 
environment alone.  Employing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) such as 
biological and nuclear weapons still cannot give a group a sustained victory. 
Cities and states can recover from such attacks, and it is highly unlikely a group 
has the resources to execute several WMDs. Therefore, even with WMD, 
terrorists cannot play in the state’s arena. Groups often rely on attacks in the 
physical environment as the supporting activity7 to enable their operations in the 
information environment.  Michael Radu suggests that terrorist organizations use 
military operations to supplement their political war.  Political war, he claims is 
“ultimately propaganda … a coherent, consistent, and conscious attempt to 
manipulate facts, images, perception, and emotions” (p.122).  
 McCormick’s Influence Process Model (explained in chapter I) supports 
this assertion.  He suggests that terrorists need either a physical act or direct 
communication with the media in order to get second and third order effects in 
the information environment, which influences one or more target audiences. 
Without the first, second and third order effects, terrorists are not afforded the 
opportunity to influence anyone beyond the immediate attack victims. This 
reinforces that IO is the supported activity (vice supporting activity for 
conventional forces) for terrorists, that the physical act enables the activities in 
the information environment, that actions in the physical domain are minimized 
                                            
7 supported activity is main effort;  supporting activity supports main effort 
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but maximized in the information infrastructure and perceptual domains. This 
conclusion produces a hypothesis that terrorist and conventional forces at war 
have an inverse relationship in these domains, as depicted in Figure 6. This 
helps visualize the difference of application of IO by each force. The figure uses 
the Waltz IO conceptual domains to demonstrate the inverse approach the 





























Figure 6.   Activity within IO Conceptual Domains 
The figure also graphically portrays the larger presence by DoD in the 
physical domain and inversely the larger reliance by terrorist in the perception 
domain. This understanding is important when comparing terrorist group activity 
to that of a conventional military. The terrorists’ approach and application of IO 
are different because they have a different approach to their operations. It could 
be said that DoD set the conditions with IO before the physical attack while 
terrorists set conditions in the physical domain before their information attack. 
However a group that has greater parity with a state will likely have less reliance 
on IO (Buettner, email, 2003). For example, the FARC has more military parity 
with its opposing state than Hamas or IRA with theirs, and conducts 
proportionately different acts in the physical domain instead of perception 
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domain. The disparity is perhaps another factor requiring terrorist groups to have 
a heavy reliance on IO to achieve their objectives. 
 
3. Terrorist IO Target Audiences. 
Terrorism is aimed at the people watching, not the actual victims. 
Terrorism is theater.   (Jenkins, as cited in Nacos,1994, p. 75) 
Joanne Wright (1990), author of “Terrorist Propaganda,” suggests that 
terrorist operations, including physical destruction, has specific targets and 
messages, which are adjusted or emphasized according to the target selected or 
the particular tactic being used. Terrorist Information Operations essentially are 
about transmitting a message. A message must have a sender and a receiver, 
but not just any receiver. The audiences are a critical component of operations; 
terrorists understand what an audience likely needs to hear in order to be 
influenced and selects targets and subsequent actions accordingly. For example, 
the ETA (Spain) would target not just the local populace but the international 
audience as well in order to ensure continued support and sympathy. Each target 
plays a role in their quest to accomplish their strategic objectives. She claims that 
terrorists often target three separate audiences in their publicity efforts.  She 
contends the three influential audiences are comprised of people who are 
uncommitted, sympathetic, or active in the terrorist organization.  For the purpose 
of this thesis we have added a fourth audience comprised of those people who 
are opposed to the terrorists.  Wright describes the uncommitted audience as 
having two components: the general public of the country where the terrorists are 
operating and the international public.  Neither audience knows much about the 
terrorist group or its cause.  Generally, the audience maintains a neutral 
perspective, often viewing the terrorists as political activists, yet they remain 
vulnerable to terrorist propaganda and being coaxed into becoming sympathetic 
toward the terrorists. Wright describes the sympathetic audience as those people 
who already have a broad historical or ideological sympathy with the terrorists 
and are familiar with their political aims.  This audience keeps the political debate 
on the terrorists’ aims rather than on the violence.  On a practical level, they 
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provide food, money, or shelter to the active members; they also provide the 
majority of recruits into the organization. The sympathizers can also have a 
limited active role of aiding secrecy by not providing or divulging information to 
the state on terrorist activity and their whereabouts.  The active audience is made 
up of those people who are self-confessed members of the terrorist organization, 
including those in prison.  The active audience is often the target of the terrorist 
groups’ internal propaganda, also known as auto-propaganda.   The fourth 
audience, comprised of those people who directly oppose the group, includes the 
state’s government, rival paramilitary groups, and anti-terrorist units.  This 
audience actively seeks to discover, discredit, and destroy the terrorist group.   
Figure 7 illustrates the four audiences described above by Wright.  The chapter 
further develops this framework by examining how terrorists select potential 

















Figure 7.   Audiences 
A terrorist groups’ understanding of their audiences lends credence to the 
theory that groups inherently view targets and operations through an IO lens. 
This might explain why groups involve their IO related actions from the beginning 
as opposed to the DoD practice of adding IO to their operations. Essentially, they 
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do not have to ask themselves “what can we do to get an edge in the perception 
domain,” because it is an inherent part of operations conception and planning 
(the main difference between sub-state and conventional forces planning).  
Figure 8 illustrates the process, where a group determines its strategic objectives 
and selects its targets to support the objectives. The targets are viewed through 
the IO lens so planned operations incorporate minimum physical domain 
presence and maximum perceptual domain influence. The resulting impact on 
the target audiences reinforces the strategic objectives, and the cycle continues 














1 – Establish objectives
2 – Select operation and target to 
support objective using IO lens
3 – Execute operation
















Figure 8.   Terrorist IO Target Lens 
Usama bin Laden’s unprecedented attack against the United States on 
September 11th, 2001 is a recent example of a single attack meant to convey 
messages to multiple audiences. The targets were selected not only to influence 
the Bush Administration and US government (opposing audience) and most of 
the American citizens (uncommitted audience), but also international audiences 
(Buettner8 lecture, 2001).  The message was that the most powerful nation could 
                                            
8 LCDR (ret) Ray Buettner, Associate Professor of Information Sciences, Naval Postgraduate 
School. 
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not protect its citizens (Nacos, 1994, p. 60). The lethalness and willingness of the 
attacks sent a message to other audiences such as Israel (opposing), Saudi 
Arabia and other moderate Arab states (uncommitted).  The attacks appealed to 
sympathetic audiences in Iraq, Lebanon, and other anti-US states to join al-
Qa’ida’s cause.   Bin Laden conveyed a message to the Muslim population 
worldwide for different reasons. The attacks also signaled commitment to current 
and potential members in the active audience, as well as financial, political and 
logistical backers in the sympathetic audience. The al Qa’ida attacks in May 
2003, were likely designed to reach multiple audiences, by showing the opposing 
audiences the organization is still functional and able to operate as a network 
(the near simultaneous attacks in several countries). The attacks demonstrated 
to the active and sympathetic audiences that the group is operating, to continue 
support, to join the cause, or to continue with assigned missions.  
Many terrorist groups are able to influence more than one target audience 
from a single attack in the physical environment by applying a slightly different 
‘spin’ to the story.  The propagandist can only achieve this by understanding their 
audiences.  The Internet and other advanced technology allow numerous terrorist 
organizations to transmit their messages directly to audiences worldwide in 
several different languages.   The Hamas Website (www.palestine-info.info/), for 
example, is a portal site in six languages: English, Russian, Indonesian, Arabic, 
Persian, and Urdu. Each site is hosted on a server in a different country and 
targets a different audience. Although the sites usually have similar headline 
stories, they often vary in perspective, structure and content.  This is evident 
even without translation, through the use and placement of photos. Hizzbollah in 
1998 operated three separate “web sites:  one for the press office 
(www.hizbollah.org), another to describe its attacks on Israeli targets 
(www.moqawama.org), and the third for news and information 




B. A TERRORIST’S APPROACH TO IO. 
Information warfare, as a separate technique of waging war, does 
not exist. (Libicki, 2001, Preface). 
Martin Libicki’s9 statement likely was meant to apply to conventional 
militaries; it is true even more so with terrorists. The terrorist use of the various 
elements is significant and an inherent component of almost all terrorist 
operations. Terrorists could not cease their application of IO and succeed in 
achieving their objectives. Terrorism is a form of unconventional warfare and 
often in unconventional conflicts; the strategic objectives cannot be reached 
through victories in conventional military battles.  The victory must be achieved 
through indirect methods.  Maurice Tugwell argues that as a consequence, the 
campaign becomes one of leverage where the objective is to move the ‘asset’ (a 
policy, a territory, the right to govern, and so on) into a liability that the state sees 
it as no longer worth fighting for.  Tugwell suggests that propaganda is key to 
achieving this objective. This, he says “brings the propagandists onto the central 
and dominating feature of the battle space landscape” (Tugwell, 1992, p.75).   In 
this battle of the weak against the strong, the prime targets for the terrorists are 
not the physical assets of the state for these are its strengths.  Rather, the 
terrorists target intangible assets: the state’s legitimacy and the will of its 
population and security forces (Wright, 1990, p.10).  The violent physical act of 
terrorism is only the most recognizable form of propaganda.  Bruce Hoffman 
suggests “terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological 
effects beyond the immediate victims or the objects of the terrorist attack” 
(Hoffman, 1998, p.43). Through the publicity generated by their violence, 
terrorists seek to obtain leverage, influence, and power they otherwise lack in 
order to effect political change on either a local or international level (p.44).  
One of the enduring axioms of terrorism is that it is designed to generate 
publicity and attract attention to the terrorists and their cause (Hoffman, 1998, 
p.154). We have established in this chapter that by design or necessity terrorists 
                                            
9  Maritn Libicki, Senior Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, speciales in 
application of information technology to national security. 
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are forced to use the information environment to wage their battles and win their 
wars. Information is a valuable currency. Terrorist have evolved into the ultimate 
IO warriors, yet are likely unaware the concept even exists. Since terrorists rely 
so heavily upon success in the information environment to achieve their 
objectives, it would seem logical that they have developed a keen understanding 
of how to best leverage the information. Groups understand the synergistic value 
of applying the elements of what the DoD calls Information Operations to 
accomplish their objectives either out of necessity or due to deft strategic 
planning. While the US military relies upon doctrine and military publications to 
explain how to incorporate and employ elements of IO, terrorists seem to operate 
under an inherent yet unwritten IO strategy.  Out of necessity they integrate the 
different elements of IO.  Generally, terrorist groups have developed their own 
‘IO toolkit’ based upon actions that have worked for their predecessors or other 
terrorist groups. The IRA has a long history of deceit, ambush, and propaganda 
from which to draw experience.  Al Qa’ida’s al-Jihad manual provides scenario 
driven guidance and direction to active members, such as actions taken prior to a 
bombing to gain the most attention, and how to maintain secrecy during an 
operation (see “OPSEC” section in this chapter).    
 An example of a coordinated terrorist IO campaign occurred in 
Latin America in the 1960’s. Carlos Marighella, a Brazilian revolutionary terrorist, 
published practical guides10 for terrorism (White, 2002, p.114). Marighella 
espoused a two phase strategy of causing violence and then giving the violence 
meaning. Violence was good for causing panic among the ruling class by 
selecting targets of symbolic value that appealed to multiple audiences. The 
entire “terror campaign was accompanied by a psychological offensive to provide 
peripheral support for terrorists,” essentially a coordinated IO campaign (White, 
2002, p.115).  Manighella’s method for organizing a terror campaign could be 
viewed as the first formal IO doctrine, and has been used over the past 40 years 
by different political groups from the Japanese Red Army to the Freeman of 
Montana (White, 2002, p.114). Terrorists cannot confront states in the physical 
                                            
10 For the Liberation of Brazil and The Minimanual of the Urban Guerilla 
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environment. Since a majority of a terrorist organization’s activity is in the 
perception domain, a terrorist’s approach to IO is similarly altered. The DoD uses 
IO to support actions in the physical environment, and the doctrine and approach 
supports that. Terrorists wage their battles in a different medium than the DoD, 
so it is logical their approach and application of the IO tools would be different. 
These differences also make a ‘side by side’ analysis difficult, if not misleading. 
We first must gain an understanding of what generally comprises terrorist 
Information Operations in relation to our established doctrine. To do so, it is also 
necessary to operationalize the conventional elements of IO in terms that make 
sense to terrorists.  Elements such as EW and computer network operations are 
difficult to analyze, if done in accordance with DoD doctrine.  Much of the 
doctrine is written in order to exploit our advanced technology and equipment. 
Terrorists simply cannot or do not need to employ the same expensive and 
resource intensive equipment that we do. The following paragraphs revisits IO 
elements and Waltz’s conceptual domain explained in Chapter II; however, we 
redefine the elements of IO to relate to terrorist activity.  This redefining of terms 
will help to identify how terrorist use IO. 
 
1.  Elements of IO. 
DoD uses offensive IO to support a physical battle though use of PYSOP 
leaflets, use of deception, OPSEC and EW. Terrorist use offensive IO principally 
to influence a variety of people, including potential supporters and use physical 
acts of violence to enable their IO messages (Denning email, 2003,). Terrorists 
use defensive IO to stay alive by maintaining secrecy and subverting collection 
and detection by the state. 
 
a.  Psychological Operations (PSYOP). 
Terrorists’ use of PSYOP is generally labeled as psychological 
warfare.  Psywar is generally accomplished through propaganda and the actual 
acts of terror, and is essential for recruitment and influencing populations and 
governments. Terrorists manipulate facts, images, perception, and emotions to 
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gain a political edge and legitimacy. The violent act itself is a form of 
psychological warfare (Hoffman, 2001).  Bruce Hoffman states, “terrorism may be 
seen as a violent act that is conceived specifically to attract attention and then, 
through the publicity it generates, to communicate a message” (Hoffman, 1998, 
p.131.)  Generally, all acts of propaganda fall under psywar. Different types of 
propaganda include auto-propaganda (acts aimed internally) and most media-
related releases and products. Many groups such as the PIRA and Hamas use 
leaflets or handbills as a means of communicating messages to the local 
population. The United National Leadership of the Uprising used leaflets to 
coordinate non-violent civil disobedience acts in Israel and even to counter 
dissenting messages of other Palestinian groups (Robinson, 1997, p.158). al 
Qa’ida distributed professionally made CD-ROMs throughout Muslim countries 
as part of their recruiting process (see Chapter VI).  Auto propaganda is used to 
instill or reinforce ideas into a group’s followers. Perhaps the best example of 
auto propaganda by al Qa’ida is selling the concept of virgins and a rewarding 
afterlife as a means to enlist martyrs and keep the thousands of followers 
involved in a protracted struggle (Hoffman, 2001, p.10). 
 
b.  Deception. 
Terrorist use of deception parallels DoD’s use. Deception is used to 
delay or prevent discovery of true attacks (critical when acts in the physical 
environment are executed at the minimum) or a group’s operations in general. 
Preventing discovery of groups’ activities and its members is key to survival. In 
May 2001, bin Laden deceived U. S. technical collection systems by allowing a 
major attack plan to be monitored (Walcott & Strobel, 2001).  The U.S. believed 
two major attacks were going to occur against American targets on the Arabian 
Peninsula. We reacted with increased security and travel advisories, which 
appeared to have thwarted or dissuaded bin Laden from carrying out the attacks. 
al Qa’ida controlled the information we received, provided a credible course of 
action, and affected our decision makers. Al Qa’ida caused the US to believe it 
had stopped the major attacks, while it was merely a deception to conceal the 
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real target on September 11th (Walcot & Strobel, 2001). The group also likely 
evaluated our reaction in order to exploit further weaknesses or modify tactics as 
part of the September 2001 attacks. Hijackers and suicide bombers employ 
tactical deception by concealing their missions and attacks. One al Qa’ida 
technique to defeat surveillance is the use of code words (see Chapter VI). 
 
c. Operations Security (OPSEC). 
OPSEC can be defined as secrecy for terrorists and is a key 
weapon in their campaigns. DoD is proficiency based and OPSEC is generally a 
tertiary priority behind intelligence and friendly unit requirements. Terrorist groups 
are secrecy based making secrecy one of the more critical elements for terrorists’ 
success and survival.  J. Bowyer Bell detailed in his book Dragonworld how 
secrecy is the fabric that envelops the covert world of terrorists. Secrecy is a 
necessary and priority element of all covert organizations, and is sometimes 
degraded as groups grow in size or undertake large operations (McCormick 
lecture, 2002).  Al Qa’ida produced a document called the Jihad Manual that 
(Hoffman, 2002) had explicit, “micro managing” instructions on operational 
security. The manual demonstrates the organization’s understanding and 
commitment to maintaining secrecy; secrecy of operations is tantamount to 
success of physical environment actions, the precursor to the intended influence 
effects.  
 
d. Public Affairs (PA). 
Media is the Public Affairs equivalent in the context of terrorist 
operations and is a critical IO element. There would be little value if an embassy 
bombing did not receive media coverage (Nacos, 1994, p 48-49). The media 
images of planes crashing into the Twin Towers reached around the world within 
an hour of the event. The media also transmitted images of Palestinians and 
radical Muslim students in Pakistan rejoicing upon seeing or hearing of the news, 
an example of media’s effectiveness. DoD focuses on disseminating the truth 
externally and internally to help audiences understand its strategy; terrorists want 
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to use media for their propaganda, even though it may focus on violence (White, 
2002, p.258). Although news reports rarely report a group’s goals or objectives, 
often any audience is better than none. Terrorists do not just want attention, but 
the exploitation of news, which implies strategy and timing. Carlos the Jackal in 
1975 waited patiently for the television camera crews to arrive before making his 
dramatic and televised escape (Hoffman, 1998, p.142). Media acts are designed 
to achieve the desired effect of presenting information that leads to confidence in 
the terrorists’ group and their ability to conduct operations (one audience), to 
convey a message (accuracy not relevant) about a group’s past, current or future 
activities or intent (various audiences). The media is also a conduit for groups to 
learn from other groups’ successes and failures (Crenshaw, 1998, p.11).  The 
media can give a group legitimacy and standing (Nacos, 1994, p.66), because 
without media, some groups such as the PLO would not exist (White, 2002, 
p.258). Terrorists must use the media to spread their terror to larger audiences 
and gain the maximum potential leverage that they need to effect fundamental 
political change. “Terrorism is theater,” Brian Jenkins declared in his 1974 
seminal paper, explaining how, “terrorist attacks are carefully choreographed to 
attract the attention of the electronic media and the international press” (Hoffman, 
1998, p.132).    Even when an operation fails, groups can still be winners if they 
draw media attention. This was evident in the years following the 1972 Olympics 
hostage crisis failure, when thousands joined Palestinian groups in 1974 and 
Arafat was allowed to address the UN General Assembly in 1975 (Hoffman, 
1998, p.73). Terrorist will sometimes deliver their message directly to the media 
to better control their message (see Influence Process Model, Chapter I). 
Examples include 1986 interviews with Abul Abbas of the PLO and Abu Nidal 
(Nacos, 1998, p.62) and al Qa’ida sending audio and video messages to al-
Jazeera (Fingel, 2003). Usama Bin Laden issued a Declaration of War in 1996 
through al-Qa’ida that was a rally call for his organization against Christians and 
Jews. Media outlets such as CNN and major US newspapers gave the 
declaration international attention with significant coverage of the document’s 
bold wording against the United States. Hizzbollah has guaranteed dissemination 
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of its message by owing and operating a radio station and newspaper in Lebanon 
(Kramer, 1998, p.131). Many groups such as al Qa’ida (see Chapter VI), 
Hizzbollah, Hamas, Zapatistas, and Tamil Tigers operate web sites as a viable 
media outlet. In 1998, 12 of the 30 groups on the State Department’s list of 
terrorist organizations had a web presence (Denning, 1999, p. 68). 
 
e. Electronic Warfare (EW).  
For practical and costs reason, terrorists rely on off the shelf technology 
such as ham radios, scanners, jammers, and IR technology (Denning lecture, 
February 2003). There are examples of groups subverting state EW systems and 
using electromagnetic spectrum weapons. The FARC used single-sided band 
radio equipment to government communications during a 1998 offensive 
(Denning lecture, Feb. 19, 2003). Remote detonated bombs have been used 
against US troops in Somalia and Afghanistan (“Bomb Explodes,” 2003). The 
PIRA used remote detonated bombs in the 1970’s to reduce accidental deaths. 
The tactic proved so effective Britain was forced to develop electronic 
countermeasures (Hoffman, 1998, p.180). PIRA demonstrated their adaptability 
by progressing from radio frequency to radar to microchip in order to counter the 
countermeasures (see also Chapter V). Remote technology was used in an 
assassination attempt on Prime Minister Thatcher in 1984 and Prime Minister 
Major in 1991 (p.180).  Chapter V further explores the PIRA’s use of EW in their 
operations. Aidid subverted US EW in Somalia by having knowledge of our 
systems and using low tech means such as drum codes and runners to degrade 
collection (Arquilla, & Ronfeldt, 2001, p.11). Al Qa’ida used similar electronic 
protect measures in summer of 2001 to mislead US electronic collectors about 
the group’s operations. Bin Laden used low-tech means such as couriers to 
communicate and conduct financial transactions (Walcott & Strobel, 2001). 
Finally, the Japanese group Middle Core Faction in 1985 used EW in support of 
operations when they cut strategic power and communication cables supporting 
computer controls, and jammed police and rescue frequencies to delay response 
by authorities (Denning, 1999, p. 180).  
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f. Physical Destruction. 
The physical attack is the most basic of all terrorist tactics and is an 
important component in the IO strategy; a springboard to allow others elements 
to be integrated. “Psychological Warfare employs physical destruction at times 
for psychological effect “(Buettner, personal communication, May 2003). Hoffman 
considers armed propaganda (violent acts with clear symbolic intent) a critical 
element in terrorists’ operational calculus (1998, p.160). While DoD generally 
uses conventional military means to execute its doctrine, terrorist’s acts include 
kidnapping, political murder and bombings. Physical attacks are necessary to get 
first order effect (media attention) in the influence process (Influence Process 
Model, Chapter I). Spectacular and brutal deeds assure terrorists of substantial 
press coverage and public attention; otherwise they “would throw roses if it would 
work” (Nacos, 1994, p.8). A rule of thumb for successful terrorist Information 
Operations is that violence cannot be indiscriminate; it must be purposeful and 
deliberate, sustained and omnipresent in order to achieve maximum effect in 
perception domain. (Hoffman, 1998, p.161) Narodnaya Volya (People’s Will) 
used bombing and murder in attempting to bring about revolution in 1870 
(Kramer, 1998, p.136). The method of individuals using extreme acts became 
known as “propaganda by deed,” (Kramer, 1998, p.136) Using physical attacks, 
as a means of influencing targets is as old as terrorism itself. The Zealots (66-73 
A.D.) staged deaths so they had psychological repercussion (Hoffman, 1998, 
p.88), while the Assassins in tenth century A.D sought death and publicity. The 
Jewish terrorist group Irgun in 1948 used violence in place of a military strategy 
to undermine resolve and attract international attention to its quest to create a 
Zionist state (Hoffman, 1998, p.48). It is likely future acts of destruction will 
include destruction of computer and automation systems in support of main 
attacks, such as the Middle Core Faction attack in 1985 in Japan. 
 
g. Computer Network Operations (CNO).  
Terrorist cyberspace actions are not yet a critical tactic or threat, 
although this is the one area terrorists can quickly gain parity with states. The 
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majority of cyber related activity appears to be mainly defense (communication 
and coordination) and exploitation (intelligence collection), with very little attack 
(physical or digital destruction). Computers are critical for use in fundraising, 
money laundering, and propaganda, but their use alone shouldn’t be viewed as 
cyber tactics or capabilities. Terrorists use of information technology merely 
represents its availability, ease of use, and affordability. Cyber tools are still 
insufficient for terrorists, because the costs are too high, and may never be viable 
as long as traditional methods are viable (Nelson, Choi, Iacobucci, Mitchell, & 
Gagnon, 1999, p. vii). CNO has the potential to cause widespread effects, but 
actual usage is limited to using the latest in encryption tools (p.32). Although 
several scenarios have demonstrated worse case results, there is no proof cyber 
warfare would be worth the investment when the possibility of a pay off can be 
small (Denning, p.70). The psychological pay off is still greater for traditional acts 
of terror such as bombing and hijacking (p.70). A 1999 Naval Postgraduate White 
Paper analyzed terrorists’ use of CNO and categorized acts and activity as 
“cyber attack” (CNA) and “cyber support” (CND) (Nelson, et al.,1999, p.10). 
Cyber support allows a security conscience organization to flourish using 
available secrecy tools such as encryption and steganography (hiding messages 
within documents and images in plain sight. Cyber support such as 
communication, planning and coordination, recruiting, fundraising, money 
laundering is arguably invisible to actions for the cause but still part of the IO 
rubric of CNO. Cyber support augments or enhances normal terrorist CAN 
activities, such as degrading confidentiality, integrity, and availability (p.11). 
Cyber attacks include interruption of Defense C41 Systems and destruction of 
SCADA sensors. The White Paper goes in depth on tactics, resources, and likely 
application or courses of actions different groups would take. The IRA conducted 
Computer Network Exploitation when it infiltrated computerized database to steal 
information and used encryption to conceal files (Denning, 1999, p.68).  Al Qa’ida 
has been researching weaknesses of Supervisory Controls and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA) systems (Venke & Ibrahim, 2002). Hamas uses “encrypted Internet 
communication to transmit maps, pictures and other details pertaining to 
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terrorists attacks” (Denning, & Baugh, 1999). Groups appear to use the Internet 
more to influence public perception than launch attacks. 
There are limited examples of cyber attacks by groups. The 
Zapatista’s use of Internet is possibly the most widely known. The Zapatista 
National Liberation Army (EZLN) compensated for lack of physical power in 
Mexico by dominating the information space.  On April 10, 1998 Zapatista 
supporters (coordinated through the Internet) organized a denial of service 
(DOS) attacks against Mexican President Zedillo’s website (Denning, 1999, 
p.73). Another example involved a coordinated computer network attack on 
Israeli infrastructure by the Palestinian hacker group UNITY (Denning, lecture, 
2003). The attack was effective, but the hackers likely were only sympathizers of 
terrorist causes, and were not organized or directed by any terrorist groups. 
Steganography has gained widespread attention but there is no evidence to 
support it having been used by terrorists (Denning lecture, 2003). In the 1970’s 
the Italian Red Brigade conducted physical attacks against computers and 
telecommunications systems (Denning, 1999, p.68.) The group launched 27 
attacks on electronic, computer, and weapon businesses in order to strike “at the 
heart of the state” (Denning, 1999, p.69).  A likely terrorist cyber attack would be 
in support of a physical attack. A cyber attack alone might go unnoticed in the 
clutter of daily life, but have more significance if conducted simultaneously with a 
physical attack (Lewis, p.4). A strategy in the future would be to combine 
distributed denial of service (DDOS) and communication jamming techniques 
against emergency services in conjunction with a large scale attack to create 
further chaos, degrade response, and increase damage and fatalities (Vatis, 
2001, p.15). 
 
h. Civil Military Operations (CMO).  
Successful terrorist organizations must conduct a variation of civil 
military operations in order to gain and retain popular support within a country it 
operates (FARC, Hizzbollah) or among its transnational followers (PIRA, al 
Qa’ida).  “Winning hearts and minds” is key to continued recruitment or financial 
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support and maintaining secrecy. While the US military uses CMO to influence 
and coordinate foreign civilian activities and civil organizations, terrorists use 
similar actions on indigenous or sympathetic populations. This is accomplished 
through a combination of propaganda and activities designed to win support. The 
FARC may provide a rural community with wealth or provide protection the 
government cannot. Hamas provides for families of suicide bombers, which gains 
not only community approval, but also it is also key inducement for recruitment. A 
group with community support improves its secrecy element, critical when states 
conduct internal offensives. 
 
i. Intelligence Support.  
Terrorists inherently rely on humans to gather intelligence, while 
DoD relies on technology. Terrorists are very successful in intelligence gathering, 
although human collection is riskier and time consuming. Given that constraint, 
groups likely take it into consideration as part of operation planning. Good 
intelligence is critical to support terrorist planning and objectives, and allows for 
coordination (Libicki, 2001, 4-1). Analysis of Al-Qa’ida’s attacks on the USS Cole, 
the African embassies, and in the United States shows how al Qa’ida made up 
for a lack of sophisticated equipment with simple and secret information 
gathering (“Update: Investigation,” 2000). Intelligence is critical for successful 
terrorist actions in the physical environment, which sets the stage for actions in 
the influence domain. This is done by conducting active and passive intelligence 
gathering and using insiders (“Update: Investigation,” 2000). An example of poor 
intelligence undermining the critical timing associated with most terrorist acts 
occurred in Rome in 1969. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
planned a sensational hijacking of a TWA flight “to coincide with a scheduled 
address by President Nixon to a meeting of the Zionist Organization of America” 




j. Comparison of IO Methods. 
Figure 9 illustrates elements of Information Operations, comparing 
some DoD methods of employment as discussed in chapter II to the terrorist 
methods discussed in this chapter.  The figure reflects a few general methods of 
employing IO to illustrate the different approach terrorists take to IO.  
 
IO Element Department of Defense 
Methods 
Terrorist Methods 
PSYOP Leaflets, broadcasts Leaflets, physical attack, 
auto-propaganda 
Deception Feints, ruses Concealing weapons, 
counter EW, proxies 
OPSEC Classification or limited 
release of information 
Covert network, isolated 
cells, controlling actions 
prior to attack 
Physical 
Destruction 
Precision guided weapons, 






EW EA, ES, EP with ground, sea, 
air assets 
Counter EW, scanners, 
DF and RF detonators 





CA, SOF Support families of 
suicide bombers; provide 
resources, protection or 
wealth to community 




Mostly CND communication 
and coordination) and CNE 
(intelligence collection) 
CNA (DOS, destruction 





Intelligence Support Sensors, UAV, HUMINT, 
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Figure 9.   Comparison of IO Elements 
 
 
2.  Terrorist Activity in the Conceptual Domains. 
In chapter II, we discussed Waltz’s theory on three main conceptual 
domains in order to set up a model to evaluate terrorists’ use and application of 
IO. This section explores Waltz’s information domains and highlights the 
common activities that terrorist conduct in each, showing that even most 
apparently singular-effect actions support a larger IO strategy. 
 
a.  Operations in the Perceptual Domain.  
Terrorist use several elements of IO in the perceptual domain to 
directly influence the decisions of key leaders and populace.  Often they integrate 
elements of PSYOP, Deception, OPSEC, PA & CMO, and Physical Destruction 
to leverage information in this domain.  
Terrorists conduct strategically timed physical attacks such as 
bombings and assassinations as part of their psychological terror campaign.  
Often the selection of the target carries ‘political weight’ that is beneficial to their 
cause. Psychological warfare operations such as coercive bargaining, fear 
propaganda and death threats are proven tactics in influencing and shaping 
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perceptions. Protests, fatwas, and other activities often are used as a deception 
to disguise their true intentions, degrade the state’s counter terrorist efforts or to 
provoke a ‘heavy-handed’ response from the government in order to exploit it. 
Secrecy enables the terrorist organization not only to hide its operations and 
training, but also to inhibit the state from discovering the true strength of the 
organization.  Terrorists often adopt names such as Army, Brigade, or Front in 
order to ‘sound’ bigger than they actually are. Terrorists rely heavily upon public 
relations with the media and the population to propagate their message 
(propaganda) to different audiences, recruits new members into the organization, 
and appeal to sympathizers for financial support. Websites are also a cheap, 
flexible and valuable resource to reach international audiences (Denning, 1999).  
 
b. Operations in the Information Infrastructure Domain. 
Terrorist use this domain to protect information, communicate, and 
disrupt its enemies’ command and control. Groups have demonstrated significant 
use of CND, but few terrorist organizations have the capability to conduct 
electronic warfare or CNA.  However, groups like the FARC and IRA have 
demonstrated a limited ability to combat the state in the electromagnetic 
spectrum.  The IRA succeeded in implementing electronic bypasses to subvert 
British electronic jamming of IRA remote detonating bombs.  They also 
successfully wire tapped police and rival paramilitary phones to gather 
intelligence.   Computer network operations are also not a critical component 
tactic, or threat, although terrorists do use cyberspace to communicate with other 
members and to conduct intelligence collection on potential targets.  Computer 
scams and credit card theft have also been used in fundraising and money 
laundering. Defensive actions include Aidid subverting US EW collection systems 





c. Operations in the Physical Domain. 
The physical attack in the physical domain often provides the 
strongest influence in the information environment.  Attacks such as suicide 
bombings, leadership assassinations, and hostage taking often provide 
overwhelming influence.   DoD doctrine for physical destruction requires an 
attack to specifically affect a C2 node, terrorists use the attacks to enable or 
support a strategy in the IE. Examples include the Japanese Red Army killing 28 
tourists in the Tel Aviv airport in 1972 to gain world-wide media coverage and to 
propel themselves “onto the world stage” (Nacos, 1994, p.50). 
 
C. SUMMARY. 
Violence and the threat of violence are the sine qua non of terrorists 
(Hoffman, 1998, p.183); terrorists plan operations to capture the attention of the 
media and to shock, impress, or intimidate the public and government with a 
deliberate planned application of violence (p.183). War and terrorism are about 
influencing the opponent. Terrorists hope to influence their targets to cede to 
their demand. This does not mean all terrorist actions are IO, but terrorist actions 
do inherently incorporate more elements of IO than DoD and they do it well. 
Terrorists rely often on violent attacks in the physical environment to enable their 
influence operations in the information environment.  Thus, the physical attack 
serves as an enabler to IO. 
 This chapter attempts to establish a general IO framework for terrorists, 
thus providing a means to evaluate the terrorist case studies in subsequent 
chapters.  In building the framework, the chapter first explores the covert, illegal 
nature of terrorist organizations.  The terrorists’ nature presents the organization 
a dilemma: the group must remain covert and secret to stay alive, yet must 
overtly gain legitimacy from the state and populace.  The legitimacy dilemma 
establishes the first part of the framework by relating why terrorist employ IO in 
order to remain secret and then use it as a force multiplier to gain respect and 
legitimacy.  This provides evidence that terrorist inherently integrate many 
elements into their operations to succeed.  Next, the chapter examines the 
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terrorists’ reliance on actions in the physical environment to support activities in 
the information environment and on how integral IO are to basic terrorist 
operations.  This forms the second part of the framework and is conceptually 
different from the US military’s use of IO to support combat operations in the 
physical environment.  Next, the chapter presents Wright’s analysis on the 
different audiences that terrorist must appeal to in order to gain influence.  
Finally, the chapter provides a terrorists’ approach to IO by operationalizing the 
terms used to describe elements of IO.  Figure 10 builds upon the IO framework 
presented in Chapter II, graphically depicting how terrorists apply elements of IO 
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Figure 10.   Terrorist IO Framework 
 
The terrorist IO framework enables us to explore terrorist organizations 
and graphically depict how a group employs its IO toolkit to influence different 
audiences and achieve their strategic objectives.  The IO framework incorporates 
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focal points established in this chapter: the legitimacy dilemma; using information 
as a force multiplier; using physical attacks to enable IO in the information 
environment; and the terrorists targeting of different audiences. 
The IO framework illustrates how actions in one or more domains can 
influence one or more audiences in order to ultimately affect the target. The 
framework shows inherently how important and integrated IO is to standard 
terrorist operations. 
Evidence suggests that terrorist may fully understand their legitimacy 
dilemma and their reliance upon the information environment.  Their choice of IO 
tools suggests that they comprehend the power held in Waltz’s information 
domains.  Terrorists also seem keenly aware of the different audiences facing 
them.  Terrorists understand their audiences and also use force multipliers to 
maximize advantages. While these assertions may not exist as published or 
written doctrine, it apparently exists for many groups as a strategy.  Chapters IV 
and V will apply this framework to two different types of terrorist organizations to 





































IV. AL QA’IDA  
This chapter analyzes how al Qa’ida (Arabic for “the base”) employs 
Information Operations to achieve their strategic objectives.  In order to gain an 
appreciation of the goals, motives, and operating environment of al Qa’ida, the 
chapter first explores the historical background of the organization and its 
charismatic leader, Usama Bin Laden.  The chapter next develops an IO toolkit, 
consisting of the IO elements frequently used by al Qa’ida.  The chapter then 
analyzes the group’s major actions since 1996 to determine how the organization 
employs IO to achieve its strategic objectives.  The depth of information available 
compared to the IRA is less, as many of the group’s activities are not yet 
documented or declassified. The model introduced at the end of Chapter III is 
applied to determine the group’s ability to use IO as a force multiplier to gain 
legitimacy and influence actions in the information environment. Finally, the 
chapter summarizes the findings of the analysis and provides a general 





Al Qa’ida is a transnational terrorist group responsible for executing the 
devastating attacks on United States soil on September 11, 2001, which killed 
2,826 of the world’s citizens and destroyed a symbol of America’s economic 
dominance. The group “funds and orchestrates the activities of Islamic militants 
worldwide” (“US Embassy”, 1998, p.3). and “attempts to radicalize existing 
Islamic groups and create Islamic groups where none exist” (“Al-Qa’ida,” 2003). 
al Qa’ida serves as an umbrella organization for many Islamic Fundamental 
terrorist groups11, and has supported Muslim fighters in Afghanistan, Algeria, 
Bosnia, Chechnya, Eritera, Kosova, Pakistan, Somalia, Tajikistan and Yemen“ 
                                            
11 Groups include al-Jihad, Abu Sayyff, Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Hizzbollah, Mujahadeen, and  
al-Gama’a al- Islamiyya  
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(“Al-Qa-ida,” 2003). It is an adaptive and nimble international terrorist group 
dedicated to opposing non-Islamic governments with force and violence (US 
Embassy, 1998, p.3). It is a dangerous group that can function on different 
operation levels, which means it does not have a single modus operandi or 
unique profile (Hoffman, B. 2002). It grew out of the Afghan war against the 
Soviets, and its core members consist of Afghan war veterans from all over the 
Muslim world. Al-Qaida was established around 1988 by the Saudi militant 
Usama bin Laden and at one time operated in at least 60 countries (Jenkins, 
2002, p. 9). In February 1998, bin Laden announced the formation of an umbrella 
organization controlled by al Qa’ida called “The Islamic World Front for the 
struggle against the Jews and the Crusaders” (Al-Jabhah al-Islamiyyah al-
`Alamiyyah li-Qital al-Yahud wal-Salibiyyin)“ (“Al-Qa-ida,” 2003), which is a 
coordinating body for groups worldwide (Alexander & Swetnam, 2001, p.6). Bin 
Laden formed this group specifically to conduct jihad against America and Israel 
(“Al-Qa-ida,” 2003).  He gained international prominence with his fatwas 
(religious rulings on Islamic law) and suspected masterminding of attacks on US 
targets such as the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000 and the East African embassy 
attacks in 1998. “Based in Afghanistan, bin Laden used an extensive 
international network to maintain a loose connection between Muslim extremists 
in diverse countries” (“Al-Qa’ida,” 2003). Al Qa’ida stayed in touch “with an 
unknown number of followers all over the Arab world, as well as in Europe, Asia, 
the United States and Canada” through high-tech means, such as faxes, satellite 
telephones, and the internet” (“Al-Qa’ida,” 2003).  
Usama bin Laden’s headquarters and training camps were located high in 
the Hindukush Mountains in Khuasan, Afghanistan, extremely forbidding terrain 
that isolated him from counter-terrorist units. Bin Laden incorporated the vast 
cave and tunnel networks, built during the 1970s to defeat the Soviets, into his 
strategy to provide secrecy and security for his operations. Bin Laden benefited 
greatly from the Afghanistan Taliban government providing him safe haven.  Prior 
to September 11th, 2001, there were no direct threats to his headquarters and 
training base.   Al Qa’ida active cells were and remain dispersed throughout the 
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world, often operating as sleeper cells.  Leading up to the 9/11 attacks on the 
US, active members of al Qa’ida operated within the US, posing as students, 
professors, and businessmen until they received the ‘execute’ order from bin 
Laden (Robbins, 2002, in Howard & Sawyer, 2003, p. 358).   
Al Qa’ida’s tactics and capabilities include “bombing, hijacking, 
kidnapping, assassination, and suicide attacks” (Alexander & Swetnam, 2001, 
p.32). Additional tactics include sabotage, cyber-based strike, shooting, vehicular 
bombing, biological, chemical, and kidnapping (Venke & Ibrahim, 2002). At one 
time the group actively sought weapons of mass destruction, and have been 
linked to production of chemical and biological agents (Alexander & Swetnam, 
2001, p. 32). A recent CIA report states the group’s “ultimate goal is the use 
chemical, biological, nuclear or radiological weapons to cause mass casualties,” 
but near term use of these weapons will likely be for small-scale attacks (“CIA: al-
Qaeda,” 2003). The group relies on criminal activity to finance operations, 
including front organizations, false charities, money laundering, stolen car 
trafficking and credit card fraud (Elliott, 2002). Very few books and unclassified 
material exist on the analysis of al Qa’ida’s activities before and after attacks on 
the USS Cole and the embassies in east Africa, and on September 11th. The 
United States continues to gather new data through debriefing of captured 
members and peripheral associates.  
 
2. Goals. 
The organization's primary goal is the overthrow of what it sees as the 
corrupt and heretical governments of moderate Muslim states, and their 
replacement with governments based on the rule of Sharia (Islamic law) (“Al-
Qa’ida,” 2003). Al-Qa’ida is intensely anti-Western, and views the United States 
in particular as the prime enemy of Islam. The group advocates destruction of the 
United States, which is seen as the chief obstacle to reform in Muslim societies. 
According to a 1998 indictment against bin Laden and members of al Qa’ida for 
the 1998 US Embassy bombing in Kenya, al Qa’ida opposed the US for four 
reasons. “First, the United States was regarded as an ‘infidel’ because it was not 
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governed in a manner consistent with…Islam. Second, the United States was 
viewed as providing essential support for other ‘infidel governments and 
institutions…Third, …al Qaeda opposed the continued presence of American 
military forces in Saudi Arabia…following the Gulf War. Fourth, al Qaeda 
opposed the … arrest, conviction and imprisonment of persons belonging to al 
Qaeda or its affiliated terrorist groups…”(“US Embassy”, 1998, pp. 4-5). One of 
the principal goals of al-Qa’ida has been to drive the United States armed forces 
out of Saudi Arabia (and elsewhere on the Saudi Arabian peninsula). Bin Laden 
has issued three fatwas, calling upon Muslims to take up arms against the United 
States, indicating that such attacks were both proper and necessary (indictment, 
1998, p. 5).  
 
3.  Organization. 
Usama bin Laden, a Saudi, founded al Qa’ida and served as its emir-
general at least through the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.  It is unclear if 
he is still alive, or what role he currently plays in the group’s strategy and 
operations. Another prominent leader is Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri, leader of 
Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Zawahiri serves as a mentor to bin Laden and is often 
considered his deputy. Muhhamed Atef (deceased) was the heir apparent to take 
over leadership of al Qa’ida. Another prominent leader was Abu Zubaydah 
(captured), who was responsible for external affairs. According to Alexander & 
Swetnam (2001), al Qa’ida in 2001 had a command and control structure that 
included a consultation council, majlis al shura (p.3). “The council considered, 
discussed, and approved major policies and actions, including terrorist 
operations and the issuing of fatwahs” (p.3). Bin Laden, Zawahiri, Atef, and nine 
others sat on this council (“US Embassy”, 1998, p. 7). The group’s military 
committee, previously run by Atef, “considered and approved military matters” 
(p.3). Other known committees were the business committee, which oversaw 
front businesses, fundraising, and financial matters. These companies operated 
like wholly owned corporations, and included al Hijra Construction, Ladin 
International (Import-Export) and Taba Investments (Snyder, Wendelken, and 
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Wallace, 2003). A religious (fatwa) committee oversaw Islamic studies and 
deliberated religious rulings before consideration by the consultation council. The 
media committee assembled and printed information and publicized statements 
of bin Laden; it additionally “served as a conduit for messages, including reports 
on military and security matters from various” cells (“US Embassy”, 1998, pp.7-
8). Al Qa’ida also had a travel office (p.3). The group has several standing cells, 
such as Logistics and Training (Snyder, Wendelken, and Wallace, 2003). The 
logistic cells were region specific and provided forged documents, arms, 
transportation and equipment. The training cells recruited new members and 
trained local groups, and assist surveillance teams in their regions. The training 
cells could become operational if ordered.  Bin Laden formed for al-Qa’ida a 
political arm called the Advice and Reform Council (ARC) in Sudan in 1994 after 
his family publicly denounced him (p.5).  Bin Laden and al Qa’ida leadership 
have used the ARC to publish “several statements condemning the Saudi and 
western governments” (p.5).   Figure 11 illustrates al-Qa’ida’s structure. 
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Figure 11.   AL-Qa’ida Command and Control Structure, May 2001 
Front organizations include Internet based groups, false organizations or 
companies, and dubious charities. Islamic Studies and Research Center, which 
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runs drasat.com, is purported to be a made up name and doesn’t exist (Thomas, 
2003, p.2, 7).  Al-Qa’ida uses Islamic humanitarian “charities” in the US and other 
countries to conduct their fundraising (Thomas, p. 4). One of the United States 
organizations was Mercy International Relief Agency (Alexander & Swetnam, 
p.29). “Analysts found al Qaeda and humanitarian relief agencies using the same 
bank account numbers on numerous occasions” (Thomas, p. 4).  The group’s 
religious affiliation with the Muslim faith may be a far-reaching common bond. 
The group is able to have its message spread by clerics in mosques around the 
world, while Muslim charities can raise or launder its funds in plain sight. Bin 
Laden formed the ARC as another means of publishing the group’s statements.  
 
4.   AL Qa’ida Supported Attacks. 
Neither bin Laden nor al Qa’ida have claimed responsibility for any attacks 
(to include the 9-11 attacks), making it unclear which attacks the group was 
responsible for and which were conducted by loosely connected supporters. The 
following attacks have been linked to al Qa’ida or its associates. 
 
• “Nov. 28, 2002: Suicide bombing at an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, 
that killed 15 people and injured 80. Also, shoulder-fired missiles narrowly 
missed an Israeli Arkia airline plane carrying 261 passengers.  
• Oct. 28, 2002: American diplomat Laurence Foley is shot by a lone gunman at 
close range as he walked to his car outside his home in the Amman, the capital 
of Jordan. Libyan Salem Saad bin Suweid and Jordanian Yasser Fathi Ibrahim 
have been arrested in connection with the murder.  
• Oct. 12, 2002: 202 people were killed in a bombing of a nightclub frequented by 
westerners in Bali, Indonesia.  
• Sept. 11, 2001: Four U.S. planes were hijacked and crashed into the World 
Trade Center, the Pentagon and a field in Pennsylvania killing 2,826 people.  
• Oct. 12, 2000: Bombing of the USS Cole anchored in Aden; 17 sailors killed; 39 
wounded.  
• Aug. 7, 1998: Bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania kill 224 
people, including 12 Americans.  
• June 25, 1996: Bombing of Khobar Towers apartments at a U.S. military 
barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; 19 U.S. airmen killed; 372 Americans injured.  
• Nov. 13,1995: Bombing at U.S. Army training headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi 
Arabia; 5 Americans killed, 31 wounded.  
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• Feb. 26, 1993: Truck bomb at the World Trade Center in New York City kills 6 
and injures more than 1,000” (“Attacks linked,” 2003). 
 
B. AL QA’IDA INFORMATION OPERATIONS TOOLKIT. 
1. Different Audiences. 
Al Qa’ida has a key understanding of the message receiver, whether it is 
its own followers, the Muslim population, or moderate Muslim and Western state 
leaders. Al Qa’ida has developed several means to leverage the information 
environment and influence the four different audiences described in chapter III, 
including the Opposing, Uncommitted, Sympathetic, and Active audiences.  
The Opposing audience consists of several entities directly opposed to the 
goals of the al Qa’ida.  Al Qa’ida often selects the United States as the primary 
target for physical attacks or propaganda, but also has included Saudi Arabia, 
Britain, Australia, Israel, and Norway12.  These physical attacks, which are 
relatively meaningless from a military or attritional point of view, are designed to 
provoke a counter-action that will have a major impact in the perceptual domain.   
According to Wright (1990), the uncommitted audience has two 
components: the general public of the country where the terrorists are operating 
and the international public. There are a significant number of Muslims who likely 
do not approve of terrorism or a group’s use of Islam as justification of its actions, 
but also do not support Western policies or influence. A recent RAND report 
states that citizens of northern Pakistan towns have high resentment toward the 
jihadists for leading hundreds of their young men to slaughter (Elliott, 2002). Al 
Qa’ida tries to unite or mobilize Muslims around the world, despite the ethnic and 
cultural differences. Al Qa’ida uses propaganda such as fatwas, media releases, 
and websites in this effort.  
The sympathetic audience is comprised of those people, locally and 
internationally, who already have a broad historical or ideological sympathy with 
the terrorists’ expressed political aims (Wright, 1990, p.77).  Al Qa’ida has 
                                            
12 A press release in May 2003 threatened attacks in Norway, although the country has not 
been involved in the war on terrorism. 
76 
reached out to this audience by trying to bridge “Islamic brotherhood and a 
hatred for the United States and its allies” (Orbach, 2001, p.5). This audience 
also has the majority of potential recruits for the organization. “[T]he attacks of 
Sept. 11, 2001 were potentially an effective recruiting weapon” (Elliot, 2002). The 
al-Jazeera network has been an important conduit to the sympathetic audience 
because of the station’s credibility with many Muslims (who may have distrust of 
Western media). Al Qa’ida has attempted to unify this sect of Muslims by 
championing the Palestinian cause or declaring support for Iraq in 2003, as well 
as decrying Western occupation of Muslim Holy Land. Although such crises are 
peripheral or unrelated to al Qa’ida’s goals, they represent opportunity to create 
solidarity and bring more followers into its fold; they also represent an 
understanding of the value of the information medium by setting the group up as 
the underdog against the large enemy, a David and Goliath scenario (Fighel, 
2001). Bin Laden has promoted his cause to this audience through media, 
capitalizing on all conflict to promote his own agenda (Schweitzer, “bin Laden 
Productions”, 2001). Al Qa’ida uses physical attacks on the United States to 
incite a response, which the group then asserts is as an attack on Islam. By not 
claiming responsibility for any of its attacks (al Qa’ida generally only issues 
declarations of praise or support for the attacks), the group can create the image 
of a persecuted victim at the hands of the “infidels.” This helps to keep the 
sympathetic audience emotionally involved in the cause and to justify further 
violence.  
The active audience is made up of those people who are actively engaged 
in or directly support violent actions.  al Qa’ida uses ‘auto-propaganda’ in order to 
target the active audience.  Auto propaganda is used to instill or reinforce ideas 
into a group’s followers. The intent is to defend and protect active members from 
Western influence and help retain their convictions.  The members hear only 
information that is conducive to the cause. Al Qa’ida regularly provides vague or 
misleading interpretations of the Quran to motivate recruits and followers (Paz,  
2001). Evidence of this was evident in letters written by the 9/11 hijackers. The 
hijackers spent months in the US prior to the operation and yet remained 
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committed to the mission despite exposure to Western influences. This highlights 
the success of this technique. Perhaps the best known example of auto 
propaganda by al Qa’ida is the use of the concept of a rewarding afterlife 
surrounded by virgins in order to enlist martyrs and keep the thousands of 
followers involved in a protracted struggle (Hoffman, 2002, p.10). The group also 
uses websites and other media mediums to get a message to this audience (see 
Public Affairs, CMO, and Propaganda section). 
 Usama bin Laden’s unprecedented attack against the United States on 
September 11th, 2001 is an example of a single attack meant to convey 
messages to multiple audiences. The targets were selected not only to influence 
the Bush Administration and US government (opposing audience) and most of 
the American citizens (uncommitted audience), but also international audiences 
(Buettner lecture, October 2001).  The message was that the most powerful 
nation could not protect its citizens (Nacos, 1994, p. 60). The lethalness and 
willingness of the attacks sent a message to other audiences such as Israel 
(opposing), Saudi Arabia and other moderate Arab states (uncommitted).  The 
attacks appealed to sympathetic audiences in Iraq, Lebanon, and other anti-US 
states to join al-Qa’ida’s cause.   Bin Laden conveyed a message to the Muslim 
population worldwide for different reasons. The attacks also signaled 
commitment to current and potential members in the active audience, as well as 
financial, political and logistical backers in the sympathetic audience. Figure 12 
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Figure 12.   Al Qa’ida Audiences 
 Al Qa’ida may have miscalculated its ability to influence international 
audiences on September 11th, 2003. Bin Laden underestimated the mobilizing 
impact of his physical attacks, violating a critical Tugwell principal (see chapter I). 
The physical environment is a delicate environment that can at times undermine 
actions in the information environment, at which point it is difficult or impossible 
to recover. Bin Laden tried to recover by taking his message directly to the media 
via videotape and voice recorded speeches.  Using al-Jazeera, he was able to 
find a launching point for the message; however, the majority of key international 
such as BBC and almost all US media outlets “refused to broadcast or transmit 
the tapes in America” causing the media campaign to fail (Boaz, 2002).  
Figure 13 illustrates al Qa’ida’s tactics and techniques, applied to the 
framework proposed in chapter III.  Evidence suggests that the terrorists have 
developed significant capability in each of Waltz’s information domains. 
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Figure 13.   AL Qa’ida IO Tool kit 
 
2.  Elements of the Toolkit. 
 
a .  PSYOP and Deception. 
Al-Qa’ida used the US’s heavy reliance on technology-based 
intelligence sensors to deceive us in the fall of 2001 (Tiboni, 2001). Usama bin 
Laden’s terrorist network was fully aware of the collection systems, such as spy 
satellites, and voice and signal intercepts, that were monitoring its actions.  Bin 
Laden used low tech means such as couriers to communicate and conduct 
financial transactions (Walcott & Strobel, 2001).  In May 2001, bin Laden 
deceived U. S. technical collection systems by allowing a major attack plan to be 
monitored (Walcott & Strobel, 2001).  The US believed two major attacks were 
going to occur against American targets on the Arabian Peninsula. The US 
reacted with increased security and travel advisories, which appeared to have 
thwarted or dissuaded bin Laden from carrying out the attacks. The group likely 
evaluated US reaction in order to exploit further weaknesses or modify tactics as 
part of the September 2001 attacks. Defense News even ran an article 
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trumpeting the use of Information Warfare to thwart the attack (August, 2001).  
US overconfidence and heavy reliance on technology contributed to the 
disastrous results in Sep 2001.  Hijackers and suicide bombers who conceal their 
missions and attacks employ tactical deceptions. One technique was the use of 
code words such as “honey” (explosives CD-ROM), “little girl” (forged driver’s 
license), and “toy” (pistol) to make intercepted conversations appear innocuous 
to intelligence analysts (Buncombe, 2003). The group conducts cyber deception 
by continually moving its main websites (see next two sections) to unsuspecting 
Internet Service Providers (ISP) and existing websites in order to remain active. 
Propaganda, in addition to the psychological terror from physical 
attacks, is a key element of the group’s psychological operations and is 
discussed in depth in the following section. 
 
b.  Public Affairs, CMO and Propaganda. 
Al Qa’ida uses the media as a psychological offensive, conditioning 
and response (Fingel, 2003). The real-time footage of 9/11 transmitted instantly 
around the world had profound impacts not only on all Americans, but on the 
international community as well (Hoffman, 1998 p.153). Bin Laden understood 
the tools of modern terrorism were not limited to explosives, bombs and 
automatic weapons, “but also the mini-cam, videotape, television, and the 
Internet” (Hoffman, 2002, p. 10). Usama Bin Laden issued a Declaration of War 
in 1996 through al-Qa’ida that was a rally call for his organization against 
Christians and Jews. Media outlets such as CNN and major US newspapers 
gave the declaration international attention with significant coverage of the 
document’s bold wording against the United States. He also circulated a 
professionally produced and edited two hour al Qa’ida recruitment tape in March 
2001 throughout the Middle East, an example of his exploitation of “twenty first 
century communications and weapons technology in the service of the most 
extreme, retrograde reading of the holy war “(Bergen as cited by Hoffman, 2002, 
p. 11). The tape became a popular and successful propaganda tool, and was 
converted to CD-ROM and DVD formats and loaded onto the Internet. Hoffman 
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asserts that the crowning evidence of Bin Laden’s “communication acumen and 
clever manipulation of media was the pre-recorded, preproduced, B-roll…that bin 
Laden had queued and ready for broadcast within hours of the commencement 
of the American air strikes on Afghanistan on Sunday, October 7th“ (Hoffman, 
2002, p.11). 
The May 2003 attacks in Saudi Arabia were preceded by a media 
release proclaiming a large attack by al Qa’ida was going to occur soon on Saudi 
soil. The specificity deviated from previous broad generic declarations, and could 
be an attempt of reasserting legitimacy among opposing and sympathetic 
audiences.  When an al Qa’ida representative states a large attack will occur, 
and it does, the resulting psychological impact of credibility and terror can make 
the number of deaths less significant. The deviation is a signal that the group 
may be on the downward slope of its life cycle, and is conducting action is 
previously did not need or want to do. Al Qa’ida used the media to reassert it 
legitimacy in order to continue to make gains in the information environment.  
Once reestablished as a credible threat, the group may be in a position to go 
back to its subtle/passive/limited use of media. 
The following websites have been linked to al-Qa’ida since 
September 2001, according to Timothy Thomas13 (2003) in his article, “Al Qaeda 
and the Internet.” There are also various sites of alleged members or 
sympathizers that are used to communicate or post propaganda. This medium 
can be a significant recruiting tool 
• “Alneda.com, which US officials said contained encrypted 
information to direct al Qaeda members to more secure sites, 
featured international news on al Qaeda, and published articles, 
fatwas…and books” (p.2). The website has also supported al 
Qa’ida’s command and control of its dispersed forces, allowing 
them to work independently.  The site provided “leadership via 
strategic guidance, theological arguments, and moral inspiration” 
                                            
13 LTC (ret) TimothyThomas US Army, analyst, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas. 
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(p.5), The site also published personal information of 84 al Qa’ida 
fighters captured in Pakistan so sympathizers could contact their 
families (p.5). 
• “almuhrajiroun.com, an al Qaeda site which urged sympathizers to 
assassinate Pakistani President Musharraf” (p.2). 
• “jihadunspun.net, which offered a 36 minute video of Osama bin 
Laden”(p.2). 
• “7hj.7hj.com, which aimed to teach visitors how to conduct 
computer attacks” (p.2). 
• “aloswa.org, which featured quotes from bin Laden tapes…and 
support for the al Qaeda cause” (p.2) 
• “drasat.com, run by the Islamic Studies and Research Center 
(which is allegedy a fake center) and reported to be the most 
credible of dozens of Islamist sites posting al Qaeda news” (p.2) 
• qassam.net, assan.com, jehad.net, alsaha.com, islammemo.com, 
mwhoob.net, and aljehad.online 
Al Qa’ida used the Internet in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks to 
justify its actions and to target prominent dissenting Muslims. According to 
Thomas (2003), Al Qaeda’s two websites, alneda.com and drsat.com, ran 
commentary that “Muslims are committed to spread Islam by the sword” because 
Islam and the West do not share fundamental values (p.3). Subsequently, 
“several Muslim critics of al Qaeda’s policies withdrew their prior condemnation” 
(p.3). Thomas states this is an example of ideological warfare working. The 
Center for Islamic Studies and Research’s (a made up organization, according to 
Thomas) website is valuable auto propaganda tool. The site “has 11 sections, 
including reports on fighting in Afghanistan, world media coverage of the conflict, 
books on jihad theology, videos of hijackers’ testaments, information about 
prisoners held in Pakistan and Guantanamo Bay, and jihad poetry” (p. 7). 
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A well known example of al Qa’ida auto propaganda previously 
mentioned is the selling of the concept of a rewarding afterlife with adoring 
virgins to enlist martyrs and keep followers committed to the cause. Part of this 
promise is the “martyr would feel no pain in his sacred attack and ascend 
immediately to glorious heaven containing “rivers of milk and wine…lakes of 
honey, and the services of 72 virgins”, where the martyr will see the face of Allah 
and later be joined by 70 relatives” (Hoffman, 2002, p. 10).   This propaganda is 
aimed not only at potential members but also current members. As previously 
discussed, letters left behind by the 9-11 hijackers made common references to 
the afterlife concept along with passages of the Quran. This is especially 
significant, given most of the hijackers lived in the United States several months 
prior to the hijackings. 
 
c.  EW and CNO. 
Al Qa’ida has significant defensive EW capability; primarily the 
knowledge and deception of US EW collection capability (see PSYOP and 
Deception).  Bin Laden used low-tech means such as couriers to communicate 
and conduct financial transactions (Walcott & Strobel, 2001). Members fighting 
the United States in Afghanistan have used remote detonation of bombs against 
soldiers. It is possible al Qa’ida intercepted electronic communications alerting of 
the arrival of the USS Cole, though US Naval authorities believe the arrival was 
gained by means of aggressive human intelligence collecting (“Update: 
Investigation into the Bombing of USS Cole,” 2000).  
Al Qa’ida’s use of computer network operations is more 
documented and likely more significant than its EW use. It uses the net as an 
ideological weapon (Thomas, 2003) for its cause (see also Public Affairs, CMO, 
and Propaganda). There is no evidence of al Qa’ida using cyber tools as a 
weapon, although other Muslim radical sub-state groups like Hizzbollah or 
Hamas have directed attacks or had attacks conducted in their name. The 
Internet is an excellent tool for terrorists because it provides anonymity. Users 
can create and delete accounts with large companies such as America Online, 
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use instant messaging, use anonymous login tools and navigate chat rooms. 
Additionally, users “can access cyber cafes, university and library computers…to 
further hide the source of the messages” (Thomas, 2003, p.3). The 9-11 
hijackers used these locations to communicate anonymously around the world 
prior to the hijacking. An al Qa’ida laptop recovered in Afghanistan showed 
several visits to the French Anonymous Society, which offered “a two-volume 
Sabotage Handbook online” (p. 3). The virtual world allows al Qa’ida to continue 
to communicate. Even though their websites can be shut down, a site can quickly 
reemerge, likely hosted by an unsuspecting ISP. The group’s site, 
“www.alneda.com, was originally located in Malaysia until” May 13th, 2002, 
reappearing in Texas (http://66.34.191.223/) on June 13th. Another al Qa’ida site, 
www.drasat.com, appeared in Michigan on June 21st before being quickly shut 
down (Thomas, 2003, p.4). Thomas considers this shell game cyber deception. 
Several US personal websites serving as unsuspecting hosts have had al Qa’ida 
web pages secretly attached (“Islamic Hackers,” 2003).  
The Internet allows a security conscience organization to flourish 
with available tools, such as encryption in email and websites. According to al-
Jazeera, Mohammed Atta (one of the pilot terrorists on 9/11) reportedly sent a 
simple and open message to al Qa’ida leadership referencing the status of his 
mission. The message read “The semester begins in three more weeks.  We’ve 
obtained 19 confirmations for studies in the faculty of law, the faculty of urban 
planning, the faculty of fine arts, and the faculty of engineering” (as quoted in 
Thomas, 2003, p.7). The message likely references the coordination of the 4 
hijacking crews. Thomas reports “Al Qaeda uses prearranged phrases and 
symbols to direct its agents. An icon of an AK-47 can appear next to photo of 
Osama bin Laden facing one direction one day, and another direction the next” 
(Thomas, 2003, p.7). Icons can change color, messages hidden of pages that 
have no link connection, “or placed openly in chat rooms” (Thomas, 2003, p.7).  
The Arab TV station al-Jazeera last year played audio recordings of 
bin Laden speeches and showed a note supposedly signed by him. The notes 
praised recent attacks on a tanker in Yemen and soldiers in Kuwait (Thomas, 
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2003, p.4). These messages were picked up and “spread around the Internet, 
offering virtual proof that bin Laden was alive” (Thomas, 2003, p.4). Thomas 
believes this allows bin Laden to lead in absentia, even after death, as “his image 
can be manipulated through or Internet broadcasts so that he appears confident, 
even healthy” (p.4). 
A website associated with al-Qa’ida, 7hj.7hj.com, provides 
instruction for Internet users on “how to conduct computer attacks, purportedly in 
the service of Islam” (Thomas, 2003, p.8). al Qa’ida has been researching 
weaknesses of Supervisory Controls and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems 
(Venke & Ibrahim, 2002). It is unclear the extent of its knowledge, its intent, or 
even if the group is capable of carrying out such an operation. The virtual threat 
of computer attacks may be al Qa’ida’s most significant cyber tactic (Thomas, 
2003, p.4). “Cyber-fear is generated by the fact that what a computer attack 
could do (bring down airliners, ruin critical infrastructure, destroy the stock 
market, reveal Pentagon planning secrets, etc.) is too often associated with what 
will happen” (Thomas, 2003, p.4). Although many worse case scenarios have 
been suggested, such as bringing down the stock exchange or disrupting utilities, 
a likely al Qa’ida cyber attack would be in support of a physical attack. A cyber 
attack alone might go unnoticed in the clutter of daily life, but have more 
significance if conducted simultaneously with a physical attack (Lewis, 2002, 
p.4). A possible strategy in the future would be to combine Distributed Denial of 
Service and communication jamming techniques against emergency services in 
conjunction with a large scale attack to create further chaos, degrade response, 
and increase damage and fatalities (Vatis, 2001, p.15). 
 
d.  OPSEC. 
Al Qa’ida produced a document called the Jihad Manual, which had 
explicit, “micro managing” instructions on operational security (Hoffman, 2001). 
Secrecy is a necessary and priority element of all covert organizations, and is 
sometimes degraded as groups grow in size or undertake large operations.  The 
manual demonstrates the organization’s understanding and commitment to 
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maintaining secrecy; secrecy of operations is tantamount to success of physical 
environment actions, the precursor to the intended influence effects. Al Qa’ida’s 
al-Jihad manual provides scenario-driven guidance and direction to active 
members such as how to blend into society in order to maintain secrecy during 
an operation.    
Al Qa’ida had originally planned to launch a boat bomb at the USS 
Sullivan (Schweitzer, “The Bin Laden Principle,” 2001). A miscalculation of the 
weight of the explosive charge sank the boat, delaying the operation for 10 
months, eventually attacking the USS Cole in October 2000 (Schweitzer, 2001). 
The coordinator’s ability to keep the operation a secret after a public failure is a 
testament to the group’s OPSEC capability. 
 
e.  Destruction. 
Al Qa’ida’s physical attacks are the result of thorough intelligence 
and extensive planning and coordinating. Each attack is likely designed to speak 
to multiple audiences in the group’s quest to reduce Western influence and install 
strict Islamic rule in moderate Arab governments. The attacks are designed to 
have a profound psychological impact by striking fear among the victims, and 
perhaps those that stand beside them. The use of suicide bombers for physical 
attacks is “a central part of the terror organizations’ psychological warfare” 
(Schweitzer, “Suicide Terrorism and the September 11 attacks,” 2002). 
 
f.  Intelligence. 
Analysis of Al-Qa’ida’s attacks on the USS Cole, the African 
embassies, and in the United States shows how al Qa’ida made up for a lack of 
sophisticated equipment with simple and secret information gathering (“Update: 
Investigation,” 2000). Intelligence is critical for successful terrorist actions in the 
Physical Environment, which sets the stage for actions in the Information 
Environment. This is done through use of the Internet, conducting active and 
passive intelligence gathering, and using insiders (“Update,” 2000). The “Internet 
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is used to gather information on potential targets,” according to Thomas (2003, 
p.6). The Muslim Hackers Club (no known al Qa’ida link) provides information, 
tutorials, chat rooms, and connectivity to other extremists groups (p.6). 
Information discussed includes Secret Service code names and potential targets 
such as Center for Disease Control in Atlanta, FedWire, and weaknesses on 
SCADA systems.  One captured al Qa’ida computer contained imaging data and 
“engineering and structural architecture features of a dam” (p.6). 
 
C. BATTLE ANALYSIS OF 9/11 ATTACKS.  
This section analyzes al Qa’ida’s direct use of IO elements for the 9/11 
attacks in order to show the extent and level of synchronization. Al Qa’ida used 
the full spectrum of IO to hijack four commercial airliners and crash three of them 
into their intended targets.14  
Operational Secrecy was a key element for success for the 9/11 attacks. 
OPSEC kept the group viable amidst targeting due to the 2000 attack on the 
USS Cole. OPSEC allowed 19 (and possibly more) terrorists to without suspicion 
to take flight training and reside without detection in the United States for several 
months prior. OPSEC allowed al Qa’ida to conduct a believable deception by 
convincing the United States the group would conduct large scale attacks in the 
summer of 2001 against US interests in the Middle East. OPSEC allowed 
terrorists to communicate, coordinate, train, and transact funds in the months and 
years prior without detection (though at least one did not arrive in the US due to 
VISA issues [Elliott, 2002]). The Jihad Manual (see OPSEC section) provided 
OPSEC guidance in minutia to those taking part in operations. OPSEC kept bin 
Laden’s and al Qa’ida’s connection nebulous, forcing the onus unto the US to 
prove their involvement. 
 Recruiting members and retaining their commitment to the cause 
and mission requires a significant auto-propaganda program. Recruitment for the 
attacks likely stemmed from media products (CD-ROMs and leaflets), attention 
                                            
14 One airliner crashed into the Pentagon, and two others hit both towers of the World Trade 
Center. The fourth plane, intended for the capitol (Elliott, 2002), crashed in Pennsylvania. 
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garnered from previous attacks (embassies and the USS Cole), and bin Laden 
fatwas and statements following US attacks on his base in Afghanistan. Bin 
Laden surviving those attacks created a mythical persona, increasing the impact 
of his words, which resonated with disenfranchised Muslim males. Al Qa’ida 
exposed members to an immersed environment of Islamic studies full of vague 
and misleading scriptures of the Quran, which justified and necessitated personal 
sacrifice and attacks on the West. The indoctrination can explain how the 
hijackers remained committed to the mission despite experiencing a Western 
way of life for several months in 2001. Auto propaganda was likely key in getting 
its members to fight the vastly superior US military forces in 2001 and early 2002. 
All these events contributed to the attacks on September 11, 2001, despite being 
seemingly unrelated. 
 An important part of the 9-11 attack was the deception several 
months prior (see paragraph (a) in previous section). Al Qa’ida was able to get 
the US to respond to indicators of a large scale attack in the Middle East. US 
actions further legitimized al Qa’ida as a credible threat.  US actions further 
revealed US response and collection methods, and likely diverted attention from 
the 9/11 attacks. The deception involved OPSEC, counter EW, and intelligence 
support. Intelligence played a key role in knowing what, when and how electronic 
systems were monitoring actions and conversations, and in selecting credible 
deception targets. The group likely measured the effectiveness of the deception, 
shoring up its own weakness and exploiting the US based on its reactions.  
Deception also involved the various front organizations and scams used to 
finance these operations. The use of code words made intercepted 
conversations seem harmless or meaningless. Such tactics were necessary 
when members communicated on the Internet via cyber cafes, libraries and 
educational institutions. Websites were established or commandeered, providing 
forums for messages, coordination, and propaganda, before and after the 
attacks. Various encryption tools were used to protect sensitive data. Intelligence 
support was critical in learning commercial flight info, which is available as open 
source.  
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The crashing of the planes itself provided the psychological warfare 
message. Worldwide media supported the tactic by replaying within an hour 
images of the planes crashing, and later the towers tumbling. The media 
captured the fate of its victims, the horror, apathy, and joy of citizens around the 
world. Bin Laden released a statement commending the attacks but not claiming 
responsibility. Al Qa’ida websites immediately rolled out information designed to 
capitalize on the attacks.  The sites information not only reached out to 
sympathetic and active audiences, but also targeted prominent Muslim leaders 
who had criticized the attacks. The physical attacks had occurred, and it was 
time to orchestrate the actions in the information environment. Once the 
anticipated American air strikes occurred, bin Laden immediately release a 
prepared “B-Roll” video to al-Jazeera (credible media source for many Muslims). 
The film contained images and speeches that increased his mysticism. He 
attempted to unite populations and different audiences by making the Palestinian 
cause also al Qa’ida’s cause, and improving al Qa’ida’s support within 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
 Figure 14 is the terrorist IO framework applied to al Qa’ida’s use of 
IO in the 9/11 attacks.  
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Figure 14.   Al-Qa’ida 9/11 Attack 
 
D. SUMMARY 
 This chapter gave an overview of al Qa’ida, including its history, goals, 
and motives.  The chapter then explored al Qa’ida’s IO toolkit.  First, it examined 
how the terrorists oriented their messages to influence multiple audiences.  
Oftentimes, targets are specifically selected for the influence that their death will 
bring about.  Secondly, the chapter examined the principle elements of IO that al 
Qa’ida has at its disposal. Evidence from this chapter suggests that al Qa’ida has 
developed a fairly diverse IO toolkit containing many of the principle elements of 
IO discussed in chapters II and III. Its greatest strength lies in its use of 
propaganda and the media, while Computer Network Operations are currently 
underused but could to be developed further. Its understanding of the information 
environment, however, is significant, using it to ascend to legitimacy and to 
communicate with worldwide audiences.   
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V. PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY  
 This chapter provides an analysis of how the Provisional Irish Republican 
Army (IRA) employs Information Operations to achieve their objectives.  The 
chapter first explores the historical background of the organization in order to 
gain an appreciation of the goals, motives, and operating environment of the 
organization.  The chapter then develops an IO toolkit consisting of the IO 
elements frequently used by the IRA.  Next, the chapter analyzes the time period 
from 1969 to present, known as ‘the Troubles’.  This period of time was selected 
because the Provisional IRA first came into existence in the late 1960s, 
splintering off from the Official IRA.  The Troubles was also one of the IRA’s most 
active times, providing ample opportunity to observe how it employs IO.  Finally, 
the chapter applies the framework established in Chapter III to evaluate the IRA. 
The chapter concludes with a summary of the findings and provides a general 
assessment of the IRA’s use of IO. 
 
A.  BACKGROUND. 
1. The Operating Environment.   
Sectarian violence between the Protestant and Catholic communities, 
which has polarized Northern Ireland for hundreds of years, has cultural roots 
dating back to the Norman invasion in 1170 and the English plantations in the 
1600s15.  Centuries of violence in Ireland and the “memory of the battles of 
Kinsale (1601) and the Boyne (1690) between the Protestants and the Catholics 
is kept alive in Republican circles today” (Laqueur, p.33).  Irish Catholics have 
long harbored feelings of betrayal, oppression, and inequality toward the British 
                                            
15 The Norman invasion in 1170 first brought the English presence to Ireland. The English 
presence disrupted the ethnic balance in Ireland.  Many Irish viewed the English as an invading 
force.  In the 1600s England dramatically worsened the situation.  The English began to create 
plantations in Ireland, often taking the land from the Catholic Irish and giving it to the Protestant 
British settlers (Moody & Martin, 2001, p.153).  The mistrust and feelings of betrayal resulting 
from the colonization by Protestant settlers were further aggravated by centuries of political and 
social segregation of Catholics and Protestants in all of Ireland. After the victory of William of 
Orange (the Protestant challenger who deposed the Catholic King, James II), laws were enacted 
by the all-Protestant Parliament of Ireland barring Catholics from all offices, land ownership, 
schooling, and other avenues leading toward wealth and education (Darby 1976, 4). 
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and the Irish Protestant Loyalists. These feelings have generated a strong sense 
of Irish-nationalism among the Catholics, resulting in a low-intensity armed 
conflict between the three entities.  Outgunned and out resourced by the British 
troops deployed to Ireland, many Irish Nationalists resorted to irregular tactics 
and terrorism, spawning one of the most persistent terrorist organizations in 
existence: the Irish Republican Army. 
 
2. History of the IRA.    
J. Bowyer Bell has conducted detailed research and writings about the 
origins and development of the IRA.  He suggests that the terrorist organization 
originated from a New York based Irish relief organization in the late 1800s.  
Comprised of Irish immigrants, the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) initially 
provided financial relief for relatives still in Ireland.  However, following the 
American Civil War, many Irish American war veterans decided to return to 
Ireland and attempt to reclaim Ireland from the British and Protestant Unionist.  
From the 1870s until 1916 the IRB terrorized the British forces and Protestant 
supporters with a campaign of bombings and assassinations.  Their physical 
attacks were intended to intimidate the British from carrying out their loyalties to 
England.  Striking fear into the British supporters, the IRB hoped to alienate them 
from the Irish population.  Finally in 1916 Patrick Pearse, a beloved Irish icon, 
cultural zealot, and active member of the Supreme Council in the IRB, forever 
changed the face of the Irish resistance.  In what has become known as the 1916 
Easter Uprising, Pearse and a few thousand IRB supporters seized the city of 
Dublin, claiming from the General Post Office that the revolutionaries had formed 
a new Irish Republic.  Once the British overcame the initial surprise of Pearse’ 
success, they quickly surrounded the city and pounded it with artillery.  With most 
of Dublin in ruin Pearse decided to surrender to the British with terms (Bell, 
1974).  “He sent the terms using a new title, the Commanding General of the 
Irish Republican Army, to the general in charge of British forces” (White, p.84).   
Pearse’s terms transformed the Irish Republican Brotherhood into the Irish 
Republican Army.  It is important to note that most of the Irish citizens in Dublin 
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did not support or approve of Pearse’s actions.  In fact many condemned him for 
the resulting ruin of the city; however, the subsequent acts taken by the British 
changed everything.  The British executed Patrick Pearse, James Connolly, and 
many other IRB leaders and sentenced most of the active supporters to long 
prison terms.  This stark British action negatively influenced thousands of Irish 
citizens, souring their perception of the British.    Jonathon White suggests that 
Pearse had actually expected such a reaction by the British and hoped to incite 
Irish nationalism.  He writes “Pearse was a romantic idealist who felt the revolt 
was doomed from the start but believed it necessary to sacrifice his life to keep 
the republican spirit alive” (White, 1990, p.84).  Although the British thwarted the 
revolt, the subsequent ‘martyrdom’ of Pearse and brutal treatment of his fellow 
Irishmen actually increased the sympathy for the terrorist group.  Pearce’s action 
suggests that, from its inception, the IRA understood the potential power of the 
information environment.  Subsequent tactics used by the IRA incorporated 
Pearce’s approach: provoking a heavy response from the British and then 
appearing as though they are victims of British oppressive rule. 
From 1916 until 1921 the British deployed regular army soldiers to Ireland 
to combat the IRA in what became known as the Black and Tan War.  British 
soldiers, trained to conduct battle in World War I, were ill prepared to face the 
unconventional battle in Ireland.  Many Irishmen viewed British forces as 
invaders, affording the terrorists safe havens and security from the British.  
Stalemated and exhausted from the violence, the British and Irish signed a treaty 
to partition Ireland in 1922.  The treaty established a free Irish Republic 
consisting of the southern 26 counties.  The six remaining northern counties, 
including the city of Belfast, formed Northern Ireland and remained under the 
control of Britain.  Disappointed and betrayed by the agreement to divide Ireland, 
many ‘die-hard’ members in the IRA ignored the pact and continued fighting not 
only against the British forces but also the Free Irish forces in the southern 
Republic.  This led to a costly Irish Civil War that continued sporadically until the 
1930s.  Tired of the seemingly endless violence, public support for the terrorists 
subsequently dropped.  Public support for the group remained low throughout the 
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40s and 50s, despite continued attempts by the Official IRA to incite nationalistic 
feelings. 
 
3. Sinn Féin and the Provisionals.  
Sinn Féin, formed in 1905, is the oldest political party in Ireland and the 
only one with representatives in both political jurisdictions: Northern Ireland and 
the Irish Republic.16  The party has always sought to end British rule on the 
island and maintains that the British have betrayed the Irish people.  Gerry 
Adams serves as the current leader of Sinn Féin.  Highlighting the organization’s 
Marxist-socialist tendencies, he claims that “the Irish are victims of the social and 
economic system which is not geared to Irish interests but in the interests of 
foreign and native capitalists or in the military and strategic interests of a British 
government and its superpower allies” (Bell, p.53).   
During the late 1960s as civil-rights issues sprang up all over in Northern 
Ireland,17 many radical members of the IRA grew dissatisfied with the soft 
defensive path the organization was pursuing. This became evident in 1969 
during the Protestant marches in Londonderry that ended in the battle of Bogside 
(explored later in this chapter). The IRA was ill prepared to fight the British forces 
and could not defend the Catholics from Protestant violence.  As a result the 
most radical members splintered away from the IRA in 1969 and formed the 
Provisional IRA (PIRA).  The PIRA established a hard stance, rejecting Northern 
Ireland as a British-imposed statelet and claiming that Northern Ireland’s very 
existence denied the Irish people their right to national self-determination (Bell, 
p.52).  Throughout this time most of the Catholics in Northern Ireland were 
                                            
16 BBC reported that Sinn Féin has 74 counselors, 18 Assembly members and two 
Westminster MPs in Northern Ireland and 62 counselors and one TD in the Irish parliament. The 
party's principal political objective is to end British rule in Ireland (BBC, History, 1999). 
17 In 1967 the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) was set up and organized 
street demonstrations to lobby for civil rights. The Stormont (Irish) government branded the 
movement a front for the IRA and banned its marches. In October 1968 the RUC used heavy-
handed tactics to disperse a Civil Rights Association march in Londonderry and in January 1969 
a People's Democracy march was attacked. Tensions between Catholics and Protestants 
deepened and by August 1969 Catholics were being burned out of their homes and shot on the 
streets of Belfast (BBC, History, 1999). 
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unemployed and oppressed, especially the youth.  The emergence of the PIRA, 
a new, more radical organization, appealed greatly to many Irishmen who had 
lost hope.  Bell suggests that the PIRA offered the youth a vocation and a chance 
to change the situation affronting the Irish people.  “The organization became 
their identity, their life” (Bell, p.82).   
Sinn Féin serves as the political wing of the PIRA, providing the 
organization political representation.  Although the two organizations are officially 
separate, Sinn Féin has often opened a path for the PIRA to indirectly negotiate 
with the British government.  The political organization also enables the terrorists 
to voice their cause internationally.  Gerry Adams met with US President Clinton 
in 1997, and in April 2003 he talked with Prime Minister Blaire and US President 
George W. Bush about the Good Friday Peace Agreement.   
 
B. PIRA INFORMATION OPERATIONS TOOLKIT. 
The PIRA, as a separatist terrorist organization, is attempting to forge a 
national identity and unite Ireland under Irish control.  The PIRA leadership must 
have realized early on that their campaign against the British would be long 
(Laqueur, p.33).  They appear to have learned from the drop of public support 
during operations from the 1930s to the 1950s, that there exists a threshold to 
the amount of violence the local populace will ‘tolerate’ and the international 
community will accept without losing public support.  The PIRA understands that 
they must modulate the level of violence and the political significance of their 
targets so as not to provoke a massive governmental crackdown (Hoffman, p. 
162). To achieve their goal, the organization has developed a ‘long-war’ strategy. 
A concept of operations focused on exploiting the perceptual domain to influence 
public opinion.  The concept relies on information and information systems to 
influence the populace and hence to pressure the decision maker to negotiate 
and concede.   
The PIRA’s strategy involves a low-intensity war of attrition against British 
Army forces to simply wear out British commitment in Northern Ireland.  PIRA 
active units attack targets with bombings, ambushes, sniping, and other forms of 
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direct attack, often attempting to intimidate British supporters or provoke a 
strong-handed response by the government.  The PIRA strategy relies upon the 
response it provokes from the British government and the Irish Protestants.  
When the inevitable government persecution follows the terrorist attack, it draws 
attention to the group and allows the terrorists and their sympathizers to present 
themselves as victims. This increases public awareness and generates sympathy 
and financial support for the group (Wright, p.186).    
In sum the PIRA effects-based operations in the physical domain are 
designed to generate a response in the physical domain.  This physical response 
is then used to create an effect in the perceptual domain.  To achieve this, the 
terrorists have several means available to translate the physical response into a 
perceptual effect.  With decades of experience at their disposal, the terrorists 
skillfully select targets to generate the desired influence.  They blend elements of 
IO into their operations to both enhance their attacks in the physical environment 
and to shape the information environment following the British response to their 
attack. 
 
I. Different Audiences. 
The Provisional IRA has developed several means to leverage the 
information environment and influence the four different audiences described by 
Wright in chapter III, including the opposing, uncommitted, sympathetic, and 
active audiences.  
The opposing audience consists of several entities directly opposed to the 
goals of the PIRA.18  Often the PIRA selects members of this audience (British 
soldiers, government representatives, and RUC police chiefs) as the primary 
target for physical attack.  These physical attacks, which are relatively 
meaningless from a military or attritional point of view, are designed to provoke a 
counter-action that will have a major impact in the perceptual domain.  By 
                                            
18 The Opposing audience includes the British government and armed forces in Ireland, the 
Royal Ulster Constablary (police), Protestant paramilitary groups and terrorist organizations such 
as the Ulster Defense Association. 
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targeting the active audience with physical attack, the terrorists minimize 
negative effects on other audiences, while maximizing the probability of violent 
response or oppressive legislation (Buettner,2001).   
According to Wright, the uncommitted audience has two components: the 
general public of the country where the terrorists are operating and the 
international public.  The majority of Irish Catholics and Protestants living in 
Ireland do not support the actions of the terrorists, yet are not fully in agreement 
with the policies of the British government. PIRA propaganda reaches the 
uncommitted audience primarily through channels of the mass media and 
Internet.  Many of the PIRA pamphlets and local newspapers do not have a mass 
circulation; however the group does make a few of them available on the 
Internet.19  The ideological appeal toward this audience is at a general level. The 
PIRA seeks to expose the British government as an oppressive and controlling 
state, disadvantaging Catholics and denying Ireland its unity.  This opens the 
way for the terrorists to attack the credibility of the state and security forces, and 
to initiate a process that Tugwell calls ‘guilt transfer’, whereby the blame for the 
deaths, injuries, and destruction caused by the terrorists is put on the shoulders 
of the state.  The PIRA actions provoke the deployment of more British security 
forces or the enactment of special legislation such as Internment; the terrorists 
present this legislation as oppressive and reactionary measures taken by the 
state.  Hoffman contends that “one of the IRA’s main aims in abandoning the 
February 1996 Ceasefire was to convince the British public that the government 
was to blame for the breakdown and thereby pressure the Prime Minister to grant 
favorable concessions” (Hoffman, 1998, p.147).    
The sympathetic audience is comprised of those people, locally and 
internationally, who already have a broad historical or ideological sympathy with 
the terrorists’ expressed political aims (Wright, 1990, p.77).  The sympathetic 
audience provides the ‘sea where the terrorists swim’.  It must be cultivated and 
groomed with several different perspectives in order to address the rifts and 
                                            
19 An Phoblacht / Republican News is available from the Sinn Féin website. 
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differences in the audience. It is centered mainly on the Roman Catholics in 
Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic, but also includes Irish communities 
abroad such as Irish-Americans and Irish-Europeans.  This audience helps keep 
the political debate on the terrorists’ aims rather than on the violence.  On a 
practical level, they provide food, money, or shelter to the active members; they 
also make up the majority of recruits into the organization.  The PIRA portrays a 
savior image to the uncommitted and the sympathetic audiences, taking sides 
with the oppressed, disadvantaged Catholics living in Northern Ireland (Wright, 
1990, p.91).  Propaganda is aimed at exploiting the fact that Catholics living in 
Northern Ireland have gotten the bad end of the stick for a long time; the 
Protestant minority, supported by the British, controls the majority of the wealth in 
Northern Ireland.  PIRA targets are often selected to mobilize the Irish community 
and they do so by appealing to the Irish Gaelic and Roman Catholic traditions 
and the hardships and oppression imposed upon them by the British.  One such 
example involved the 1981 hunger strike in Maze prison.  The PIRA used 
Catholic religious propaganda aimed at portraying Bobby Sands as Christ.  “The 
iconography that they were using was of a dying Christ in the bosom of the 
Blessed Virgin Mary.  People demonstrated wearing the prison shroud, putting on 
their heads the crown of thorns, which Christ had worn to Calvary.  All of it was 
going to the very heart of Christian symbolism” (PBS, Frontline, 2003).  The 1981 
hunger strike is further examined later in the chapter. 
The active audience is made up of those people who are actively engaged 
in or directly support violent actions, including those in prison.  The IRA uses 
‘auto-propaganda’ to target the active audience.  The intent is to defend and 
protect active members from being exposed to British and Unionist propaganda.  
The members hear only information that is conducive to the IRA cause.  The 
propaganda strategy attempts to “bind individuals to the cause through action, 
and, once they have traversed the line between legality and illegality, to keep 
them there” (Wright, 1990, p.140).  The IRA often recites historical rally cries of 
fallen comrades to assist in this.  A quote from Patrick Pearse, the leader of the 
1916 Easter Uprising and a hallowed figure in the republican history, reads "any 
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Irishmen accepting anything less by one iota than separation from England is 
guilty of so immense an infidelity, so immense a crime against the Irish nation... 
that it would be better for that man (as it were certainly better for his country) that 
he had not been born" (Maloney, p.309).  Figure 15 illustrates the PIRA 
audiences with the IO framework we developed in chapter III. 
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Figure 15.   PIRA Audiences 
 
2. Elements of the Toolkit. 
The PIRA descended from a terrorist organization with nearly 100 years of 
experience.  This section breaks out the elements of their tactics and techniques 
that we would call their IO toolkit.  We provide evidence that the PIRA has 
evolved into a skilled practitioner of IO. 





a. Psyops and Deception.  
The PIRA often employs elements of IO tactically to assist in the 
execution of direct action missions.  Operatives wear disguises and use proxies 
for intelligence gathering and infiltration/ exfiltration of active service units.20  
They use diversionary activities (explosions, shots, etc.) to draw British or 
Loyalist forces both away from PIRA operatives and toward ambushes (Gerwehr 
and Glenn, 2000).21   Operatives skillfully conceal weapons, enabling them to get 
close to their targets. 
The mortar attack on 10 Downing Street in London prior to the 1991 
Gulf War illustrates the PIRA’s use of deception to transport the weapons within 
range and the subsequent psychological operations to exploit the attack.  On the 
morning of 7 February 1991, the PIRA moved a Mark 10 mortar concealed in a 
van to within 200 yards of the British Prime Minister’s residence on Downing 
Street.22  With a small section of the roof cut out of the van, it appeared normal to 
other drivers and people along the route.  Bell describes the attack, “the driver 
parked, got out in the snow and jumped onto the rear seat of a waiting 
motorcycle.  The short timer was running (1997, pp.623-624).  Although the 
shells missed their mark, falling a short distance from Prime Minister John 
Major’s residence, the attack had an enormous psychological impact on the 
British leadership and citizens at the height of the 1991 Gulf War.  Hoffman adds 
that the attack “successfully elbowed the war out of the limelight and shone 
                                            
20 IRA volunteers operating in rural areas, wanting to blend in with the hedges, fields, and 
trees, could wear jackets, but they were not the gear for towns and villages. You had to blend in 
with the local population: you had to look like a mechanic, or a postman, or a bank clerk, not Fidel 
Castro (Gerwehr and Glenn, 2000). 
21 PIRA often employ deception in their operations.  Operatives create a disturbance with the 
intention to attract attention.  They would deliberately abandon their getaway car, setting an 
ambush with a hidden car bomb built into the dashboard. “The brown Mark 4 Cortina would be 
used as the getaway car. It would be abandoned with the aim of attracting a nosy bomb-disposal 
squad officer or policeman. If the glove compartment was opened, an electrical circuit would be 
completed which would detonate ten pounds of high explosives (Gerwehr and Glenn, 2000). 
22 The Mark 10 Mortar is constructed from three oxyacetylene cylinders and arranged on a 
rack with rubber collars at their base to cushion the recoil.  The propellant, made from sugar and 
sodium nitrate, sends the projectiles in a predetermined arc; each one is packed with up to 40 
pounds of industrial explosive. 
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renewed media attention on the terrorists, their cause and their impressive ability 
to strike at the nerve-center of the British government even at a time of 
heightened security” (p.182).  An Phoblacht / Republican News and other IRA 
propaganda portrayed the government’s inability to stop the attacks and protect 
their citizens.   
In Northern Ireland, the terrorist leadership often staged marches, 
protests, and gatherings along the traditional Protestant marching routes or in 
parts of the city where Catholics and Protestants live in close proximity.  
Antagonists would create a civil disturbance to draw British forces into the area.23  
Once the British responded to the disturbance, active members then targeted the 
soldiers or incited them to respond with force.   Often these deceptive events 
were staged with the intention to draw a heavy-handed response from the British. 
Bloody Sunday is named after the events that occurred on Sunday 30 January 
1972, when British paratroopers shot dead 13 Catholics and injured 14 others. 
The killings took place in the predominantly nationalist city of Londonderry aka 
Derry to the Irish Republicans.  The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association 
(NICRA) had organized the illegal march to protest against internment and the 
ban on the right to march.24  The PIRA induced and exploited the British physical 
response for perceptual purposes.  Bloody Sunday strengthened local and 
international perception of the Irish as oppressed and deprived of basic civil 
rights.  Additionally, the PIRA planned riots in Belfast near areas where Catholics 
and Protestants live in close proximity, such as the Falls Road (a Catholic area) 
and the Shankhill Road (predominately Protestant).  These riots helped to fuel 
the hatred between the two communities (Bell, 1998, p.61).    
                                            
23 The Protestant ‘Orangemen’ have a marching calendar with two big annual events. On 12 
July 1969 Orangemen commemorate the Battle of the Boyne in 1690 when the Protestant King 
William defeated the Catholic King James. The other big event is 12 August when Apprentice 
Boys march in Londonderry to commemorate the Siege of Derry in 1689 when local apprentice 
boys closed the city's gates against King James' army (BBC, History, 1999). 
24 The British government interned ‘arrested’ thousands of suspected IRA members during 
the 1970s.  Many falsely accused suspects were jailed without trial or legal representation.  The 
Internment, as it became known, caused great consternation among the Irish Catholics, further 
instigating IRA attacks and boosting recruitment. 
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The PIRA leaders also staged dramatic funeral processions to have 
a psychological effect.  The funerals typically proceeded through Catholic 
neighborhoods to appeal to nationalistic feelings.  Bagpipes, pallbearers clad in 
IRA uniforms, and militant ceremonial traditions create a mystical atmosphere, 
transforming the dead terrorists into heroes or martyrs, who died for the republic 
for a free and independent Ireland.  The funeral procession for Bobby Sands and 
the other hunger strikers incited many Protestant communities along the funeral 
route.  This example will be further explored later in the chapter.  
 
b. Public Affairs, CMO and Propaganda. 
Most terrorist organizations have recognized the importance of 
manipulating the media and ‘spinning’ a perception of the group that is favorable 
to their cause or detrimental to their opponents.  Since its early beginning, the 
PIRA has been a master of propaganda.25  The Provisionals distribute 
disinformation (by pamphlet, enhanced photo, radio and television broadcast, 
etc) to religious, cultural, civic, and military leaders in order to alienate the British 
and Loyalists from the noncombatant population (Gerwehr and Glenn, 2000).  
During the 1970s and 80s, the PIRA leaders often planned attacks (bombings or 
shootings) to take place in time for the evening television news.  “One analysis of 
60 bomb explosions in July 1974 showed that more than 80% of them were 
timed around four o’clock in the afternoon; this allowed maximum coverage on 
the television news” (Ulster Patriots, 2003).  With the advent of 24-hour news, 
terrorists are able to carry out attacks and capture media coverage at any time.  
Hoffman (1998) suggests that when the PIRA chose to abandon 
the February 1996 Ceasefire Agreement, the group’s propagandists attempted to 
convince the British public that the government failed to meet the agreement and 
was to blame for the breakdown (p.147).   In 1997, Henry McDonald, a BBC 
news correspondent in Northern Ireland from 1994-1996, highlighted the 
                                            
25 The British War Office noted in 1922 that Sinn Fein’s mastery of publicity was unrivaled 
even then.  “Sinn Féin’s publicity department was energetic, subtle, and exceptionally skilled at 
mixing truth, falsehood, and exaggeration” (Laqueur p.44). 
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techniques of the PIRA’s propaganda people.  He reported that the PIRA and 
their apologists orchestrate a public relations campaign that imposes a 
‘politically-correct culture’ on the reporting of both British and Irish news.  It’s a 
culture McDonald claimed “where the commentators and opinion formers blame 
PM John Major for resumed PIRA violence, rather than the PIRA itself” 
(McDonald, 1997).  He contended that complaints had been voiced in Britain 
over the stranglehold exercised by Sinn Féin and the PIRA army council ‘spin 
doctors’ over the reporting in Northern Ireland. 
The PIRA uses several different media to propagate their message; 
however the message theme is centrally controlled by the organization.  All the 
Provisionals’ statements and publicity is managed by the Army Council and then 
released to the media. There are several radio and television stations in Northern 
Ireland and the Irish Republic that are sympathetic to the PIRA and broadcast 
news and information with a republican point of view.  The primary print media in 
Belfast is An Phoblacht/ Republican News.26  The newspaper circulates in both 
Northern Ireland and in the Irish Republic. Electronic copies of the paper are also 
available on the Internet.  The Irish People is a publication in the United States 
geared toward the Irish-American audience with a Republican spin (Bell, 1998, 
p.211).  After cursory research, we discovered that the terrorists and 
sympathizers often exploit the Internet to distribute their propaganda through 
websites, chat rooms, and politically loaded newsletters (Internet Google search). 
Sinn Féin, often referred to as the PIRA’s propaganda machine, 
serves as the political voice for the organization.  It is led by Gerry Adams, a 
former PIRA Belfast Commander.  The political party provides the terrorists a 
legitimate public relations platform to the rest of the world.  Sinn Fein maintains a 
dynamic website at http://sinnfein.ie, providing public affairs and perception 
management to local and international audiences. 
                                            
26 In 1979 the Republican News and An Phoblacht merged into one paper and relocated to 
51-3 Falls Road in Belfast.  The press center is equipped with the latest video and photographic 
technology and serves as a control center for republican news releases (Wright, p.78) 
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The Irish Northern Aid (NORAID) agency in America, while 
providing Irish-Americans a legal way to channel funds to the IRA, also serves as 
a distant network to propagate influential messages abroad.  In Wright’s book 
O’Ball quotes a NORAID spokesman in New York as saying “the more British 
soldiers who go back home in coffins the sooner it will be over” (Wright, 1990, 
p.161).   The agency maintains a website on the Internet and produces several 
monthly publications.  One of the primary themes of their propaganda is to 
discredit the British legitimacy in Ireland.27  In 1981, NORAID placed an article in 
a New York magazine, announcing that many governmental and private 
establishments in New York had removed the British flag from view in protest to 
the handling of the PIRA hunger strikers.  NORAID published the article in an 
effort to taint British legitimacy in the eyes of Americans.  Subsequently, the 
London Daily Telegraph and BBC picked up the story and made it a front-page 
headline, reporting that British flags had disappeared due to Irish-American 
pressure.  The stories incited demonstrators in London, which Lord Carrington 
finally had to call up police action to disperse (New York University, 2003).  Other 
Irish nationalist publications also exploited the event.  A headline from the Irish 
People read, “British Flag Down from the Mast” (22, August 1981).   Although we 
could not find published evidence to support our assertion, it is our opinion that 
this action also contributed to the strong American reaction against the British 
treatment of the hunger strikers. 
Irish-American associations have had a great impact on several 
aspects of American society, namely politics and entertainment.  In the 1980s, 
Irish-Americans in Chicago influenced the City Council to intervene on behalf of 
the IRA.  The City Council urged President Reagan to pressure PM Thatcher to 
concede to the demands of the IRA and stop the hunger strikes.  Below is an 
excerpt from the Irish People. 
Be it resolved, that the Chicago City Council supports the demand 
of the political prisoners and strongly urges the British government 
to take the necessary action to prevent the tragic and disastrous 
                                            
27 NORAID publications often portray the Ulster Loyalists as obedient British puppets and 
tout the PIRA as freedom fighters and heroes (New York University, 2003). 
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results of a hunger strike. In the name of basic human justice, we 
urge the British government to grant the political prisoners 
demands.        (Chicago City Council, 21 February 1981) 
IRA influences have also made their way into many Hollywood movies about the 
Troubles in Ireland.  Nearly all the movies are made from the perspective of the 
Irish Nationalist, intended to either generate sympathy for the IRA’s ongoing 
struggle for independence from Britain or draw attention to their cause.28 
 
c. EW and CNO. 
Although the electronic warfare capability of the PIRA is not 
technologically astute, the terrorists are very innovative when it comes to 
exploiting the electromagnetic spectrum.  Early PIRA bombs were very crude and 
unreliable, often killing a large percentage of the PIRA bombers as they 
emplaced the devices.  The PIRA decided to correct this so they created a bomb 
that would be emplaced and then subsequently detonated remotely using the 
remote control devises from hobby store planes and cars. During the 1980s 
British counter terrorist units countered PIRA remote-detonated bombings by 
jamming the electronic frequencies of the devises.  The PIRA in turn produced a 
switching system, allowing the remote system to defeat the counter measure; 
which was again eventually defeated by the British.  Persistently, the PIRA came 
back with a remote bomb that they could detonate using a radar gun and 
photographer’s flash, which the British have yet to defeat (Hoffman, 1998, p.181). 
Unclassified information about the PIRA’s ability to employ 
computer network operations is difficult to find and warrants more thorough 
research.  A cursory investigation led to several studies suggesting that the PIRA 
                                            
28 The Crying Game (1992) starring Stephen Rae; Patriot Games (1992) starring Harrison 
Ford & Sean Bean; Clear and Present Danger (1994) starring Harrison Ford & William Dafoe; In 
the Name of the Father (1993) starring Daniel Day Lewis; The Run of the Country (1995) starring 
Albert Finney and Matt Keeslar; Circle of Friends (1995)  starring Chris O'Donnell and Minnie 
Driver; Braveheart (1995) starring Mel Gibson and filmed entirely in Ireland; Michael Collins 
(1996)  starring Julia Roberts; Mary Reilly (1996) starring Julia Roberts; The Boxer (1997) 
starring Daniel Day Lewis; The Devil's Own (1997) starring: Harrison Ford & Brad Pitt; Bloody 
Sunday (2002) starring James Nesbitt. 
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is not capable of conducting damaging CNO at this time.29  Rathmell, Overhill, 
Valeri, & Gearson’s study, the IW Threat from Sub-State Groups: an 
Interdisciplinary Approach, concludes that there are a number of reasons why the 
PIRA may be reluctant to adopt CNO.  They claim that CNO as a tactic is not 
consistent with the PIRA’s ‘macho’ culture and self image.  The PIRA’s reputation 
espouses a perception of disciplined violence. They cite, “The Irish Republican 
movement places great store by, even glorifies in physical violence” (p.13).  
Secondly, they note that the sociological background and education level of the 
group is not conducive to use CNO.  Finally, they argue that the PIRA would 
probably not ‘contract-out’ free lance hackers to do the work due to operational 
security.  Security is of paramount importance to the PIRA survival, the terrorists 
are unlikely to risk their security unless the payoff is worth it.  Their study 
suggests that the payoff is not there, yet.   
Although not considered an aspect of CNO, the PIRA is more likely 
to use computer networks and advanced Information Technology (IT) to enable 
and enhance other aspects of their operations.  Command and control, public 
affairs, and psychological operations are three such areas. Michele Zanini 
suggests that most active terrorist organizations are undoubtedly becoming more 
comfortable with advance IT.  Terrorists routinely use cellular telephones and 
email to communicate.  They gain enormous flexibility, enabling them to disperse 
their cells and overcome state boundaries that often create obstacles to 
communication and travel.  Both active PIRA members and their sympathizers 
have established countless websites on the Internet, exploiting the world-wide 
connectivity of the Internet for perception management and propaganda.  The 
Sinn Féin website at http://sinnfein.ie/ serves as the main PIRA internet site for 
public affairs and perception management operations (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001, 
chapter 2).   
In February 1997, British newspapers reported that the PIRA had 
launched a massive propaganda campaign over the internet, including 
                                            
29 The Naval Postgraduate School White Paper Cyberterrorism provides further evidence 
supporting the inability of the PIRA to employ dangerous CNO. 
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instructions on how to make Molotov Cocktails to maximize the effects during 
riots and various pointers on counter-intelligence, crafting false identifications, 
forging documents, and creating disguises (NYU, 2003).   
 
d. OPSEC. 
Secrecy and operations security are absolutely critical to the 
survival of a covert terrorist organization.  The PIRA learned from experience that 
security originates from the organizational structure of the group.  Initially the 
PIRA operated in ‘Flying Columns’, which were essentially structured like a 
normal hierarchical military organization.  However, during what became known 
as the Kesh Prison Sting, the British conducted a covert deception operation, 
where they made the PIRA leaders believe they had been infiltrated.  The 
success of the British deception was profound.  The terrorists purged most of its 
top commanders and lieutenants and innovatively changed the predictable, 
regimented structure of their organization.  This new cell structure greatly 
increased the terrorists’ ability to operate securely and greatly diminished the 
British ability to infiltrate the organization.  The PIRA emerged as a “smarter and 
more determined organization” (Bowlin, 1999, p.91).  Figure 16 depicts the cell 
structure of the Provisional IRA. 
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Figure 16.   Provisional IRA Cell Structure by O’Brien, p.110 
The PIRA compartments the inner core (PIRA Army Council, Chief of 
Staff, and GHQ Staff) of the secret army from the operational arms (Northern and 
Southern Commands).  The Army Council, which is composed of seven men, 
authorizes, oversees, and initiates policy.  The Army Chief of Staff and the 
commanders of the Northern and Southern Commands implement the policy 
directives.  If a commander is arrested, a new one is immediately emplaced, 
which suggests that there is a pecking order among the leaders.  The basic 
tactical Cell is called, the Active Serve Unit (ASU). Each ASU cell is comprised of 
four PIRA members and is controlled by the Brigade or Command in their 
respective area.  “The cells are specialized into intelligence cells, sniping cells, 
executions, bombings, robberies etc” (O’Brien, 1993, p.109).  The Brigades or 
Commands, not the cells, control the storage and movement of weapons and 
explosives.   Covert and clandestine networks relay information, weapons, or 
other logistics to the ASU operatives as they near their targets.   To further 
enhance OPSEC the Commands often order their cells to conduct operations 
outside their own area (O’Brien, 1993, p.109). 
109
With the ever-present and highly technical British intelligence 
apparatus (MI5 and MI6) scouring Northern Ireland for possible leads on the 
terrorists, the PIRA depends greatly on operating in secrecy.   Bell describes 
“secrecy as integral, not an aspect of operations” (1995, p.28).  The PIRA has 
internalized OPSEC into a part of normal operating procedures.  “A gunman’s 
patterns’ of life are changed, life becomes a cover, each word, and every 
reaction is adjusted. Cover is not considered a secret, not even a tradecraft, but 
a given” (1995, p.28).  One of the more influential members, Danny Morrison 
served as the director of PIRA publicity.  He was able to operate publicly under a 
legal and acceptable cover, even while he conducted covert and illicit support for 
the PIRA.  He was finally arrested in Belfast for his involvement in the PIRA (Bell, 
1995, p.37). 
Lacking hi-tech solutions, the PIRA often relies on deception to 
assist in OPSEC.  In June 1996, the PIRA attacked Crossmaglen, the British 
Army base in South Armagh.  Being heavily fortified and guarded, the army base 
proved difficult to strike with the limited range of the PIRA mortars.  The PIRA 
deceptively overcame this by concealing a MK-15 ‘Barrackbuster’ mortar inside a 
hay bale.  The hale bale was then placed on the back of a tractor to make a 
close-quarter attack on the base.  The mortar was fired from a farmyard 150 
yards from the base and hit a British Lynx helicopter as it landed to resupply the 
soldiers (Geraghty, 1998, p.196).30  The mortar attack on 10 Downing Street in 
London also provides an example of deception enhancing PIRA OPSEC. 
 
e. Intelligence. 
Although Intelligence is not noted as a formal element of 
Information Operations, this thesis includes Intelligence as a vital enabler of IO.  
Without intelligence, it would be impossible to effectively attack or influence 
                                            
30 The MK-15 ‘Barrackbuster’ was about 1 meter long and delivered more than 150 pounds 
of home-made explosive.  The range was around 150 meters.  The bomb was also used against 
police and army bases in Ballygawley, Newry and Osnabruck in 1996 (Geraghty, p.194). 
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targets.  The PIRA has developed a far-reaching intelligence capability of passive 
and active gathers. 
1. Passive Intelligence Gatherers.  Bell suggests that the 
PIRA has established a huge intelligence network of passive supporters.  He 
states, “their friends, neighbors, and contacts make up a huge intelligence net, a 
net in place of those conscious of movement priorities, those often alert, silent, 
working without trace…” (1998,  p.196).  This connection with the local populace 
allows the terrorists to measure the ‘pulse’ of the local audience.  The PIRA is 
able to use the locals as a Measure of Effectiveness for the propaganda.  This 
also allows them to tailor their attacks, so as not to inflict more damage than the 
public will accept. Additionally, the passive supporters provide a continual source 
of current information about British activity and unit locations.  This information, 
although not always timely, is often enough to begin targeting a victim. 
 
2. Active Intelligence Gatherers.  When passive 
information gathering proves insufficient, especially when more information is 
needed on a specific target, underground leaders and decision-makers direct 
specific information gathering efforts in the form of active observation and 
surveillance (Bell, 1998, p.196).  ASUs, insiders, and active members serving as 
spies often conduct active intelligence gathering.  In the transition from passive to 
active information gathering, Bell notes, there are certain risks or costs assumed 
by the terrorist organization.  First, the terrorist incurs a certain risk of exposure.  
Active observation may expose the nature of pending operations to the other 
terrorist members and the authorities as well.  Second, the terrorist invites what 
Bell terms the “difficulty of precision,” the dangers associated with the relative 
lack of training and proficiency on the part of those tasked to conduct the 
surveillance (p.196).  This places an unexpected burden on the terrorist 
organization.  While most terrorist organizations are hampered in active 
observation by the relative lack of ability, many make up for it with creativity 
(p.200).  As Bell points out, “what is impressive is that for those, ill trained or not, 
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who are absolutely dedicated, completely focused on particular targets, that so 
much useful can be found”  (p.198). 
  An example of the IRA’s intelligence capability surfaced in early 
1979, when British and loyalist forces in Belfast initiated Operation Hawk, a major 
surveillance operation.  The British employed highly sophisticated electronic 
equipment, covert agents, and thoroughly supported the operation with 
intelligence analysts to track key IRA suspects. In March of 1979, the operation 
received a lucky break when a Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) checkpoint 
stopped a car carrying Brian Keenan, a high-level IRA operations officer. More 
significant than Keenan’s capture, however, was the discovery of his coded 
address book—a source that proved to be an intelligence windfall. In mid-June, 
based on analysis of Keenan’s coded notes, the British and RUC raided three 
houses in the Belfast area. The raids were an eye-opener for the British (Bell, 
1998, p. 197).   To the authorities’ amazement, the raid exposed a highly 
sophisticated terrorist intelligence operation. The Provisional IRA, it turned out, 
had been running its own surveillance on Operation Hawk and a number of other 
covert activities for more than six years. The Provos used military-style 
transmitters, specialized monitors, and even direction finding devices, all 
fabricated with components from Ulster Polytechnic and Grundig and Strathearn 
Audio (GSA) factories in Northern Ireland. IRA members in Belfast had also 
established wiretaps on several police telephones, which aided in thwarting 
police raids and gave them insight into future activities in the city requiring police 
assistance. The IRA even used equipment acquired from GSA to develop their 
own electronics factory, manufacturing sophisticated electronic devices and 
state-of-the-art radio detonators for IRA bombs (Bell, 1998, p. 198).  
 
Figure 17 illustrates the PIRA’s tactics and techniques, applied to the IO 
framework proposed in chapter III.  Evidence indicates that the terrorists have 
developed significant capability in each of Waltz’s information domains. 
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Figure 17.   PIRA Toolkit and Audiences 
 
C. BATTLE ANALYSES.  
This section briefly examines three separate PIRA operations that 
occurred during the Troubles: the 1972 assassination of Lord Mountbatten and 
ambush of 18 British paratroopers; the 1981 Bobby Sands hunger strike; and the 
1984 bombing of PM Margaret Thatcher.  Using our proposed IO framework, this 
section examines the PIRA activities listed above to provide evidence of the 
group’s use of IO.  Before examining the operations, the section presents an 
introduction to the time period known as the Troubles. 
The 1969 Battle of Bogside in Londonderry marks the beginning of the 
Troubles.  Tensions between Derry Catholics and the RUC were high throughout 
the summer of 1969 as the annual Protestant Apprentice Boys March 
approached.31 Sean Keenan, a PIRA veteran, knew that the Protestant marchers 
could be easily provoked into a fight.  He created several ‘street committees’ with 
                                            
31 “The previous month Sammy Devenney had died from injuries he received when RUC 
officers battered him in his own home. As 12 August approached there was an expectation that 
the march would trigger unprecedented violence” (BBC, History, 1999). 
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seven other PIRA members.  The committees then went about to plan for the 
defense of Bogside.  “Plans were laid to erect barricades at strategic points and 
Keenan announced that people were to defend themselves with ‘sticks, rocks, 
and the good old petrol bomb” (Taylor, p.63).  On 12 August, as the Protestants 
marched past the Catholic Bogside, an enormous crowd of Catholics converged, 
throwing rocks. The RUC intervened and, assisted by the Protestant marchers, 
charged at the nationalists. Within hours the rioting had escalated out of control. 
“The police were stoned and petrol bombed as they made their way in riot gear 
into the Bogside” (BBC, History, 1999). After 48 hours of continuous rioting the 
police were exhausted and British PM Wilson deployed troops to Londonderry. 
The British troops forcefully ended the riot, killing five Catholics.   
During the Londonderry riots, the PIRA and the Irish Civil Rights 
Association called on Catholics to revolt in other areas of Northern Ireland32 in 
order to pull RUC police and British soldiers out of Derry. “There was indeed 
some provocation by nationalists, since the strategy was to foment disturbances 
to draw police away from Derry” (Taylor, p.68).  On 14 August in Belfast, several 
hundred Catholic protestors were struck with a massive Protestant backlash.  
During the ensuing mass clash of Protestants and Catholics, RUC police 
responded with heavy weapons (.30 Browning machine guns).  Protestant 
crowds, shielded by British and RUC forces during the riots, emerged at night 
burning nearly 100 Catholic houses.  As described by Bell, the aggressive and 
often one-sided British responses to these riots encouraged the PIRA to move 
from a defensive campaign to an offensive one.  By employing strong-handed 
tactics to counter the disturbances, “the British Army largely transformed the 
rocks and riots of 1969 and 1970 into a very real, if low-intensity, war the 
following year, with snipers, car-bombs, shootouts in housing estates, and battles 
on the border” (1997, p.378).  During the riot in Belfast, Patrick Rooney, a nine-
year-old Catholic boy was hit and killed as he slept in his bed.  The RUC bullet 
had passed through two walls of the house before striking him in the head.  
                                            
32 Rioting broke out in Strabane, Lurgan, Dungannon, Coalisland, Newry, and most 
seriously, Belfast (Taylor, p.68). 
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“From that day forth, the Protestant onslaught entered nationalist folk history as 
the pogrom:” full scale sectarian terror (Taylor, p.69).   
 
1. 1972 Lord Mountbatten Assassination and Ambush of 18 
British Paratroopers. 
In August of 1972 the PIRA pulled off two very big operations: the 
assassination of Lord Mountbatten, Queen Elisabeth’s uncle and former viceroy 
to India, and the ambush of 18 British paratroopers along the border of Northern 
Ireland.  This section provides evidence that both of these attacks did enable the 
PIRA to conduct subsequent activities in the information environment.  The 
operations also suggest that the terrorists may select certain targets to influence 
specific audiences.  The attacks were intended to directly influence the active 
and sympathetic audiences in order to strengthen the PIRA’s status among the 
competing terrorist groups.  Evidence also suggests that the PIRA attempted to 
‘spin’ the message to other audiences, but had little success in achieving 
influence.  Figure 18 at the end of the section, illustrates the primary IO tools the 
PIRA employed, the target audiences, and the influence the terrorists leveraged.   
On Monday morning, 27 August in Mullaghmore, the PIRA assassinated 
Lord Mountbatten as he “went out on his thirty-foot boat, Shadow V, with his 
fourteen-year-old nephew, Lady Brabourne, and a young boatman” (Taylor, 
p.265).  The terrorists had planted a 50-pound bomb on the boat and detonated it 
remotely.  Everyone aboard died in the blast.  Since both boys and the lady were 
also killed during the operation, the PIRA received waves of negative publicity 
both locally in Ireland and internationally in Britain and the US.  Nevertheless, the 
PIRA attempted to make the best of the attack.  A Republican News article cited 
by Coogan had “…a photograph of Mountbatten with ‘Executed’ emblazoned 
across it, and a sneering half-page article signed by ‘the Brigadier’ described how 
the Queen took the news without a blink, merely informing the butler that ‘there 
would be one fewer for dinner’” (Coogan, 1994, p.361).  Although the terrorist 
propaganda had little influence in the opposing and uncommitted audiences, 
Wright proposes that the intent of the target was to “produce inward-looking 
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propaganda” (p.161).  She suggests that the assassination of Mountbatten by the 
Provisionals was designed to target active PIRA members and avid 
sympathizers.  Several paramilitary groups within Ireland struggled to gain 
support from their perspective populations (Catholic or Protestant).  Since the 
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) also vies for Catholic support and had 
recently assassinated Airey Neave, a conservative Protestant politician within the 
House of Commons, the PIRA needed to trump their spectacle and gain the 
public’s eye.   
Only hours after the Mountbatten assassination, the terrorists ambushed a 
three-truck convoy of British paratroopers from the 2nd Battalion Parachute 
Regiment.  The attack took place near Warrenpoint on the border with the Irish 
Republic and had been planned by the South Armagh Brigade under the 
direction of Northern Command (Taylor, p.296).   “A typical ASU, acting on local 
intelligence, used a double-trap ambush: one explosive device was planted in a 
truck to hit the British convoy and another in the ground where the survivors 
would likely take cover” (Bell, 2000, p.229).  As the convoy passed the truck, the 
PIRA remotely detonated the explosives, immediately killing six British paras and 
wounding several more.  “The explosives, estimated to be half a ton, were 
packed in milk churns and triggered by a remote control from the IRA’s vantage 
point across the water.  The mechanism was simple: a radio transmitter” (Taylor, 
p.266).  Under the fire of a PIRA sniper, the survivors of the blast ran for cover by 
the Gate Lodge of Narrow Water Castle.  Only a few minutes later the second 
explosion ripped through the Gate Lodge, killing twelve more paras including 
LTC David Blair, the Commanding Officer of the Queen’s Own Highlanders 
(Taylor, p.266).   
The attack on the British paratroopers was also primarily intended to 
influence the active and sympathetic audiences.  It was planned to avenge the 
deaths on Bloody Sunday when British paratroopers from the same regiment had 
gunned down 13 Catholic protestors in Derry.  Taylor writes, “To the Provisionals 
it was revenge for what the Paras had done on Bloody Sunday.  A slogan soon 
appeared on the wall opposite Sinn Féin’s HQ on the Falls Road in Belfast, 
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‘Thirteen gone and not forgotten-we got eighteen and Mountbatten” (Taylor, 
p.267).  PIRA propaganda also sent a message to the British government and 
army forces in the opposing audience.  Highlighting their persistence and 
dedication to the cause, the terrorists portrayed the attack as a continuation of 
the endless low-intensity war of attrition against the British.   British General 
Glover stated about the ambush, “arguably it was the most successful and 
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Figure 18.   PIRA Mountbatten and British Paratrooper attacks 
 
2. 1981 Hunger Strike at Maze Prison. 
The 1981 hunger strike and deaths of ten PIRA prisoners in Maze prison 
had profound consequences for Northern Ireland and the British government.  
The conservative government under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher took a 
hard, non-negotiable stance with the terrorists.  PM Thatcher refused to talk to 
the terrorists under any circumstances.  “Compromise was not in her vocabulary” 
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(Taylor, p.271).  She refused to recognize the terrorists as anything more than 
criminals and denied them any concessions toward ending the strike.  Her 
intransigence during the event provided the PIRA a platform from which they 
launched a propaganda war, transforming nine murdering terrorists into Irish 
icons.   Bell asks, “how could the weak and criminal shape communication so 
that the legitimate and legal lost” (2000, p.210)?   
This section provides evidence that the slow, painful death of Bobby 
Sands and nine other terrorist prisoners did enable the PIRA to conduct activities 
in the information environment.  The section highlights the IRA’s skillful use of 
perception management and propaganda to address multiple audiences, 
swaying not only local opinion in Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic, but also 
the opinion of the international community.33  Peter Taylor quotes Gabriel 
Megahey, the PIRA weapons dealer in America, “the hunger strike had the effect 
of re-awakening an Irish American giant: an Anglophobic one” (p.10).  The PIRA 
exploited the actions and inactions of the British government to achieve active 
support in the nationalist areas of Northern Ireland.   After the deaths, political 
support for Sinn Fein dramatically increased in two elections (Northern Ireland 
and in the Irish Republic) transforming the party from a militant armed sect to a 
significant political force in Ireland.34   Regionally, this surge in political support 
for Sinn Fein and the real threat that the party might overtake the Social 
Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP) as the main representative of the Catholic 
population in Northern Ireland, created great political pressure on PM Thatcher to 
intervene in Irish politics. As a result the British government signed the Anglo-
Irish Agreement in 1985, granting the Irish republic greater political authority in 
Northern Ireland.  Figure 19 at the end of the section, illustrates the primary IO 
tools the PIRA employed, the target audiences, and the influence the terrorists 
leveraged. 
                                            
33 The London Times reported “a survey of 73 newspapers around the world since Bobby 
Sands began his hunger strike on 1 March, showed the world opinion shifting toward the IRA” 
(Two killed in violence in ulster, Boston Globe, 1 June 1981, p.10).   
34 Support for Sinn Fein grew from zero to 13.4% of the whole vote inside Northern Ireland.  
They received up to 40% of the Catholic vote and seriously challenged the SDLP, the leading 
Irish party in Northern Ireland (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ira/conflict/hunger)   
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On 1 March 1981, Bobby Sands, the PIRA leader in Long Kesh ‘Maze’ 
prison, reinstated a hunger strike after the British breached an agreement to 
grant the prisoners special political status.35  With no shortage of volunteers, 
Sands selected PIRA men, who geographically, represented the whole of 
Northern Ireland to join the second hunger strike.  Aware of the uncompromising 
position of PM Thatcher toward terrorists, the PIRA skillfully exploited the 
agonizing deaths of Bobby Sands and the other terrorist members through an 
intensive perception management campaign.  The PIRA selected the order that 
the prisoners would begin their strike at staggered intervals.  Sands believed that 
this would incite maximum support for their cause and put pressure on PM 
Thatcher.  As the hunger strike developed, it increasingly became a personal 
showdown between the ‘Iron Lady’ and the ‘Iron Men’ (Taylor, p.277).  Sands 
refused to eat for 66 days, finally falling into coma and dying.  Sands’ death and 
the subsequent starvation of nine other PIRA prisoners became an international 
spectacle, capturing the attention of the world.  “International interest in the 
hunger strike was intense. International media poured in from all over the world” 
(Moloney, p.209).   
Sinn Fein, PIRA activists and supporters crafted an information attack 
using all three of Waltz’s domains to influence major portions of all four 
audiences.   
Bobby Sands exploited the physical domain by sacrificing himself for the 
cause.  As his body deteriorated through his 66 day fast, finally falling into a 
coma and then death, Sands provided images (B-Roll) for the media.  The 
images had long-lasting psychological affect on all audiences.  For the active and 
extreme parts of the sympathetic audiences, “Sand’s photograph, a flattering 
portrait showing a good-looking, long-haired youth, became a symbol of 
revolution” (Moloney, p.209).  In Tehran a street was named after him, as was 
one in New York.  For the uncommitted and opposing audiences his physical 
                                            
35 Special category or political status included five demands: the right or IRA prisoners to 
wear civilian clothes; the right to freely associate within a block of cells; the right not to do prison 
work; the right to educational and recreational facilities; and the restoration of lost remission of 
sentences (http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/summary.htm). 
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appearance served to protest against the treatment of PIRA members as 
criminals in prison; he saw his efforts other than criminal.  The PIRA was able to 
exploit PM Thatcher’s public statements stridently referring to the terrorists 
seeking political status as mere criminals.  They were able to infer that she had 
absolutely no understanding of the Irish political psyche. 
The PIRA exploited the information infrastructure domain through many 
sympathetic and uncommitted networked organizations such as: NORAID, Sinn 
Fein, and the US media.  The Irish Diaspora (active and sympathetic audiences) 
all over the world became more committed to the nationalists’ cause.  
“Demonstrations took place in New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and many cities 
in the US.  In New York, NORAID supporters mounted a picket outside the British 
consulate on Third Avenue that lasted for years” (Moloney, p.209).  International 
(uncommitted audience) interest in the hunger strike was intense.    An article in 
the Chicago Tribune read, “Reagan should act on Ulster” urging the US 
President to take action against PM Thatcher (Chicago Tribune, 5 October 1981).  
After Cardinal Terence Cooke from New York appealed to PM Thatcher to end 
the hunger strike, an article appeared in the Chicago Tribune entitled “IRA 
brutalities, Terrorist propaganda triumphs”.  It reported that the IRA was winning 
a massive propaganda war in Northern Ireland with world opinion.  The article 
read, “The IRA has done it.  They have snookered not only Cardinal Cooke and 
much of the US news media, but nearly all Irish-American Catholics into backing 
their cause… they swallow IRA propaganda as if it were taffy” (9 May 1981) 
The PIRA fought a war of perception and profoundly shaped the 
perceptual domain through the actions already mentioned in the physical and 
information infrastructure domains.  The terrorists flew relatives of the hunger 
strikers to the US to make guest appearances on local and network television 
news and talk shows in New York, Chicago, Boston, and Philadelphia.  The ten-
year-old daughter of Joseph McDonald’, one of the hunger strikers, appeared on 
Good Morning America to plead for Americans to help to save her daddy (NYU, 
2003).  The PIRA campaign successfully transformed the murdering terrorists, 
who had decided to kill themselves in protest, into martyrs, heroes, and 
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revolutionaries.  The active audience gained cohesion from the event, rallying 
behind Bobby Sands; while the opposition British audience was ridiculed for its 
inhumane uncompromising actions.  The uncommitted sympathetic audiences 
either ‘swallowed the propaganda like taffy’ and became actively sympathetic, or 
saw through the propaganda and became opposed.   
Bobby Sands’ funeral supplied the PIRA with their most spectacular 
propaganda opportunity.  It was noted as the largest political demonstration in 
Irish history.  Tens of thousands of nationalists poured in from all over Ireland to 
pay homage to Bobby Sands, the dead IRA man who rapidly assumed an iconic 
status (Moloney, p.209).  The Provos organized monster demonstrations, 
parades, and posters; and orchestrated a symbolic funeral that successfully 
transformed Sands into an Irish Martyr (Bell, 2000, p.147).  The PIRA actually 
built a grandstand for all the international photographers.  At one point, CBS 
News had seven television camera crews in Northern Ireland reporting on the 
Hunger strike (PBS, 2003).  In total over 100,000 people attended the funeral 
procession, which was led by a bagpipe and drum band with the coffin flanked by 
a black-clad guard of honor. The enormous funeral procession and ceremony 
was televised worldwide, broadcasting the event to millions of people.  
Newspapers, journals, and other publications added to the notoriety of the PIRA 
plight and English brutality.  Poems and ballads enriched the already lengthy 
PIRA history, providing many new recruits and influencing international 
audiences for the Irish cause.  
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Figure 19.   PIRA Bobby Sands hunger strike 
   
 
3. 1984 Bombing of Prime Minster Thatcher. 
In 1984, three years after the death of Bobby Sands, the PIRA attempted 
to get revenge.  The terrorists planted a time-phase bomb in one of the walls 
inside the Brighton Hotel in London, where Prime Minister Thatcher and the 
heads of her conservative party were hosting a convention.  This section 
provides evidence that the attack did enable the PIRA to conduct subsequent 
activities in the information environment.  Evidence further suggests that the 
terrorists may select certain targets to influence specific audiences.  Although PM 
Thatcher narrowly escaped being blown up, the PIRA skillfully exploited the story 
with propaganda and ‘spin’.  By taking the attack to the UK mainland, the 
terrorists specifically targeted the opposition and uncommitted audiences in 
Britain.  PIRA propaganda attempted to blame PM Thatcher for the attack, 
promoting “what the British government and British people have to realize is that 
122
what they are doing leads to this type of action” (Wright, p.94).  Figure 20 at the 
end of the section, illustrates the primary IO tools the PIRA employed, the target 
audiences, and the influence the terrorists leveraged. 
On 12 October 1984, the PIRA attempted to assassinate PM Margaret 
Thatcher at a Conservative Party convention in the Brighton Hotel.  Although the 
attack failed to kill PM Thatcher, the deceptive bomb emplacement, technological 
ingenuity, and audacious target selection captured international media attention 
and moved the terrorists again into the spotlight (McGuire, 1973, p.62).  The 
terrorists deceptively hid the bomb inside a wall next to PM Thatcher’s room 
several weeks before the convention.  The patchwork on the wall successfully 
concealed the bomb during the sweep by the British security team.  The PIRA 
incorporated a detonation timing devise powered by a computer microchip, 
making the bomb less detectable and the detonation time extremely accurate. 
The attack provided the PIRA a platform from which to launch a very effective 
propaganda attack.     
After the bomb detonated and the London press reported that PM 
Thatcher was alive but severely shaken, the PIRA exploited the physical attack 
with intense propaganda.  An Phoblacht/Republican News and other nationalist 
media in Ireland quickly picked the story up and provided a PIRA perspective.  
Directly targeting the opposing audience, the terrorists publicly warned Mrs. 
Thatcher and all other government officials through several news media.  An 
article from the Manchester Guardian International on 21 October 1984, read, 
“today we were unlucky, but remember that we only have to be lucky once- you 
on the other hand will have to be lucky always” (Hoffman, p.182).  The 
propaganda portrayed the vulnerability of the British security system in the UK 
and the determination of the Irish terrorists.  PM Thatcher’s ‘political weight’ 
ensured that the international media headlined the story, broadcasting the event 
to the rest of the world.  Bell describes the IRA’s influence on the opposing 
audience, “In Britain no cabinet member can open a hotel room door without 
recalling the bomb that nearly killed PM Thatcher, or drive into the parking lot at 
Westminster without realizing that there too a bomb went off- and killed Airey 
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Neave, Thatcher’s representative Tory for Northern Ireland”  (Bell, 1995, p.36).  
In an attempt to influence the perception of the sympathetic audience toward 
Britain, Sinn Fein blamed the attack on the British government and its continued 
oppressive occupation of Ireland.  Gerry Adams publicly described the attack as 
“an inevitable result of the British occupation of the six counties” (Wright, p.94).  
Finally, the PIRA influenced the active audience with two primary messages.  
First the attack was presented as direct revenge on PM Thatcher.  Many of the 
nationalists still held her solely responsible for the death of Bobby Sands and the 
hunger strikers in 1981.  Second, the PIRA successfully struck the Prime Minister 
on UK soil.  The audacity of the attack strengthened the terrorists’ image, 
emboldening the members’ belief in the organization and gaining the respect of 
other paramilitary groups.   
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This chapter introduced the Provisional Irish Republican Army, a direct 
descendent of the Official IRA, an existing organization with decades of 
knowledge and experience.  The brief historical overview developed a general 
understanding of the (Catholic-Protestant) sectarian violence and the deep-
rooted hatred that many Irish Catholics have toward the British.  The chapter 
presented the constraints and opportunities facing the PIRA operating in Ireland.  
Local and international opinion has created the need to moderate the amount of 
violence, and the terrorists apparently have successfully determined the 
threshold of violence that is acceptable.  Since the PIRA is no where near military 
parity with the British, they rely heavily on actions in the information environment 
to achieve their objective.  The terrorists’ goal of re-unifying Ireland under Irish 
control is based on their contesting the existence of Northern Ireland.  They claim 
that “the British guaranteed Northern Irish entity denies the Irish people their 
inalienable right to national self-determination” (Wright, p.227).  In all aspects of 
PIRA propaganda the dominant theme is to portray Britain as the single and root 
cause of all the problems in Ireland (Wright, p.216).   
 
2. IO Toolkit. 
Evidence from the chapter suggests that the PIRA have developed a fairly 
diverse IO toolkit containing many of the principle elements of IO discussed in 
chapters II and III.  The terrorists skillfully blend elements of IO into their tactical 
operations to help overcome British intelligence and counter-terrorist defenses.  
Sinn Féin is quite possibly the greatest PA / propaganda asset available to the 
terrorists for achieving political negotiations.  Gerry Adams has legally 
represented the terrorists’ goals and motives in negotiations with Protestant and 
British leaders, including British Prime Ministers.  He has also entertained 
international leaders such as US President Clinton and George W. Bush.  The 
front organizations such as NORAID and the Irish-American associations provide 
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the group direct access to the US populace and often generated sympathy for 
the PIRA movement.  With the advent of the Internet, many legal media outlets 
for the PIRA (An Phoblacht, Irish Times, Irish People, etc.) have the ability to 
distribute their messages world wide. 
  
3. Information Environment. 
Although the PIRA’s toolkit appears well-equipped, evidence suggests that 
they may have an even more profound understanding of the information 
environment.  The chapter examined how the terrorists managed to ‘spin’ their 
messages to influence multiple different audiences (opposing, uncommitted, 
sympathetic, and active).  The perceptions of each audience varied and was 
shaped by applying the right mix of influences in the information domains 
(physical, information infrastructure, and perceptual).   
The Mountbatten and Thatcher operations primarily targeted the opposing 
audience.  Oftentimes, the PIRA selected people in the opposing audience as 
targets specifically for the influence that their death or near death will bring about.  
The targets were selected to intimidate, provoke, and destabilize the audience 
opposing the terrorist organization.   
The PIRA’s operations during the civil-rights protests in the 1970s and 
subsequent defense of the Catholics after the Battle of Bogside, primarily 
targeted the uncommitted audience.  The terrorists’ goal was to portray PIRA as 
the defender of the Catholics in Northern Ireland, who were being persecuted by 
the Protestants and the British.  The more the PIRA could force increased British 
and RUC responses, both armed force and legislation/policy, the more they could 
claim the state as oppressive and in crisis.  “The provos have been waging a 
sectarian campaign which knows no off season and which is calculated to bring 
violent reaction from loyalists” (Wright, p.101).   
Although the Sands’ operation influenced all four audiences greatly, it 
dramatically affected the sympathetic audience. The broad propaganda themes 
directed at the sympathetic audience was intended to rally increased support for 
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their cause, making the ‘sea’ of sympathizers as deep as possible.  By portraying 
themselves as political prisoners, the PIRA prevented the public from perceiving 
them as criminals.  The terrorists presented the British uncompromising actions 
as wrong and unjust and thereby portrayed British presence in Ireland as wrong 
and unjust.  Sinn Féin represented the terrorists as a popular political force in 
Ireland, and served as the primary conduit to the sympathetic audience.  Gerry 
Adams appealed mainly to the “Roman Catholic communities in Belfast, 
Londonderry, and the border areas” (Wright, p.118). 
The ambush of the 18 British paratroopers, the mortar attack on PM 
Major’s residence, and the Brighton bombing of PM Thatcher appealed greatly to 
the active audience.  All three attacks attempted to avenge the deaths of PIRA 
members and supporters by directly striking out against British targets on UK 
soil.  PIRA propaganda themes targeted the active audience in an attempt to 
isolate them from the rest of society.  It attempted to reinforce the volunteers’ 
morale by leveraging the groups’ ethnic and religious background to counter 
British propaganda and by reiterating the inevitability of victory. Often the 
audacious attacks and advanced technology appealed to potential recruits 
(Wright, p160).  
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VI. CONCLUSION  
Al-Qa’ida’s attacks on September 11th shook the US from its post-Cold 
War slumber and introduced a new asymmetric threat to its interests and security 
within its borders.  Nichiporuk and Builder (1995), leading Rand analysts, 
forecasted this new threat in his book Information Technologies and the Future of 
Land Warfare.  They suggest that non-state actors may well be the enemies of 
tomorrow, not conventional military forces from nation-states.  Nichiporuk and 
Builder suggest that the information revolution is changing the nature of conflict, 
and contends that  
“even though the revolution is a technological one, the changes it 
will bring to warfare will not be mostly in the form of new 
technology.  Instead, it is altering the actors on the stage, the 
audience that can watch, and hence, the objectives of conflict.  
Non-state actors are seeing their relative strength on the 
international stage increase. They will certainly not be able to 
militarily challenge nation states on equal footing, but they also will 
not challenge a nation-state in the same way that another nation-
state would” (p.83). 
Understanding how this terrorist threat exploits information to influence US 
policy and decisions is crucial if the US hopes to combat this foe in the 
information environment.  The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the use of 
Information Operations by two different terrorist organizations and determine how 
they employ Information Operations to achieve their strategic objectives.  
Evidence from the study suggests that terrorists, by design, rely upon an 
information strategy to achieve their objectives.  They lack military parity with the 
state and therefore cannot rely upon physical attacks to achieve their objectives. 
The physical violence from terrorists is the most obvious form of influence they 
wield against states.  Terrorists use this overt violence to enable operations in 
the information environment because they lack resources and military parity.  
Terrorists use IO as a force multiplier to overcome this parity and challenge a 
state.  In this manner Information Operations serves as the supported activity to 
achieve the terrorists’ objectives.  
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A. SYNOPSIS. 
The thesis constructed an argument that an IO perspective has a great 
deal of explanatory power when examining terrorist operations.  The study 
established this argument through a logical process.  First, it integrated a 
generally accepted IO theory and military doctrine to form a fundamental 
framework.  Second, the study incorporated the application of IO elements used 
by terrorists with the framework, developing the IO framework to be consistent 
with the terrorists’ tactics, techniques, and procedures.  Third, the thesis applied 
the IO framework to two different terrorist organizations as evidence that this 
perspective is indeed appropriate.   This section provides a synopsis describing 
how we constructed our argument and serves to segue into the conclusions of 
the thesis. 
 
1. Basic IO Framework. 
Terrorist organizations do not maintain publications on how to use IO nor 
do they typically recognize IO as a concept of operations.  Thus, the thesis 
explored US military doctrine and Edward Waltz’s IO perspective to establish a 
fundamental understanding of IO to be applied to terrorist organizations.  US 
doctrine prescribes the principle elements of IO used in the study: PSYOP, 
Deception, OPSEC, EW, CNO, PA, and CMO.  Doctrine provides historical 
evidence that these elements, when incorporated into a strategy, create a 
synergy and can profoundly influence human decisions and actions.  Next, the 
thesis examined Waltz’s perspective of IO, first by providing an explanation of the 
role of information in conflict and then by exploring the three conceptual domains 
in his operational model of IO activities.  Waltz’s information models established 
a fundamental perspective, illustrating how elements of IO can shape the 
domains of the information environment and influence an adversary’s perception 
and decisions in conflict.  Figure 21 illustrates how the thesis incorporated the 
principle elements of IO from US doctrine into Waltz’s fundamental perspective, 
producing a useful framework to explore terrorist organizations. 
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Figure 21.   Basic IO Framework  
 
2. Terrorist IO Framework. 
Since terrorist organizations are illegal and covert organizations by nature 
and are likely to approach IO differently than the US military, the thesis further 
developed the framework in order to explore the terrorist case studies.  To 
accomplish this goal the thesis examined works by several well-known terrorist 
authors to highlight the asymmetries of terrorist organizations that can have an 
impact on how terrorists employ IO.  By applying insights offered by J. Bowyer 
Bell into the internal and external security pressures facing terrorists, the thesis 
highlighted the dilemma most terrorist organizations face.  Terrorists must remain 
underground, hidden from the state’s counter terrorist forces, yet they must also 
emerge from the underground and overtly appeal to the state and population for 
legitimacy and respect.  Terrorist use IO to overcome this dilemma. The thesis 




a. Destruction in the Physical Environment Enables 
Information Operations.  
The terrorists’ information strategy employs limited activities in the 
physical environment for the primary purpose of capturing the eye of the media 
and the attention of their target audience.  The terrorists then exploit these 
physical attacks with PSYOP, propaganda, and other elements of their IO toolkit. 
Terrorist IO serves as the supported activity (the main effort), providing the 
terrorist the ability to influence the perception of the local and international public 
and the state’s decision makers.  The violent action serves as the supporting 
activity that enables subsequent actions in the information environment.  Most 
terrorists realize that there is a threshold of violence that the population will 
tolerate and accept.  If the physical attack causes too much damage, the 
terrorists risk alienating themselves from the public and possibly causing a 
massive crackdown by the state.  This threshold of violence in the physical 
environment is precisely why terrorist IO is inverted to the US military’s approach 
to IO.  Unlike the military, the terrorists lack the resources and the ability to 
sustain actions in the physical environment, and therefore rely on success in the 
information environment, where the majority of operations occur.  They cannot 
hope to degrade the state’s military enough to generate concessions from the 
state.  Rather, terrorists must attempt to subvert the states military strength by 
shaping the perception of the state’s populace to support their cause an by 
pressuring the government to negotiate.  
 
b. Offensive – Defensive IO. 
Terrorist organizations integrate offensive and defensive IO 
naturally to overcome the legitimacy dilemma described earlier by Bell.   
Terrorists employ elements of IO defensively to remain covert and ensure the 
group is secure.  Unlike the US military, which often employs elements of 
OPSEC and deception as minor considerations to an operation, the terrorists 
have incorporated these elements defensively as part of normal operating 
procedures.  Offensively, the terrorists integrate elements from their IO toolkit to 
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exploit the activity in the physical environment.  Offensive IO serves as a force 
multiplier in the terrorists’ quest to gain respect and legitimacy.  The terrorist 
must appear legitimate and powerful in order to negotiate with the state and gain 
support from the populace. 
 
c. Audiences. 
  Terrorist organizations that understand the power of the 
information environment develop what we recognize as IO tools to exploit it.   
This is evidenced by the PIRA’s advanced toolkit consisting of political, 
economic, and military capabilities.  Terrorist organizations employ elements of 
their IO toolkit to leverage information and shape the perceptions of different 
audiences.  The primary goal is to influence the specific audience in a manner 
that supports the terrorist’s cause.   Applying insight offered by Joanne Wright 
(1990), the thesis outlined the four audiences available to terrorist influence: 
opposing, uncommitted, sympathetic, and active.  Figure 22 incorporates the four 
audiences into the IO Framework, illustrating the power held in the information 
domains to influence different audiences.   
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Figure 22.   Terrorist IO Framework   
 
1. Opposing Audience.  Since members of the opposing 
audience are generally the hardest to gain support or sympathy from, they are 
optimal immediate targets for physical violence.  Terrorist propaganda targets the 
opposing audience in an attempt to challenge the state’s legitimacy and ability to 
provide safety for its citizens.  
 
2. Uncommitted Audience.  Through local and 
international media, terrorists capture the attention of the uncommitted audience 
and attempt to inform them of the terrorist’s cause.  Ultimately they attempt to 
convince uncommitted members that the state is evil and oppressive.   
 
3. Sympathetic Audience.  Terrorist propaganda 
attempts to gain support and backing from the sympathetic audience.  The 
sympathizers often serve as safe havens for the terrorists and provide protection 
and intelligence for their operations.  Most new terrorist members are recruited 
from the sympathetic audience.    
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4. Active Audience.  Auto propaganda targets the active 
audience to ensure they remain committed to the organization.  Active members 
are generally isolated from outside influences and hear only propaganda that 
supports the cause. 
The terrorist’s ability to target their message and successfully influence 
the targeted audience depends on the terrorist’s intelligence network and the 
tools available in their IO toolkit.  For effective targeting, intelligence about each 
audience is crucial to determine the cultural, political, and economic factors that 
are relevant to the audience.  The intelligence network is generally comprised of 
active and sympathetic members living in the population.  This network provides 
the terrorists a direct link to the populace and provides a way to measure the 
effectiveness of their information campaign.  The terrorists IO toolkit provides the 
means to influence the different audiences.   
 
3. Application of IO Framework to Terrorist Organizations. 
The thesis adapted the IO framework to two terrorist organizations, Al-
Qa’ida and the Provisional IRA, to provide evidence that the IO perspective is 
useful in analyzing terrorist operations.  The study provided brief historical 
backgrounds, introducing the two non-state terrorist organizations.  This was 
important to develop the goals, means, and operating environments pertaining to 
each group.   The study then illustrated the IO tactics, techniques, and 
procedures of each group that made up their IO toolkit.  Figure 23 illustrates the 
IO framework applied to Al-Qa’ida’s 9/11 attack against the US and Figure 24 







a. Al-Qa’ida Framework 
Figure 23 illustrates the IO framework applied to Al-Qa’ida’s attack 
against the US on September 11th, 2001.  Chapter IV describes in detail how Al-
Qa’ida employs elements of its IO toolkit to achieve influence in multiple 
audiences.   
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b. PIRA Framework 
Figure 24 illustrates the IO framework applied to the PIRA’s 1981 
Maze prison hunger strike.  Chapter V describes in detail how the PIRA employs 
elements of its IO toolkit to achieve influence in multiple audiences.   
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Figure 24.   PIRA Hunger Strike IO Framework 
 
B. CONCLUSIONS.  
Terrorist organizations are militarily weaker than the states they face and 
cannot rely solely on physical attacks to accomplish their goals.  Their covert, 
illegal nature forces them to engage in psychological warfare and drives them to 
using IO as their primary type of operation (a supported function).   
Generally speaking, all terrorists employ elements of IO tactically to 
enable the success of their strategic operations.  However, the terrorist’s ability to 
manipulate information is a reflection of their understanding of the information 
environment and likely has direct influence on the IO toolkit they assemble.   
Evidence suggests that terrorists rely upon an information strategy 
primarily because they don’t have any other choice.  Since they are not at military 
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parity with the state, they must attempt to subvert the state’s strength by 
targeting its populace.  However, as a terrorist organization nears military parity 
with a state or perceives it is nearing parity, terrorists may be likely to rely more 
on destruction in the physical environment as the supported activity and less on 
IO to shape the information environment.   Terrorists may perceive themselves 
nearing parity through the inactions or impotence of state responses to their 
attacks.  The operating environment and intense British presence in Ireland has 
prevented the PIRA from perceiving that they are nearing military parity with 
Britain.  The terrorists therefore have continued to rely upon IO as the supported 
activity.  Al-Qa’ida on the other hand, may have moved IO to a supporting role 
during their attacks on 9/11.  Usama bin Laden’s perception may have been 
shaped during the previous decade with impotent attacks by the Clinton 
administration.  Perhaps he perceived he was invulnerable to US attack in the 
Hindukush Mountains, secluded in the Taliban safe haven.  Usama bin Laden 
may have relied too heavily upon actions in the physical environment to gain his 
objectives. 
By applying the IO framework to terrorist organizations, the thesis 
provided evidence that taking an IO perspective to terrorist operations is 
appropriate.  The framework may prove useful in developing a new approach to 
counter-terrorism policy by showing how terrorist use IO and the extent of the 
synchronization of the individual elements, giving a sense of what use is 
deliberate or inherent. It is possible to develop a pre-emptive or minimizing 
counter-terrorism strategy based on the understanding of the influence process 
and terrorist strategy of minimal actions in the physical environment to gain 
maximum benefit in the information environment. A strategy could deny or 
degrade terrorists’ benefits from their physical attacks or counter their intended 
influence of select audiences, essentially altering the environment the terrorist 






C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH. 
 As one of the first examinations of how terrorists integrate IO into their 
operations, this thesis merely opens the door to this subject.  In doing so, 
however, it exposes a number of related subjects that require further study. 
 
1. Terrorist target selection process. 
This thesis highlighted the fact that terrorists often select targets for 
physical destruction in order to achieve influence in a particular audience.  
Further research may provide insight into this targeting process that terrorists use 
to select their targets, improving the effectiveness of defensive operations. 
 
2. Application of IO Framework to Other Types of Terrorist 
Organizations. 
Although we suspect our findings to be broadly applicable, further 
research is needed to apply the IO framework proposed in this thesis to other 
types of terrorist organizations such as religious sects, Leftist extremist groups, 
and Marist revolutionary movements.  Additionally, we limited our case selection 
to only open-source unclassified sources.  Since many aspects of Information 
Operations deal with relatively sensitive topics, there is presumably a wealth of 
information to be found from classified sources.  Further research is needed to 
explore the classified holdings for more evidence supporting the IO perspective 
of analyzing terrorist operations. 
 
3. Counter-Terrorism Strategy. 
Further research using the IO framework proposed in this thesis could 
help to develop a pre-emptive counter-terrorism strategy based on the terrorist 
use of Information Operations to support their objectives. A strategy could focus 
on interrupting, delaying, denying, or degrading actions at critical points (i.e. 
physical attack, media use) in order to alter their operating environment.  
Alternately, specific actions in the information environment could be conducted 
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LIST OF ACRONYMS 
AQ-al-Qa’ida 
CMO-civil military operations  
CNA-computer network attack 
CIA-Central Intelligence Agency 
CND-computer network defense 
CNE-computer network exploitation 
CNO-computer network operations 
DF-directional finding 
DOD-Department of Defense 
DDOS-distributed denial of service 
DOS-denial of service 
ETA- Bask Separatist Movement (Spain) 
EW-electronic warfare 






IRA-Irish Republican Army 







PFLP-Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
PIRA-Provisional Irish Republican Army 




SOF-special operations forces 
UAV-unmanned aerial vehicle 
UBL-Usama bin Laden 
US-United States 
WMD-weapons of mass destruction 
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